VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0534/01 0721207
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 131207Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5069
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000534 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 
WEEK ENDING MARCH 10 
 
This is CWC-23-06. 
 
--------------------------- 
P-5 MEETING ON UNIVERSALITY 
--------------------------- 
 
¶1.  (U) Russia hosted a March 7 meeting of the P-5 
ambassadors.  The Director General made a presentation on 
universality-related efforts of the OPCW.  He noted that much 
has been achieved, membership now stands at 178 states, and 
the organization rapidly is being faced with approaches to 
just the hard cases: Angola, North Korea, Syria, Egypt, and 
Israel, whose adherence is of critical importance to achieve 
the objective and purpose of the CWC.  States believed close 
to adherence are the Bahamas, Central African Republic, 
Comorros Islands, and the Congo.  Angola is particularly 
difficult and is nowhere close to joining.  The DG noted he 
had a good meeting on January 24 with the Angolan Foreign 
Minister, but results since then have been lacking. 
 
¶2.  (U) The DG reported that in Asia, Myanmar is showing good 
signs and is actively interacting with the Technical 
Secretariat.  However, historically, Myanmar always appears 
 
SIPDIS 
receptive but like Prometheus' rock, it always falls back 
down the hill.  Iraq possibly will join soon.  The TS 
training for Iraq has been successful, but it needs to fully 
understand CWC requirements.  North Korea is the hardest case 
of all: it has no interest in communications with the TS; it 
has never responded to TS initiatives.  The DG will continue 
his efforts, focusing on his visit to the UNGA to try to meet 
with the ambassador from North Korea. 
 
¶3.  (U) The DG noted that States Party must avoid 
legitimizing the Middle East stand off.  SPs must actively 
engage the non-SPs, whether by demarche or other means, and 
have not done enough to assist.  Slow progress is being made, 
via the Mediterranean workshops.  The DG met with the 
Egyptian Foreign Minister during his Africa trip.  The 
Egyptian Ambassador in The Hague requested a meeting with the 
DG, where they discussed the possibility that Egypt might 
send an observer to Executive Council or Conference of States 
Parties meetings or OPCW workshops.  Under discussion was how 
Egypt might increase its presence generally.  The DG reported 
that he has had no recent contacts with Lebanon or Syria. 
The DG noted that he had been invited as a guest speaker to 
an April 3 WMD-related meeting at Hebrew University in Israel 
where he will take the opportunity to press Israel regarding 
its accession. 
 
¶4.  (U) With respect to the Mediterranean workshop schedule 
for June 2006, the DG reported that he had been waiting for a 
response from the Turkish ambassador regarding Ankara's 
willingness to host the meeting.  Unfortunately, he received 
a firm no on March 6, and the TS had no alternate venues 
under consideration. 
 
¶5.  (U) The P-5 ambassadors thanked the DG for his 
presentation, and stressed the importance of adequately 
preparing the Mediterranean workshop.  Finding an alternate 
venue with a view towards a meeting in June would not be 
practical, recommending the second half of the year instead. 
The DG agreed, but the schedule is very full, making that 
time period impractical.  The DG suggested March 2007 as an 
alternative, expressing his hope that Turkey might be willing 
to play host at that time.  The DG further noted that the TS 
would need three to four months to prepare the workshop.  The 
UK and Russia commented that it would be best to keep 
pressure on Egypt, to keep the process moving.  China also 
stated that Egypt will be the key to Middle East accessions. 
(After the DG departed, China remarked that the DG is overly 
optimistic about Egypt's willingness to join the Convention. 
The P-5 ambassadors agreed to consider meeting the Egyptian 
ambassador in The Hague, to keep up the pressure.) 
 
¶6.  (U) China noted that it is important to continue pressing 
Myanmar, regretting the recent EU/ASEAN splits in decisions 
affecting Myanmar.  China urged the EU to reconsider.  It is 
important to take a cautious approach and not give up too 
soon.  The UK responded that the OPCW is a small piece of the 
 
complex issues that arise from the military government.  EU 
members hold strong opinions about the Myanmar government, 
and change in policy is unlikely.  China retorted that when 
the target is the regime itself, no communication is possible 
with the government.  This is beyond Beijing's comprehension; 
Myanmar must be part of the ASEAN summit. 
 
¶7.  (U) France noted the importance of regional groups such 
as SADEC in any effort to pressure Angola to join the CWC. 
Especially if the other African states adhere in the 
near-term, Angola will feel the pressure.  This also would 
make the situation more uncomfortable for Egypt. 
 
¶8.  (U) Finally, the ambassadors briefly discussed the 
upcoming March 10 consultation on rationalization of the EC, 
chaired by the Russian ambassador.  Russia noted it had 
tried, without success, to find a facilitator, so that the 
meeting would be more of a brainstorming session. 
Delegations noted concerns over the South African proposals, 
which may not have come up recently but could arise in the 
future.  Items should not be carelessly taken off the EC work 
program.  There is no cost to leaving items on the list.  The 
alternative might result in endless discussion, distracting 
delegations from the real work of the EC. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
INDUSTRY CONSULTATIONS - GENERAL DISCUSSION 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) The vice-chair for the industry cluster, Ambassador 
Guillermo Fernandez de Soto (Colombia) chaired this session, 
with Bill Kane, head of the Industry Verification Branch, 
directing the TS input.  In his opening remarks, de Soto 
stated that the purpose of this meeting was "to give new 
impetus to this cluster."  Mohamed Daoudi (IVB) made a 
presentation on past achievements of the industry cluster 
since EIF, for historic perspective.  The three current 
facilitators - Steve Wade (2A/2A*), Arya Sandeep (Schedule 3 
transfers), and Luis Garcia (OCPF site selection) - presented 
the status of their facilitations.  Ken Penman (Declarations 
Branch) made a brief presentation summarizing three TS 
recommendations for potential future industry cluster topics: 
late submission of declarations, improvement in the 
submission and handling of industry declarations, and 
transfer discrepancies.  Daoudi made a brief summary 
presentation on 12 other outstanding industry issues. 
 
¶10. (U) Del rep deployed the talking points received as 
guidance: there is U.S. interest in the topic of late 
declarations and willingness to consider facilitating such 
discussions.  There is also interest in seeing the TS report 
its ongoing efforts to clarify declarations that are 
incomplete or internally inconsistent.  De Soto was 
supportive of U.S. facilitation on late declarations and 
stated he would bring this to the Bureau; other SPs were also 
supportive of moving forward (e.g., France, Germany, Japan, 
Australia, Netherlands).  In addition to the topics the TS 
raised, the Netherlands suggested that TS efforts in the area 
of sampling and analysis may raise other topics for the 
cluster.  Iran stated that they felt the DG's paper on 
facility agreements was not very promising and reminded the 
group that SPs cannot decide whether facility agreements are 
needed. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
INDUSTRY CONSULTATIONS - 2A/2A* LOW CONCENTRATION LIMITS 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶11. (U) Steve Wade (UK) led a facilitation on the topic of 
low concentration limits for declarations of Schedule 2A/2A* 
chemicals.  He provided an updated draft (dated March 2006) 
of his paper during the consultation, which included the 
following changes to OP 13 (all in brackets): (1) 
specification of the concentration at "30" percent; (2) 
specification of the quantity threshold at the "verification" 
threshold; and (3) clarification that this quantity is the 
"annual" amount produced, processed or consumed.  Wade stated 
that he had had a discussion with the TS Legal Advisor 
regarding the provisions of this proposal, and that he felt 
 
 
the provisions were legally viable.  France asked that the 
Legal Advisor prepare something in writing to this end, which 
Wade committed to request. 
 
¶12. (U) Wade also gave several statistics about the 
fluoropolymers industry (which generates PFIB as an unwanted 
byproduct).  He stated that between 2004 and 2009: (1) growth 
of the PTFE industry was estimated at about 6 percent 
annually; and (2) growth of the other fluoropolymer 
industries was estimated at about 5.3 percent annually.  He 
also stated that the range of capacities of PTFE facilities 
was 1,500 to 16,000 tons per year, which meant that 
facilities would have to drop production below 200 tons per 
year in order to avoid declaration under this proposal. 
 
¶13. (U) The discussion centered on OP 13 and PFIB.  India 
still favors 1 percent without a quantity threshold and 
requested more clarification on this proposal.  Switzerland, 
the UK, and Norway all favor a low concentration but would 
support this proposal.  France still seems very confused on 
what OP 13 accomplishes and requested clarification.  Germany 
requested that we return to discussion on Option C from the 
October 2005 facilitator's paper, at which point Italy left 
the meeting.  Germany also referred to its paper on BZ and 
asked that the rationale for a low concentration level for BZ 
be discussed.  Japan supported Germany's proposal to return 
to the October 2005 paper. 
 
¶14. (U) Ken Penman (Industry Information Evaluation) stated 
that, currently, six SPs declare 12 PFIB plants under 
Schedule 2.  From open source information, the TS estimates 
that this proposal would bring in about 12 new plants for 
declaration, some of which would be in the U.S.  Later, 
Penman provided del rep a copy of an October 2005 report 
compiled by CEH Marketing Research Reports on the 
fluoropolymer industry.  He also recommended the discussion 
on this topic in the Report of the Fourth Session of the 
Science Advisory Board (SAB-IV/1, dated 6 February 2001). 
With these documents and current SP declarations, we should 
be able to get a better feel of the actual impact of this 
proposal. 
 
¶15. (U) Wade promised to provide the additional legal and 
clarification information requested.  He also committed to 
providing a new draft of his paper in the near future. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
INDUSTRY CONSULTATIONS - SCHEDULE 3 TRANSFERS 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶16. (U) Arya Sandeep (India) led a facilitation on the topic 
of transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals.  The basis of this 
discussion was the existing facilitator's paper from January 
19, 2006.  However, at the meeting, Iran dropped a paper of 
proposed amendments to the facilitator's paper.  The 
facilitator opened discussion on Iran's proposed amendments, 
but there was no expectation of any acceptance of these 
proposals until delegations have received reactions from 
capitals. 
 
¶17. (U) Del rep deployed guidance as received.  The proposed 
change to OP1 was supported by Germany, Sweden, Russia (who 
proposed the language changes), and Iran (who proposed more 
positive language than the Russians). 
 
¶18. (U) France, UK, Switzerland, and the Netherlands were 
concerned with the phrase "show restraint" in Iran's proposal 
as addressing transfers that could be for prohibited 
purposes, language Iran insists is similar to that of the 
facilitator's earlier (October 6) paper. 
 
¶19. (U) It is important to note that, despite its compromise 
proposal, Iran still prefers a total ban on transfers to 
non-SPs.  They see the five year period discussed in para 27 
of VA Part VIII to be in line with the three year delay in 
implementation of the Schedule 2 ban discussed in para 31 of 
VA Part VII.  However, a version of Iran's proposed changes 
may be the facilitator's best chance of success for a 
decision. 
 
 
------------------------------- 
OCPF SITE SELECTION METHODOLOGY 
------------------------------- 
 
¶20.  (U) Luis Garcia (Spain) led a facilitation on the topic 
of how the TS should select Other Chemical Production 
Facilities (OCPFs) for industry inspections.  First, the TS 
presented its latest round of modeling (the Highly Protected 
documents were made available the day before the 
consultation), showing what would happen in all 73 cases if 
20 countries colluded by putting the maximum number of points 
on one country and the remainder of their points on the PSF 
facilities in the regional group of the country being 
targeted.  In general, this changed the expected number of 
inspections by only one or two per year.   Italy opened 
discussion by pleading for simplicity, noting that it was 
difficult to explain to his capital, and he had given up (a 
number of delegates nodded in agreement).  Italy begged the 
facilitator to make the concepts more comprehensible and move 
towards simplifying the proposals. 
 
¶21.  (U) The facilitator then introduced a draft decision. 
Several delegations (UK, Iran, India) noted that this 
introduction was premature because delegations are nowhere 
near consensus on a methodology.  The facilitator needs to 
focus on the methodology, not draft decisions.  Iran 
supported by Brazil stated that the facilitator's proposed 
methodology is unacceptable because it allows states to 
nominate other states; it is unacceptable to bring political 
elements into the process.  New Zealand and Norway noted that 
the current methodology is unacceptable, and that change is 
needed now.  Even with political elements, and collusion by 
half the nominating states, the expected number of 
inspections increases only by one or two per year, a minimal 
impact. 
 
¶22.  (U) Delegations raised concerns regarding operational 
paragraphs (OP) 4-6.  OP4 recommends that the TS provide all 
states upon request the nominations made by each state. 
Switzerland, supported by Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the UK, 
recommended that if nomination information is provided to 
requesting states, it should be done in the following year so 
that states cannot predict where the inspections might be 
carried out.  Sweden wondered how a state that feared it had 
been a victim of collusion would know and what information 
would be available to distinguish between collusion and 
multiple nominations made without collusion.  France, noting 
that nominations will be incomprehensible anyway, supported 
the facilitator's approach.  The facilitator closed this 
discussion by telling delegations that the TS should not hide 
any information from anyone. 
 
¶23.  (U) In addition, delegations were concerned about the 
90-day lag for submitting annual declarations (OP3).  France, 
supported by Italy, noted that this would be the same time 
period states would have to prepare ADPA declarations, and 
many would be unable to do both by the end of the 90 day 
period.  With respect to OP5, delegations wondered why the 
facilitator proposed to review the methodology after four 
years rather than three or five years.  The TS responded that 
if a four-year time period was chosen, three inspection 
cycles would have been completed, allowing for a more fulsome 
debate on its experience. 
¶24.  (U) Delegations worried about immortalizing the A14 
methodology as currently described in OP6.  New Zealand noted 
that a number of delegations believe that A14 is not the 
best, and that in a separate consultation delegations should 
consider what technical characteristics might better describe 
the work at OCPF sites worldwide.  The key issue for the 
selection methodology is that it increases the probability 
that facilities relevant to the CWC are selected for 
inspection. 
 
¶25.  (U) The U.S., supported by a number of delegations, 
pressed the TS to provide a listing of the inspectable OCPF 
sites with the relevant A14-related information.  The TS 
requested that interested delegates meet with Per Runn to 
determine how best to move this request forward. 
 
 
¶26.  (U) Finally, delegations debated how best to proceed. 
Colombia, as Vice Chair for the cluster, noted that 
delegations needed to move faster.  Only three consultations 
remain before CSP-11, and if a method is to be finalized 
prior to the CSP, more meetings are necessary.  Several 
delegations supported holding consultations outside the 
industry intersessionals.  Iran said that it favored holding 
two or three OCPF meetings during the industry weeks so that 
experts from Tehran could attend. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
COMMERCIAL SCHEDULE 1 FACILITY AGREEMENT 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶27. (U) Del rep recently proposed to the TS that we return to 
discussions on the draft facility agreement language for the 
one U.S. commercial Schedule 1 facility that is declared.  In 
the past, discussions had stalled because of significant 
differences on the Schedule 2 boilerplate language.  Now that 
those differences have been narrowed to just one topic 
(sampling and analysis), it seems appropriate to return to 
the Schedule 1 effort.  The TS agreed with this proposal and 
anticipates preparing a draft summarizing the current state 
of discussions shortly after the meetings of the EC. 
 
--------------- 
FINANCIAL RULES 
--------------- 
 
¶28. (U) Consultations on the Financial Rules were held on 
March 7, and were sparsely attended.  Overall it was a 
productive meeting, with only two financial rules and one 
amendment remaining pending.  There will be no decision ready 
for the upcoming EC, however delegations foresee a decision 
at the May EC, assuming capitals are on board with decisions 
made at this and preceding consultations.  The facilitator 
(Snelsire, U.S.) opened by asking if delegations had further 
comments on the amendments. 
 
¶29. (U) Rule 9.3.01 (b) Germany suggested adding that 
investment losses should be reported to the DG, as well as 
the Principal Financial Officer and that the DG will prepare 
the report.  This was supported by delegations. 
 
¶30. (U) The facilitator noted that the amendments to 
financial rules 10.6.04(d), 10.6.05(c) and 10.6.06 (all 
relating to procurement) are still being considered in 
capital.  Discussion then began on the overall financial 
rules, article by article. 
 
¶31. (U) Article 1 - Rule 1.1.01 - Iran suggested replacing 
the word "issued" with "prepared" to more accurately reflect 
reality (1st sentence).  They further suggested adding that 
after DG "and approved by the Executive Council" to that 
sentence; and to end the final sentence with "and Executive 
Council."  They linked this suggestion with rule 16.2. 
Germany disagreed with adding the EC to this paragraph, 
arguing that it is not needed.  Japan requested deferring 
this item.  Germany agreed and noted that this would add an 
unnecessary redundancy to the financial rules. 
 
¶32. (U) Article 2 - Rule 2.2.01 - Iran noted that the same 
body who approves the financial rules should interpret the 
rules, therefore the DG should not make that interpretation; 
instead the EC should.  Thus Iran wants to change DG to EC in 
both places.  The TS noted that in general that is true, but 
during deliberations and debate of the draft financial rules 
in 1998, the EC delegated it to the DG.  Other delegations 
felt that to change this to reflect Iran's concerns could 
lead to micromanagement by the EC and be more trouble than it 
is worth. 
 
¶33.  (U) Japan suggested adding "shall bring the case to the 
attention of the EC for its consideration" after ...the DG 
shall....  Italy suggested keeping Japan's suggestion and 
adding as a first sentence, "Daily interpretation of the 
financial rules are by the DG." then the rest of the 
paragraph.  Germany preferred the original wording, noting 
 
that the EC can change any interpretation whenever it 
decides.  The UK supported Germany and noted that these rules 
have been discussed and agreed upon since 1998 and asked 
whether there was a value into going back through the rules 
so minutely.  The facilitator suggested keeping the paragraph 
as-is except for changing "and" to "but."  Iran reiterated 
that it wanted to keep its suggestion as is and suggested 
deferring the question to later. 
 
¶34. (U) Article 3 - Rule 3.2.01 - Italy noted the second 
sentence is a redundancy and that it should be deleted.  This 
was agreed and the article passed without further comment. 
 
¶35.  (U) Article 4 - Rule 4.12.01 - Germany suggested adding 
"generally" before 60 days, for flexibility in case of a 
vendor having trouble getting their invoices out in this time 
frame.  Delegations agreed and the article passed. 
 
¶36.  (U) Articles 5 through 16 garnered little substantive 
comment and were passed. 
 
¶37. (U) The facilitator will incorporate all the changes into 
a new version of the document for delegations to send to 
capitals.  The next meeting will be held after the March EC 
with a hope to completely approving the Financial Rules at 
that time. 
 
---------------------- 
HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT 
---------------------- 
 
¶38.  (U) EC Chairman Dastis arranged a March 3 meeting of the 
OPCW working group on the HQ Agreement and MFA Protocol chief 
Peter Lohman.  Lohman outlined changes at Schiphol to address 
the concerns raised by Ambassadors, but conceded that there 
are problems ensuring that all airport staff are aware of the 
procedures.  He asserted that the MFA would continue making 
the point to airport supervisors.  On difficulties 
delegations have had with police, Lohman said that the MFA 
will meet with some 50 senior officers in the near term.  He 
added that the mayor of The Hague had expressed publicly his 
general concern about how the police are dealing with the 
public. 
 
¶39.  (U) On financial matters, Lohman noted the large policy 
paper that had been prepared by the MFA.  He also noted that 
a steering group would be set up which would deal with 
assistance to diplomats, schools and health care.  The group 
would also address tax issues.  Finally, Lohman said that the 
MFA desk handling international organizations will be 
expanded to handle these issues. 
 
¶40.  (U) Javits sends. 
ARNALL