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Viewing cable 06MADRID787, ETA CEASE FIRE: HOW IT HAPPENED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MADRID787 2006-03-31 15:22 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Madrid
VZCZCXRO8995
PP RUEHAG RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ
RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHMD #0787/01 0901522
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 311522Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9294
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 1832
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000787 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PGOV SP
SUBJECT: ETA CEASE FIRE: HOW IT HAPPENED 
 
REF: A. MADRID 779 
     B. MADRID 766 
     C. MADRID 720 
     D. MADRID 707 
     E. OSLO 374 
 
MADRID 00000787  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. The small group of advisers who have guided the Zapatero 
government's contacts with ETA remain tightlipped about their 
activities due to the extreme political sensitivity and 
domestic controversy surrounding the issue.  Spanish 
officials have maintained this silence even as they discussed 
other aspects of the ETA announcement with us and praised the 
public USG reaction (REFS A and D).  However, by tracking 
news reports and other open source information over the last 
two years regarding the activities of parties thought to be 
involved in the negotiations, post's political analyst has 
developed an outline of the key events that led to ETA's 
March 22 cease fire declaration.  At the moment, this 
analysis provides the clearest picture we have as to how the 
cease fire came about: 
 
//BASQUE SOCIALISTS PLAY KEY ROLE// 
 
2. According to news reports, Jesus Eguiguren, the President 
of the Socialist Party of Euzkadi (PSE) (the Basque branch of 
the Socialist Party (PSOE)), sent a message to President 
Zapatero shortly after Zapatero's March, 2004 victory over 
the Popular Party (PP) advising Zapatero that he had had an 
open channel to ETA front group Batasuna since 2000.  This 
was a sensitive issue, since the PSOE and PP leadership had 
agreed in 2000 to coordinate their counterterrorism policies 
and to keep each other informed of any terrorism-related 
initiatives undertaken by their parties.  Further, the PSOE 
and PP had worked together to pass the Law of Political 
Parties in 2002, which was developed to strip Batasuna of its 
legal status because of its refusal to condemn terrorism, 
thus removing ETA from the political process and terminating 
Batasuna's access to public funds.  Nonetheless, the Zapatero 
government reportedly instructed Eguiguren to continue 
discreet contacts with Batasuna.  Zapatero did not advise the 
PP that such contacts were taking place. 
 
3. These contacts were personal rather than institutional, 
reflecting the importance of friendships and family 
connections in the Basque Region's small but tempestuous 
political environment.  PSE leader Jesus Eguiguren, joined by 
senior PSE figure Francisco Egea, met with Batasuna leaders 
Arnaldo Otegi and Pernando Barrena and with Rafael Diez 
Usabiaga, secretary general of the radical Basque labor union 
"LAB."  Despite their political differences, Egea and Otegi 
were lifelong friends, having been raised near each other in 
the small town of Elgoibar in the Basque heartland of 
Guipuzcoa.  From 2000 to 2004, contacts among these political 
figures were intermittent and informal. 
 
4. Beginning in the fall of 2004, contacts among PSE and 
Batasuna leaders intensified and they began to meet regularly 
in the small village of Txillarre.  Batasuna, which was 
barred from political activity under the Law of Political 
Parties, expressed interest in participating in the April, 
2005 Basque Regional elections through the presentation of a 
list of candidates with no criminal records.  Eguiguren 
evidently suggested this might be possible and inquired about 
the possibility of an ETA cease fire announcement. 
 
5. While discussions on a cease fire did not progress, 
Batasuna was eventually able to field candidates through the 
obscure "Communist Party of the Basque Lands," (EHAK).  The 
government declined to bar EHAK's participation in the April 
elections despite Civil Guard reports indicating that EHAK 
was the political heir to Batasuna.  Both the PSE and EHAK 
scored major gains in the April vote, at the expense of the 
PP and the moderate Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). 
 
//CONVERSATIONS EXPAND// 
 
6. Following the Basque Regional elections, the Zapatero 
government evidently decided to broaden its discussions with 
Batasuna.  On June 21, 2005, PSE leader Eguiguren and Spanish 
government intermediaries attended a meeting with Batasuna 
leader Otegi in the French town of Saint Jean de Pied de 
Port.  Also present as facilitators were retired French 
Cardinal Roger Etxegaray and another French priest.  The 
conversation on that date moved to specific issues, such as 
the treatment of ETA prisoners and considerations for victims 
of ETA terrorism. 
 
7. When reports of this and other meetings appeared in the 
Spanish press, senior PSOE figures Jose Blanco and Alfredo 
Perez Rubalcaba denied that any conversations with ETA were 
underway.  But Batasuna spokesman Joseba Permarch clarified 
that while there were no "official" contacts, personal 
 
MADRID 00000787  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
contacts had taken place.  There were also separate reports 
of another set of contacts between ETA representatives and 
members of the Spanish security services.  Zapatero's Chief 
of Staff, Jose Enrique Serrano, was identified as the key 
figure overseeing these contacts (regarding which there is 
almost no additional information). 
 
8. Meanwhile, additional contacts were taking place outside 
of the Basque Region.  Spanish daily "El Pais" reports that 
meetings between unnamed Spanish government representatives 
took place during the summer and fall of 2005 in Oslo, Norway 
and in Geneva, Switzerland.  It was during one of the 
meetings in Geneva that the ETA representatives indicated 
that the organization was prepared to declare a "permanent 
cease fire." 
 
//CEASE FIRE PLAN COMES TOGETHER// 
 
9. On November 16, 2005, PSE and Batasuna representatives 
reportedly held a critical meeting in Txillare to review 
details of a possible cease fire.  Rumors began circulating 
almost immediately that an ETA truce was imminent, including 
reports that, under the terms of an informal agreement, 
Batasuna would be permitted to run in the 2007 Basque 
municipal elections under a different organizational name in 
exchange for agreement by ETA to accept delaying a 
controversial political agreement until after the 2008 
general elections.  As a gesture of goodwill, the government 
would relocate ETA prisoners to the Basque Region to allow 
them to be near their families.  NOTE: In a March 26 
interview with El Pais, President Zapatero indicated that he 
would accept both the political participation of a renamed 
Batasuna and the relocation of ETA prisoners to the Basque 
Region.  END NOTE. 
 
10. Also in November, there was another meeting in Oslo, 
during which an ETA representative reconfirmed to a Spanish 
government intermediary ETA's readiness to declare a cease 
fire, though ETA did not indicate when a declaration would be 
issued.  In early March, rumors of an impending cease fire 
began to pick up pace, with the sudden announcement on March 
22 that ETA would release a statement that day. 
 
//WHO ARE THE MEDIATORS?// 
 
11. While it is clear that Batasuna and Basque Socialist 
representatives played leading roles, it is less certain who 
the other facilitators may have been.  Three names routinely 
put forward by observers are: 
 
- Retired French Cardinal Roger Etxegaray, who had experience 
as a mediator in Kosovo, Timor, the Middle East, Chiapas, and 
Iraq.  Etxegaray is close to Bishop Uriarte of San Sebastian, 
who is himself related to a noted ETA lawyer. 
 
- Basque priest Joseba Segura.  Segura is a close associate 
of Bishop Uriarte and reportedly has a close relationship 
with radical Basque labor leader Rafael Usabiaga. 
 
- Irish priests Alec Reid and Harold Good.  Alec Reid, who 
has traveled to the Basque Region, is reportedly held in high 
regard by radical Basque nationalists for his role in the 
Northern Ireland peace process.  Sinn Fein figures Gerry 
Kelly and Alex Maskey, who say they have participated in the 
ETA peace process, credit Alec Reid as having provided 
"spiritual guidance" during ETA discussions. 
 
NOTE: While Basque nationalists have a historically close 
relationship to the Basque Catholic Church, the Spanish 
Catholic Church is divided on the issue.  Bishop Blazquez of 
Bilbao (currently President of the Spanish Episcopal 
Conference) praised the cease fire declaration, while the 
Secretary General of the Episcopal Conference called the ETA 
 
SIPDIS 
statement "insufficient."  This split reflects a broader 
divergence between Spanish Catholics loyal to Madrid's 
central authority and Basque Catholics, who have generally 
supported Basque nationalist sentiment.  END NOTE. 
 
//COMMENT// 
 
12. As noted above, the actual participants in the 
ETA-government discussions have not discussed their roles, 
and it is unlikely that they will do so in the near future. 
The facts are further obscured by a proliferation of reports 
indicating high-level participation in the peace talks, 
including reports of participation by Prime Minister Tony 
Blair, former President Clinton, and others.  It appears more 
likely that there were several sets of discussions underway 
at the same time, all of which contributed to building good 
will between the parties.  The difficult negotiations have 
yet to come, as ETA comes to terms with a non-military 
resolution to the conflict and the Spanish government and 
 
MADRID 00000787  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
political parties debate how far to go in accomodating 
radical Basque nationalist interests. 
AGUIRRE