VZCZCXYZ0053
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0487/01 0661603
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 071603Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5012
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000487 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 
WEEK ENDING MARCH 3 
 
 
This is CWC-20-06. 
 
------------------ 
INSPECTOR TRAINING 
------------------ 
 
¶1.  (U) In coordination with Ian Richards (special assistant 
to the Deputy Director General) and Renato Carvalho (head of 
Inspectorate Management), del rep will participate in 
selected sessions of Technical Secretariat inspector training 
during the week of March 13.  The goal will be to get a 
better feel for the types and format of training provided to 
newly-hired inspectors.  Alexandru Dolea (Industry 
Verification Branch) recently provided del rep with copies of 
training materials that have been used for the training of 
new inspectors in the past.  These materials and the 
information from the training sessions will be helpful in 
U.S. efforts to develop training materials and opportunities 
that can be offered to the TS to improve the basic training 
received by new inspectors.  Many at the TS, including 
Richards, are in support of the U.S. efforts. 
 
¶2.  (U) Del reps will also lobby Verification chief Horst 
Reeps and Inspectorate chief Ichiro Akiyama to ensure that 
they request additional resources for inspector training in 
the 2007 budget proposal.  Program managers will need to have 
their requests to the budget office by the end of March. 
Reeps and Akiyama have indicated privately that they have 
concerns about the quality of inspector training.  Del reps 
will emphasize that it is difficult for the U.S. and other 
delegations to make a strong case for strengthened training 
efforts if the TS leadership states that it is satisfied with 
current efforts. 
 
------------- 
AFRICA OFFICE 
------------- 
 
¶3.  (U) On March 1, a meeting of the Open Ended Working Group 
on the Establishment of an Africa Office was held at the 
OPCW.  The meeting was called by facilitator Malik Azhar 
Ellahi (Pakistan) and attended by Director General Pfirter, 
as well as the new Director of Special Project Krzysztof 
Paturej.  Six delegations from Africa attended the meeting 
(Tunisia, Nigeria, Algeria, Morocco, Kenya and South Africa.) 
 The meeting was widely attended with some delegations not 
having a place at the table. 
 
¶4.  (U) The DG noted only 7 African nations are still 
non-signatories.  He encouraged delegations to continue their 
work to convince non-members to join the CWC.  He noted the 
Memorandum of Understanding the OPCW signed with the African 
Union, and the need for additional voluntary contributions to 
assist in universality and implementation efforts.  The 
facilitator presented his paper, noting there seemed to be 
agreement to use the non-paper as a basis for continued 
discussion.  He acknowledged that delegations still need to 
get comments from capitals.  He emphasized that his timeline 
is to have something by the December CSP, and there were no 
indications on when the next consultation would be held, 
though it was clear it would be after the March EC. 
 
¶5.  (U) The discussion began with the U.S. asking whether 
there were aspects of the MOU with the AU which would affect 
deliberations on an Africa office; and followed that with a 
question on whether this type of office is a new idea or 
whether similar organizations (such as the IAEA) have 
established similar offices.  The facilitator suggested the 
Africa Group answer the first question and said while the UN 
has offices outside of New York, he would need to check on 
whether there are such offices from disarmament agencies. 
 
¶6.  (U) South Africa took the floor next and their del rep 
criticized the paper in very strong terms.  Instead of 
focusing on a way forward, he seemed stuck on the mandate of 
the working group and how it should proceed.  He wanted to 
know the legal implications of an office in Africa.  The 
facilitator noted while the TS has provided him with data, 
they need to know the details by which an office in Africa 
 
would work in order to gather the appropriate information. 
The South African del rep continued to request extensive 
amounts of information, but declined to provide any 
parameters that the TS would need to provide the information. 
 In short, he wanted a lot, but did not want to do any of the 
work to get it. 
 
¶7.  (U) Austria, in its role as President of the European 
Union, stated the EU desire to support an implementation 
program in Africa.  They noted only a portion of the 225,000 
Euros mentioned in the facilitators paper could go to setting 
up an Africa office.  The figure is the amount they put aside 
as an EU contribution toward all implementation programs. 
Further, this amount would not be available every year. 
 
¶8.  (U) In answer to a question by Tunisia, Malik noted that 
the Legal Advisors office has reviewed the facilitator's 
paper and have seen no problems.  However, it cannot answer 
whether there are any legal implications in the day-to-day 
running of an office, as it depends on the location.  Italy 
noted that further details must be given before a decision on 
opening an office can be made.  The Dutch suggested sending a 
team immediately to Africa to assess key details, which some 
delegations supported.  The U.S., UK, France and others 
replied it would be a good idea to see what information could 
be assembled in The Hague, if there were problems in getting 
data, then a team could be sent.  This seemed to be the 
consensus opinion.  (Note: Dutch Amb. Lak later clarified to 
del rep that the reason he suggested sending the team is that 
he has no faith in any data provided by the African 
delegations or the AU.  His intention was to send the team so 
that the TS could get credible data and not just rely on what 
is provided by the Africans.) 
 
¶9.  (U) Kenya noted that the non-paper seems to focus on 
set-up of an office and not other mechanisms.  They further 
stated that the African EC proposal was not just focused on 
universality and implementation, but to promote ideals and 
public awareness of the CWC.  Kenya also seemed to want a lot 
from the TS, but did not indicate a willingness to assist in 
the process. 
 
¶10.  (U) South Africa chimed in again and stated that the 
working group should stick to the African EC proposal and not 
the facilitator's non-paper.  He did acknowledge that the EU 
contribution is for implementation and not for CWC education. 
 However, he did not agree with going to the African Union 
for assistance, as they are not sponsors.  He then admitted 
that they were not even aware of the initiative to set up an 
office in Africa.  Now on a roll, the South African continued 
by stating that the DG does not have a role other than 
implementation support.  He then continued to ask for details 
that the facilitator clearly could not provide without giving 
the TS parameters by which to gather information, and then 
strongly suggested that the facilitator work with African 
Ambassadors immediately.  The South African Ambassador tried 
to smooth the waters by stressing that African delegations 
were concerned that the process that was being considered was 
not generating movement toward a decision on an office. 
 
¶11.  (U) Malik replied that he would talk to the South 
African del rep outside after the meeting.  The facilitator 
noted the he has had two meetings with alternates in the 
Africa Group, and that he would be glad to meet with the 
Ambassadors in the Africa Group.  He further stated that 
while he drew heavily upon the Africa Group proposal, the 
basis of work is the CSP-10 decision, which says that the 
answer may be a mechanism, but not necessarily an Africa 
Office. 
 
¶12.  (U) Germany noted that some issues were raised which had 
not yet been answered.  Has there been any interaction 
between the TS and the African Union?  The U.S. stated that 
while it still needed comments from Washington on the 
non-paper, the facilitator's document provided a good way to 
proceed within a process that ensured thorough examination of 
the topic.  After a discussion with his Ambassador outside 
the consultation room, the South African del rep apologized 
to the facilitator and noted that the African Union-OPCW MOU 
 
should not be part of this discussion as the issues have not 
been discussed within the AU.  He requested the TS prepare 
papers on the legal implications and financial implications 
of an Africa office, continuing to be oblivious to the fact 
that the TS needs parameters in order to give him the 
information papers he requested. 
 
¶13. (U) Norway expressed general support for establishment of 
an Africa office.  Japan stated that it still needed comments 
from Tokyo on the non-paper, but emphasized that it also had 
a number of questions and needed more information.  Sweden 
noted that there is an (unspecified) regional disarmament 
office in Lome and asked whether there was an option to work 
with them or learn from their experience. 
 
¶14.  (U) The facilitator said he will consult with the 
Director of Special Projects to answer what questions he 
could and he will work with the African Union to get answers. 
 He will not shift the burden to the TS to get details 
without specifying what is needed.  And finally, he will 
consult with the TS, African Group and other delegations on 
the way forward. 
 
--------------- 
FINANCIAL RULES 
--------------- 
 
¶15.  (U) Consultations on the Draft Financial Rules took 
place on March 2.  Delegations continued to focus on the 
proposed revisions to the draft financial rules.  Iran 
initially asked that financial cap in draft rule revision 
4.1.02 be reduced from 10 percent to five percent. On the 
monetary cap of 2500 Euros, Iran said it could be flexible 
and retain the 2500 Euro cap. 
 
¶16.  (U) Delegations agreed to a Russian proposal to delete 
"the postponement of other activities" wording from draft 
financial rule revision 4.5.01 paragraph B. 
 
¶17.  (U) On draft financial rule revision 9.3.01 paragraph B, 
Iran and India asked that the references to the TS "writing 
off losses" be deleted and that the language concerning the 
reporting of losses be strengthened.  The new language calls 
on the Principal Financial Officer to "prepare a detailed 
report concerning these losses and any required follow-up 
action."  Language was also added that would require the TS 
to notify the EC about any losses through "existing reporting 
requirements. 
 
¶18.  (U) On the procurement related sections in draft 
financial rule revisions to 10.6.4, 10.6.05, and 10.6.06, 
India and Iran continued to call for inclusion of the draft 
revision language requiring the availability items to be 
purchased in all SPs, while Germany, the UK, and Italy called 
for the removal of all language related to procurement. 
 
¶19.  (U) At the end of the consultation, the facilitator 
(Snelsire, U.S.) told delegations that he had copies of the 
IAEA financial rules and regulations that he would make 
available to delegations on request. Conveniently, there is 
no/no provision in the IAEA financial regulations or rules, 
which also serve as the procurement rules, to limit the 
organizations ability to procure items if they are not 
available in all SPs.  Despite this Iran and India are likely 
to continue to push for this problematic language concerning 
procurement and a deal will not be done until the end.  This 
deal will likely involve some formulation of the CSP-8 
language on procurement that Washington forwarded to the del. 
 
¶20.  (U) Consultations on the financial rules will continue 
on March 7, when the facilitator hopes to begin to address 
the draft financial rules themselves, leaving the procurement 
issue to the end.  All other language concerning the 
revisions to the draft rules have "ad ref" been resolved. 
 
-------------------------------- 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OIO REPORT 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶21.  (U) Consultations on the implementation in 2005 of the 
recommendations in the 2004 annual Office of Internal 
Oversight report (EC-44/DG.5 dated February 14, 2006 and 
EC-44/DG.5/Corr.1 dated February 24, 2006) were held on March 
¶3.  Only seven delegations attended the consultation. 
Mohamed Louati, the Head of the Office of Internal Oversight, 
introduced the report and noted that much progress had been 
made concerning the OIO's recommendations, especially in the 
Human Resources and Budget Branches, but that more work 
remained to be done. 
 
¶22.  (U) Iran asked why there was no clear explanation of why 
certain recommendations had not yet been implemented.  Ali 
Asghar of the Administration Division responded that the 
process simply took time.  The French asked that the TS 
produce a document in spreadsheet form outlining the precise 
status of each of the OIO recommendations. 
 
¶23.  (U) On Human Resources, the French requested that 
someone from HRB attend the next OIO consultation to provide 
more detail on the implementation of the OIO's 
recommendations concerning human resources.  The Iranian 
delegation questioned the necessity of using outside 
consultants.  Del rep questioned the need, outlined in 
paragraph 12 of the report, to fund an outside study to 
determine if an external classifier should continue to be 
used, as opposed to hiring a full-time classifier.  Del rep 
noted that during last year's budget consultations, the Head 
of HRB had made it clear that due to the small number of 
posts that have to be classified each year, it would not be 
cost effective to hire a full-time classifier.  Germany 
supported the U.S. 
 
¶24.  (U) In reference to paragraph 18, the Iranian delegation 
asked if employees who were missing documentation of their 
educational and professional qualifications from their 
personnel files had been able to produce documentation. 
Asghar responded that of 51 employees who had no 
documentation of their qualifications, only 9 were unable to 
produce any proof of their educational and/or professional 
qualifications. 
 
¶25.  (U) Asghar cited as an example the fact that several 
employees who had claimed to have Masters Degrees had in fact 
only completed some work towards a Masters degree but had not 
in fact been awarded a degree.  He added that the Legal 
Advisors office was studying how such cases should be 
handled.  Asghar went to great pains to emphasize that only a 
few employees hired in 1998 had failed to document their 
qualifications and that subsequent to 1998 all candidates for 
jobs at the OPCW were asked to present their degrees as part 
of the hiring process.  Nonetheless, delegations still seemed 
to be surprised that the TS had not taken a tougher line with 
individuals who appeared to have lied about their educational 
background.  Del will follow up with the TS on this issue. 
 
¶26.  (U) In reference to paragraphs 20-25 on the efficiency 
of the recruitment process, del rep noted that the U.S. is 
pleased by the reported improvements in HRB's performance but 
still concerned that too often positions are not advertised 
until a significant time after the incumbent has left the 
position.  This results in long staffing gaps that can impact 
on TS activities. 
 
¶27.  (U) As an example, del rep cited the fact the P-5 
position in ERD previously occupied by Ioan Tudor was still 
vacant, despite the fact that Tudor had notified the TS that 
he planned to leave over a year ago.  Asghar responded that 
sometimes the TS delays advertising vacancies because it is 
considering reclassifying certain positions or extending the 
incumbent.  He asserted that this was in fact the case with 
the P-5 position in ERD.  (Note: This is the first time we 
have been told this and it seems unlikely, especially given 
the fact that Tudor had a job lined up in New York and was 
not considering extending as far as we know.  It is also 
unlikely that the TS would consider downgrading a position of 
such importance.) 
 
¶28.  (U) The German delegation asked if paragraph 23 of the 
 
report meant that the TS planned to continue using outside 
consultants in the recruitment process.  Asghar said the TS 
would continue to use consultants. 
 
¶29.  (U) Iran asked in reference to paragraphs 26 and 27 on 
geographical representation, if the TS had considered 
conducting targeted recruiting in developing countries to 
enhance geographical representation and if the TS had 
considered using quotas to ensure geographical 
representation.  France, Germany, and the U.S. intervened to 
note that the CWC clearly stated that qualifications should 
be the paramount factor in hiring, thereby precluding the use 
of quotas.  Japan noted that the TS had used the Associates 
program as one means of ensuring that developing countries 
have qualified candidates to apply for jobs, and that to date 
the TS has hired four individuals from developing countries 
who had participated in the Associates program. 
 
¶30.  (U) Javits sends. 
ARNALL