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Viewing cable 06NDJAMENA360, EASTERN CHAD: ABSENCE OF CHADIAN FORCES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06NDJAMENA360 2006-03-07 15:49 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Ndjamena
VZCZCXRO1003
RR RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0360/01 0661549
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071549Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3292
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0273
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0505
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1111
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1201
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0507
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2479
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1588
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0117
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0950
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0615
RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI 0214
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0626
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000360 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA, 
DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI, USAID/DCHA/OFDA 
AND USAID/W FOR DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR 
AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA 
FOR REFCOORDS;NAIROBI FOR USAID/OFDA/ECARD;ACCRA FOR 
USAID/WARP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC UN SU
SUBJECT: EASTERN CHAD: ABSENCE OF CHADIAN FORCES 
EXACERBATES BANDITRY 
 
NDJAMENA 00000360  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (U) SUMMARY.  A security void caused by the repositioning 
of 
Chadian police and military forces since December is the 
principal factor in the increased raiding and looting in the 
border area south of Adre.  First-hand accounts by refugees 
arriving from these areas and assessments by senior staff 
from international humanitarian organizations indicate that 
Sudanese and Chadian Arabs have operated in the absence of 
security forces to engage in heightened raids.  The affected 
Chadian populations have responded by regrouping into larger 
villages and organizing militias for self-defense and 
counterattacks.  This increased banditry does not bear the 
hallmarks of government-sponsored Janjaweed attacks which 
some observers have alleged is being "imported" into Chad. 
Additional donor funding for humanitarian assistance to 
Chadian internally displaced persons (IDPs) is not warranted 
at this time.  Banditry and carjacking north of Adre continue 
to 
be a major concern for refugee assistance programs. End 
Summary. 
 
2. (U) PRM/AFR Neil Ahlsten (Chad/Darfur Program Officer) 
traveled to Abeche and eight refugee camps in eastern Chad 
from February 17 to March 3 to review security and assistance 
programs for 205,000 Sudanese refugees from Darfur.  The 
present report focuses on security issues in eastern Chad, 
while septel focuses on refugee assistance programs.  Ahlsten 
did not travel to Adre or Goz Beida, but did interview senior 
humanitarian staff with a close knowledge of the IDP 
situation along the Chad/Sudan border and Sudanese refugees 
who 
recently arrived from the affected areas. 
 
 
The Wild East: Arab Bandits and Chadian Militias 
 
 
3. (U) Since the beginning of the year, numerous Chadian 
villages have been attacked in cross-border raids near 
Goungour (35km south of Adre) and Borota (70km south of 
Adre). 
The assailants are small groups of Sudanese or Chadian Arabs 
engaging in opportunistic looting of cattle, food stocks and 
other assets from the local Chadian population. The 
organizations treating victims of the attacks, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Medecins 
Sans Frontieres, France (MSF/France), indicated that only a 
small fraction of the villagers are wounded or killed in the 
attacks.  The casualties are normally those who actively 
resisted the assailants.  This increased banditry does not 
bear the hallmarks of government-sponsored Janjaweed attacks 
which some observers have alleged is being "imported" into 
Chad. 
 
4. (U) According to UNHCR's figures from mid-February, there 
are a total of 18,700 Chadian IDPs along various stretches of 
the Chad/Sudan border between Adre and Goz Beida.  In January 
and February up to 7,000 Chadians were displaced, including 
3,200 near Goungour and 3,500 near Borota.  The bulk of the 
affected population is the group of 12,000 Chadian IDPs in 
areas around Modoyna and Koloy (which lie between Ade and 
Goz Beida) who were displaced in 2005 by cross-border acts of 
banditry from Sudanese Arabs.  Because of the insecurity, up 
to 2,000 Sudanese refugees from Darfur who were living in 
host Chadian communities south of Adre have also moved to 
Gaga refugee camp. 
 
5. (SBU) The concentration of Chadian military forces at Adre 
has emptied nearly all of the gendarmaries along the border 
and exposed the Chadian population to opportunistic raids. 
 
NDJAMENA 00000360  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
A significant number of the Chadian IDPs were in fact never 
attacked.  Instead, as a preemptive measure in the absence of 
security forces, they moved themselves and their assets a few 
kilometers from their homes to regroup in larger villages. 
ICRC, MSF, and the International Federation of the Red Cross 
(IFRC) report that a Masalit militia has formed in areas 
south of Adre to provide self-defense for the local 
population.  They also report that elements of the Masalit 
militia have crossed the Chad/Sudan border to attack Arab 
populations in Sudan in retribution for acts of banditry, 
which in turn has elicited further attacks from the Arab 
populations. 
 
6. (U) ICRC has taken the lead in providing humanitarian 
assistance to these IDPs.  According to its assessments, a 
significant amount of assistance is not warranted at this 
time. ICRC has distributed non-food items and is coordinating 
with MSF to provide primary health care and monitor the 
nutritional status of the IDPs. Food aid is not necessary at 
this time because most households have been able to preserve 
food stocks following a bumper harvest in November and 
December. Since the distance of displacement was usually only 
a few kilometers, most IDPs will have access to their fields 
in 2006.  IDP leaders have dissuaded ICRC from distributing 
tents out of concern that it would make their villages more 
attractive to looters. 
 
7. (U) In addition to the IDPs noted above, the World Food 
Program (WFP) has identified 1,200 Chadians who fled border 
areas near Goz Beida and traveled two hundred miles to the 
town of Mongo in the district of Guera.  A WFP assessment 
mission in the week of February 27 - March 3 found that this 
population was originally from the Guera area, but had moved 
to locations along the Chad/Sudan border roughly forty years 
ago.  With the rise in insecurity along the border, the 
population decided to return to its area of origin. 
 
 
Insecurity Near Refugee Camps 
 
 
8. (U) Since December, armed groups have carjacked or stolen 
nine humanitarian vehicles and briefly detained numerous 
staff members such as the WFP chief of mission for eastern 
Chad and the UNHCR head of field office for Guereda.  The 
most recent attack against humanitarians occurred in the town 
of Iriba at 4pm on March 1st, when four uniformed armed men 
forced entry into the compound of Medecins Sans Frontieres, 
Luxembourg, stole a vehicle at gunpoint and headed east 
toward Sudan.  The authorities were notified within a few 
minutes of the theft but were unable to intercept the 
vehicle, which was recovered the following day where it had 
been abandoned a few kilometers from the Sudan border. The 
attackers were wearing Chadian military uniforms and are 
suspected to be deserters.  No one has been apprehended in 
conjunction with any of the nine vehicle incidents.  Many 
humanitarian workers believe that local government officials 
know who is responsible for the attacks but do not wish to 
respond because it is an internal Zaghawa affair.  In some 
cases, the extended family members of local authorities are 
rumored to be responsible for the attacks. 
 
9. (SBU) Insecurity to the east of Guereda and Iriba is 
colored by the presence of Chadian rebel group "SCUD." Senior 
staff from the NGO CARE believe that the town of Moudre 
(35km east of Guereda and 15 kilometers west of Am Nabak 
Camp) is under the control of SCUD forces.  They are in close 
contact with village leaders, who have advised them over the 
past weeks not to pass through the area. 
 
 
NDJAMENA 00000360  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
10. (U) UN agencies have repeatedly asked the Government of 
Chad (GoC) to take concrete action to reduce the threat posed 
to humanitarian workers and assets. Thus far, signals from 
the GoC have been mixed.  In a meeting with the UNHCR Deputy 
Representative on February 23, the Governor of Biltine said 
that he was not able to guarantee security for humanitarian 
staff, particularly in the area of Am Nabak Camp.  The 
following week, the sous-prefet of Guereda indicated to UNHCR 
that President Deby supported the addition of 150 gendarmes 
to the area, some of whom would monitor checkpoints along the 
roads leading to Am Nabak.  Local authorities are also saying 
that they will need material support from UNHCR fuel in 
particular, in order to provide this kind of support. 
 
11. (U) In a meeting with Ambassador Wall on Saturday, 
March 4, UNHCR Assistant High Commissioner Judy Chang-Hopkins 
and Representative Ana Liria-Franch asked if the US could 
provide vehicles and fuel to Chadian gendarmes. 
Ambassador Wall encouraged UNHCR to continue seeking ways to 
improve security in partnership with the local authorities. 
UNHCR may increase its monthly fuel ration to key 
sous-prefets to address this resource constraint issue. 
An interagency mission led by the UN Department of Security 
and Safety will begin a ten-day visit in Chad on March 6 to 
advise UNHCR on security arrangements for eastern Chad. 
 
12. (U) Senior staff from UNHCR and NGOs have made it clear 
that security must improve in order for them to provide 
adequate services to refugees in areas north of Adre. Because 
of multiple attacks against humanitarian vehicles in the 
Am Nabak area, all services except for water provision were 
suspended in the camp from February 14 to March 6.  The NGO 
Right to Play has indefinitely suspended its activities in 
eastern Chad.  Other NGOs are considering significant 
reductions in activities if the GoC is not able to provide 
more significant security guarantees in the coming weeks. 
 
13.  (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered. 
TAMLYN