This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000372 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA; UDSA FOR FAS/PECAD, 
FAS/CNMP, FAS/AAD, APHIS; BANGKOK FOR USAID (JOHN 
MACARTHUR), APHIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAGR EAID AMED PGOV PREL CASC TBIO KFLU BM
SUBJECT: BURMA AI OUTBREAK UPDATE - MARCH 20 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 43425 
 
     ¶B. RANGOON 364 
     ¶C. RANGOON 345 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY.  No human cases of AI have been reported in 
Burma to date.  A joint FAO/WHO assessment team, accompanied 
by USAID Bangkok Infectious Diseases Advisor and Embassy's 
FSN agricultural specialist, visited hospitals and poultry 
farms in Mandalay and Sagaing Divisions on March 17-18 to 
gather further information on AI cases among birds in Burma. 
Burmese authorities have culled poultry and banned the sale 
and transport of poultry and eggs from affected areas, 
although FAO and WHO remain concerned about the possibility 
of spreading the infections by the methods used.  Embassy has 
polled foreign donor missions, but none seem ready to help 
meet the most urgent needs relayed by the FAO and WHO to help 
the GOB contain the spread of AI in Burma.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) A joint FAO/WHO assessment team returned to Rangoon 
from Mandalay on March 19 to brief FAO, WHO, and Livestock 
Breeding and Veterinary Department (LBVD) officials.  USAID 
Bangkok's Infectious Diseases Advisor, Dr. John MacArthur, 
who participated in the Mandalay assessment team visit, 
briefed the Charge before returning to Bangkok on March 19 
and will separately report his findings to Washington.  Both 
he and FSN reported receiving complete access to the various 
sites, including a last-minute request to see the hospital 
set up to the handle human cases.  USAID advisor also 
received more up-to-date documents than Ministry of Health 
(MOH) officials in Rangoon had. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Key findings of the FAO/WHO assessment team include: 
 
-- Although Burma first reported possible AI on March 12 
after poultry die-offs in Mandalay District, earlier 
suspected outbreaks occurred in Khin Oo, Zeegon, and Shwebo 
townships (in Sagaing Division, northwest of Mandalay) in 
early February 2006. 
 
-- 1,500 chickens died in Shwebo township (8 percent of the 
total flock of 18,100 birds at 60 chicken farms, including 26 
commercial layer farms, there). 
 
-- The die-offs began in the first week of February but 
officials did not notice for two weeks because the rapid test 
used cannot identify H5N1. 
 
-- As chickens there did not respond to medicine and began to 
die in large numbers, some poultry farmers in Shwebo sold 
their remaining birds to a chicken wholesaler in Mandalay. 
Unconfirmed rumors suggest that about 1,500 chickens were 
also smuggled by train from Shwebo to Myitkyina (Kachin 
State) and most were dead or dying when discovered by GOB 
officials; LBVD is now testing samples for AI. 
 
-- LBVD officials have begun culling all poultry in a 
3-kilometer radius of the Kywesekan site in Mandalay where 
authorities first confirmed the H5N1 virus.  18 chicken and 
quail farms are affected.  Authorities have also established 
an additional 7-kilometer control zone and banned all 
movement of livestock, poultry, and equipment from poultry 
farms within the area. 
 
-- FAO and USAID visitors at the culling sites expressed some 
concern that the methods used (improper disposal of used 
PPEs, failure of visitors to disinfect their shoes, stray 
dogs allowed to roam freely near the piles of dead chickens) 
could spread the virus to other poultry farms that the same 
LBVD staff visit.  Local officials agreed to modify culling 
procedures based on advice from the survey teams. 
 
-- The Mandalay District Commander has banned all sales of 
eggs and chicken at town markets, Army officers have 
instructed soldiers and their families to avoid consuming 
chicken and eggs.  A list of infected sites we received from 
LBVD officials revealed numerous military-owned poultry and 
quail farms in the vicinity of the Mandalay site. 
 
-- The government is not offering compensation to poultry 
owners or commercial farmers, but LBVD officials have assured 
those whose flocks they cull that they will be eligible to 
receive new stock and feed free of charge at a later date. 
FAO has advised LBVD officials that the 21-day disease-free 
minimum may be too short of a time period and recommended 
LBVD waits longer before restocking any culled flocks. 
-- The FAO/WHO visitors also recommended that LBVD officials 
work more closely with the MOH and arrange joint team visits 
to suspected sites so one can focus on quarantining and 
culling birds while the other screens humans for potential 
cases. 
 
-- No human AI cases have been detected in Burma to date. 
 
-- According to NGO contacts, the two individuals 
hospitalized in Mandalay for observation after contact with 
AI-infected poultry (ref C) both tested positive for malaria, 
not influenza. 
 
-- The GOB is continuing its aggressive public awareness 
campaign, with daily television broadcasts and newspaper 
articles encouraging people to report dead birds, prepare and 
cook meat safely, and practice proper hygiene. 
 
¶3. (SBU) WHO Burma's AI coordinator, Kanokporn Coninx, told 
emboffs on March 18 of additional concerns.  WHO believes 
some Mandalay poultry farm owners may have attempted to send 
their stock to distant markets ahead of visits by AI 
investigation teams.  WHO staff have also heard reports of a 
disease outbreak among poultry in Mon State in southern 
Burma, near the Thailand border.  The Deputy Minister of 
Health and GOB technicians traveled to the affected area on 
March 20 to investigate further. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Charge met on March 17 with the Canadian and EU 
Ambassadors to Burma, both based in Bangkok.  They said that 
neither Canada nor the EU plans immediate AI assistance to 
Burma.  Canadian Amb. Comeau said Canada did not plan any 
direct AI assistance, but would likely support FAO and WHO in 
their regional efforts.  EU Ambassador Hamburger deferred to 
Brussels.  Neither government has a plan to respond to 
Burma's most urgent needs for PPEs, laboratory testing 
equipment, or outside medical/veterinary expertise. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Other missions in Burma had similar reactions.  All 
are aware of recent AI developments in country, but none have 
plans to offer immediate assistance, either directly to the 
GOB or via FAO/WHO.  The Koreans will offer flu shots to 
KOICA volunteers in Burma (especially those in the Mandalay 
region) and are reviewing long-term aid options.  Australia 
and the U.K. have no plans to provide immediate assistance. 
Prior to the recent outbreak, the German Embassy recommended 
to Berlin that they fund a request from WHO/FAO Rangoon for 
donor support but has not yet received a response.  Tokyo had 
decided prior to the outbreak to give $10 million to FAO 
Burma and $2 million to UNICEF Burma for AI public awareness 
activities, and the GOB Ministry of Health and Ministry of 
Livestock and Fisheries have both approached the Japanese 
Embassy for further assistance in response to the outbreak. 
Japan is reviewing these requests. 
 
¶6. (SBU) COMMENT: As they cope with a significant AI outbreak 
in central Burma, GOB officials have shown remarkable 
openness in sharing information and allowing access for 
foreign officials, including our USAID advisor, to sites 
under investigation.  They clearly recognize the need for 
public awareness and fast action to contain the spread of AI 
and the threat it poses to both human and animal populations. 
 Unfortunately, the international donor community does not 
appear prepared to respond rapidly to the spreading 
infection.  LBVD and MOH officials continue to appeal for 
technical expertise to ensure their quarantining, culling, 
monitoring, and treatment efforts are effective.  They have 
proven responsive to USAID advisor's recommendations. 
Technical experts would not only help make Burma's response 
to this AI crisis more effective at an early stage, they 
would also provide up-close opportunities to observe GOB 
surveillance and end-use accountability, and transit this 
information to the outside world.  The window has been opened 
to us; now we must find ways to keep it open.  END COMMENT. 
VILLAROSA