VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNJ #0336/01 0601620
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011620Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3252
INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0950
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0254
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0622
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0487
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0306
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0701
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1181
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2460
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1567
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0926

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000336 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, INR, DRL, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA; 
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM CD
SUBJECT: CHAD:  MAVERICK OPPOSITIONIST UNDERLINES 
OPPOSITION DISUNITY 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 296 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:   Opposition leader Yorongar, in a call on 
the Ambassador February 27, said that the opposition would 
never agree on a single candidate but, if (huge if) fair 
elections could be assured, Deby would lose to almost anyone. 
 He cited recent rebel activity in the south as a further 
element of growing instability in Chad.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Ngarlejy Yorongar, traditionally the most outspoken 
of the opposition leaders in Chad, called on the Ambassador 
February 27.  His constituency is the oil-producing region in 
southern Chad (Eastern Logone province).  Unlike most other 
oppositionists who opposed Deby in the past two presidential 
elections he garnered some support outside his district, but 
he seems to have lost national standing due to intemperate 
accusations against virtually every politician on the scene. 
This past week he saw defection of three members of his 
opposition bloc within the National Assembly, thereby losing 
its previous standing as a voting bloc in the assembly. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Yorongar opened with a recital of all that ills 
Chad at present -- friction with Sudan, mounting instability 
in the East, an incipient rebellion in the South, and a 
crisis in relations with the World Bank.  He said that he was 
long on record condemning the incompetence of Chad,s 
negotiations with the oil companies.  Deby,s cronies and 
relatives had led these negotiations, had been out of their 
depth, and produced an agreement that gave Chad less than it 
deserved.  However, Yorongar said, the agreements with the 
oil companies and with the World Bank were in place and 
back-pedaling on them brought discredit to Chad.  In 
Yorongar,s analysis, the prospect of oil revenues had 
whetted Deby,s appetite for power on a bigger stage, 
propelling him to incite rebellion in Darfur and seek more 
money to buy the armaments necessary to sustain these 
ambitions.  Yorongar took particular umbrage at what he 
described as inadequate recompense in the oil agreements for 
his home oil-producing area. 
 
¶4. (SBU) As for rebellion in the South, Yorongar cited two 
separate series of incidents that he claimed had taken place 
in the past two weeks.  First, he said, a rebel group 
operating under Col. Michel Mbailemal had staged two attacks 
in the area of the towns of Bam and Bessao in the area close 
to the tri-border with Cameroon and CAR.  They had destroyed 
vehicles and for a time occupied the town of Bessao before 
withdrawing.  A second group under Col. Dassert was operating 
in Moyen Chari province between Bailli and Sarh.  It had 
destroyed 12 vehicles in one attack and four in another, and 
seized four officers from the Chadian armed forces.  Yorongar 
emphasized two aspects to these attacks:  these groups were 
operating with ease near cities such as Moundou and Sarh and 
could probably attack them too, and the government forces, 
reprisals were wrought against the villages.  Yorongar 
claimed that the armed forces were too thin on the ground to 
do much to impede the rebels, but they were harming innocent 
southern villagers, about whom the northern government,s 
feelings had never been tender. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The Ambassador turned the discussion to the 
announcement that presidential elections would take place May 
3 -- would Yorongar participate?   Yorongar did not answer 
directly but said the populace was sick and tired of fake 
elections.   The opposition had made a serious proposal in 
September to President Deby to institute a dialogue leading 
toward a fair election, but Deby had not taken up the offer. 
Yorongar said that he would favor a deferral of the election, 
but it would only be useful if the deferral were at least 
six-eight months and if there were strict international 
supervision of a process to rectify the electoral lists and 
reconstitute the electoral commission. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Noting that Yorongar had not joined the opposition 
coalition CPDC with the other prominent oppositionists, the 
Ambassador asked whether he would now join the coalition and 
work with it to produce a single candidate?  Yorongar said 
that he did not trust or respect the other oppositionists. 
They had betrayed him many times and had often taken cabinet 
 
positions in the government.  However, Yorongar said that he 
had not burned his bridges with them an he was ready to work 
with them. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Yoongar said that he agreed with the Ambassador,s 
bservation that those in power would beefit from disunity 
in the opposition.  However, he said, neither the opposition 
in general nor the CPDC in particular would ever agree on a 
single candidate.  He cited his experience during the 
election of 1996, when he was arrested and beaten, was no 
longer at that time able to use his legs, had gone to Paris 
for medical treatment, and received a visit there from two of 
the other principal candidates, Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue and 
Jean Bawoyeu Alingue.  He said he had told them he would take 
himself out of the running and had urged the two of them to 
decide on a single candidate -- but they had refused, and 
they would always refuse. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) In any case, Yorongar said, the benefit to Deby 
would not be nearly enough to get him elected on an even 
playing field.  If a serious dialogue with the opposition got 
under way, leading to a new electoral list and commission and 
an election under strict international supervision -- if 
there were a free and fair election -- there could be any 
number of candidates and Deby could present himself again as 
a candidate, but he would lose even in the North. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Comment:  Yorongar,s assessment of opposition 
disunity is as bleak as the French Ambassador,s (reftel). 
Members of the CPDC assure us privately that they could come 
up with a single candidate if a serious dialogue got under 
way, but their claim is untested.   Yorongar is not that 
single candidate as no credible interlocutor believes that he 
could ever command national support.   The southern rebel 
activity is relatively minor by comparison with events in the 
East but bears watching. 
WALL