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RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNJ #0462/01 0881407
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 291407Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3410
INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1001
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0300
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0666
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0544
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0344
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0082
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0739
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1238
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2519
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1625
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0998
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0630

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000462 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, INR, DRL, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA; 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD:  INTERIOR MINISTER SEES DEBY AS "LEAST BAD," 
EXULTS IN BATTLE VICTORY 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Close Deby advisor and fellow Zaghawan 
Interior Minister Mahamat Ali described Deby as the "least 
bad" option for Chad, in conversation with Ambassador March 
¶28.  Claiming total victory in the March 20 battle against 
the Chadian Zaghawa rebels, he downplayed anxieties over 
intra-Zaghawa bloodletting, poohpoohed the importance of 
other Chadian rebels, and dismissed the likelihood of direct 
Sudan attack.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Ambassador Wall called on Minister of Territorial 
Administration Mahamat Ali Abdallah Nassour March 28. 
Mahamat Ali is one of Deby's closest advisors, a fellow 
Zaghawan but not of the same clan (Mahamat Ali is a Kobe from 
Iriba rather than Bideiyat from Bahai), who as a military 
leader was instrumental in Deby's original conquest of power 
in 1990 and has served in key postings ever since.  Mahamat 
Ali had just returned from the East, where he accompanied 
Deby in overseeing the March 20 battle at Hadjar Marfaine. 
 
----------------- 
Deby the Least Bad 
----------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Taking a line on the internal political situation 
sounding strikingly similar to the views regularly purveyed 
by the French, Mahamat Ali three times, at different points 
during the conversation, emphasized that President Deby was 
the "least bad" option realistically available to Chad, a 
country he described as extremely difficult to govern and 
hold together.  He said he hoped for the understanding of the 
international community, at a time when rebellions were 
flaring in the East and even the South, to bear with Chad 
during its present election, however imperfect the electoral 
process was.  For all the flaws of Deby's governance, Mahamat 
Ali said, he had maintained stability and brought some 
progress to Chad, when compared to where Chad had been when 
Deby came to office.  The political opposition had, he said, 
been enticed into a stubborn boycott partly by the prospect 
of a Zaghawa rebellion and a hope that the international 
community would put pressure on Deby not to go forward with 
the election.  The opposition's demands were unrealistic. 
The government had always been prepared for dialogue, within 
reasonable limits, and the door remained open.  In fact, if 
Deby won the coming election overwhelmingly, he would still 
want to associate the opposition in realistic improvements to 
the electoral system.  Mahamat Ali was unfazed by the 
opposition's call for obstructing the election. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  The Ambassador said that the United States had 
hoped there would be a more credible election.  We would have 
liked to provide assistance for the upcoming election, as 
requested by the Prime Minister, but the organization of a 
credible election, as set forth in recommendations made a 
year previously by the United Nations Development Program, 
would have required more time than was now available.  The 
government not having taken the required measures, it was too 
late now for support from the international community.  The 
Ambassador said that President Deby deserved credit for 
maintaining a period of relative stability and some economic 
progress in Chad.  The United States was grateful for Chad's 
cooperation on combatting errorism.  In the Ambassador's 
view, however, Dey would enhance prospects for Chad's 
continued sability and be widely viewed as a great African 
hief of state if he put in place in Chad a credibleprocess 
of peaceful transition. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Mahmat Ali said that he "fully shared" the 
Ambassadr's view.  Chad could have done better.  However, f 
Deby resigned or passed the scene, the result would be war, 
not enhanced democracy.  It was essential for the 
international community to take an understanding attitude and 
accompany Deby in this mandate so the country would not fall 
into the abyss.  After some time, Deby contemplated an 
alternation of power.  Mahamat Ali was certain that Deby 
thought in this way.  He did not have limitless ambition. 
Deby understood the need to associate the opposition in 
governance.   One area for improvement was voter 
registration.  Mahamat Ali said he had proposed to Deby and 
the Prime Minister a new voter census, indeed, a new general 
census.  The present figure of 5.5 million registered voters 
was indeed very high for a country projected to have only 
nine million inhabitants; however, Mahamat Ali suspected that 
Chad's population was actually much higher, more than 12 
million, just as N'djamena's estimated 600,000 population was 
likely also well over one million. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Zaghawa Rebels Smashed, Others Do Not Matter 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Mahamat Ali said that the battle of Hadjar Marfaine 
on March 20 was a clarifying, watershed event.  Sudan had 
poured in arms, vehicles, and money into various Chadian 
rebel groups in Darfur -- Bideiyat Zaghawa, Borogat Zaghawa, 
Arab, and Tama --, hoping they would mount a unified force 
that could overthrow Deby and undermine the Darfur rebellion. 
 Sudan would now have to think again.  The most important of 
the rebel groups was the Bideiyat group under Yahya Dillo 
(SCUD) which had set up a forward base at Hadjar Marfaine 
(just inside Chad, north of Adre).  The battle of March 20 
totally obliterated that base and the SCUD was now in 
complete disarray.  The Ambassador asked about the likelihood 
of further Zaghawa defections and reprisals, given that this 
battle was the first instance of intra-Zaghawa killing, and 
about the danger presented by other Chadian rebels such as 
Tama leader Mahamat Nour.  Mahamat Ali dismissed Mahamat Nour 
as "no problem at all."  If the Sudanese were banking on him, 
they were banking on the wrong man.  Deby well knew where the 
real danger had lain -- the SCUD -- and he had gone after it. 
 Other rebels, Borogat, Tama, and Arab, would remain 
disunited and ineffective.  Sudan wanted Mahamat Nour to lead 
them but they would not follow him.  The intra-Zaghawa 
fighting was not mortal to the Zaghawa community.  The great 
majority of that community knew full well that they needed to 
stick together behind Deby, help him remain in power, lead 
the country to greater democracy and better governance, 
combat corruption and build a truly national army. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The Ambassador asked whether Mahamat Ali saw a risk 
now of a direct attack from Sudan.  Mahamat Ali said there 
was "very little likelihood" of it.  Sudan's strategy was to 
work through the rebels.  Chad held to its right to pursue 
Chadian rebels into Sudanese territory, which could lead to a 
Sudanese reaction, but he doubted that a direct attack formed 
part of Sudan's general plan.   And as of March 20, the 
Sudanese plan would have to be re-written. 
WALL