VZCZCXRO1914
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0728/01 0820720
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 230720Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1994
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KHARTOUM 000728 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AF/EA, DCHA 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
USMISSION UN ROME 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JMELINE, TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KAWC SU
SUBJECT: ABYEI REVISITED - POWER VACUUM REMAINS 
 
REF:  a) Khartoum 2138, b) Khartoum 2140 
 
KHARTOUM 00000728  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
------------------- 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
¶1.  This is the second of two cables prepared by a USAID 
team that visited South Kordofan State and Abyei from 
February 17 to March 8, 2006.  The purpose of the mission 
was to a) monitor USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, 
and Humanitarian Assistance (USAID/DCHA) programs, b) 
assess the returns process, c) examine protection issues, 
d) examine the humanitarian and transition issues, and e) 
identify potential additional areas of assistance to 
facilitate realization of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA). 
 
¶2.  Per Ref B, it is clear that local and returnee 
populations in Abyei continue to have unrealistically 
high expectations of support from the international 
community.  The inability of these populations to see 
peace dividends is resulting in increasing levels of 
frustration, which could upset the process of 
normalization engendered by the CPA.  The approaching 
rainy season and resulting difficulty of movement is 
likely to exacerbate tensions and frustrations.  A 
humanitarian crisis stemming from poor hygiene 
conditions, coupled with an absence of services, is very 
likely during the rains. 
 
¶3.  In addition to the previous recommendations (Ref B) 
the team recommends additional interventions to reduce 
and mitigate tensions between the Misseriya and Dinka 
populations and address the frustration of the local 
communities towards the international community.  Such 
interventions should include:  increasing awareness of 
nomad migration routes and movements; livelihood support 
involving water catchments and storage containers; 
assistance for milling cereals; conflict resolution 
through support to family tracing and unification 
initiatives; and civil society engagement in the 
implementation of the Abyei protocol.  It is critical to 
implement the humanitarian interventions before the 
advent of the rainy season in order to reduce 
frustrations and demonstrate some peace dividends before 
movement becomes difficult, if not impossible.  End 
summary and comment. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶4.  A USAID team of staff from the USAID/Khartoum and 
USAID/Washington visited Abyei from March 5 - 8, 2006, to 
review the humanitarian and transition situation and to 
identify critical interventions in advance of the rainy 
season.  The team's work should be seen in the context of 
the recently drafted USAID Sudan strategy, which 
emphasizes assistance to the three areas, especially in 
supporting the implementation of the CPA, standing up of 
state governments, and assistance to returnees. 
 
¶5.  The political situation remains as reported 
previously (Ref B).  There continues to be little 
progress on implementation of the Abyei protocol. 
Confusion over the location of authority continues.  The 
U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) indicated that the two 
parties could not agree on the modalities for 
implementation of the protocol.  This has resulted in a 
lack of services to the local community and a focus on 
meeting daily needs rather than addressing larger issues. 
 
¶6.  Local police forces ave cee. a2aated$ but0thejrQ 
cpaciI$){#|ilis|l  b in?zmi`}>{j(NovkmwlQoD|Q};QM4QHWQther logistical support, 
as well as basic supplies such 
as stationery to facilitate the work of local police. 
The police force in Abyei is not integrated, a factor 
that could affect the force's ability to work credibly in 
some areas. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000728  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
¶7.  UNMIS reported that despite tensions between the 
Misseriya nomads and Dinka, no incidents of violence have 
occurred in the Abyei area of responsibility.  There is 
concern that when the Misseriya and other nomadic groups 
begin northward migration after the rainy season begins 
in May, tensions could flare. 
 
¶8.  A checkpoint has been established immediately north 
of Abyei town.  It is not possible to proceed beyond this 
checkpoint without obtaining a permit from the National 
Security office in Abyei.  UNMIS has been unable to 
travel north of the town for several weeks because of a 
decision to not apply for the permit (Note: Under the 
Status of Forces Agreement between the U.N. and the GNU, 
the U.N. should not have to apply for permits.  End 
note.)  Monitoring of the CPA has not occurred north of 
the checkpoint for some time.  UNMIS was unable to 
monitor troop movements north of town, and therefore was 
unable to fulfill its mandate until after an altercation 
on March 7.  This checkpoint has also restricted USAID 
partners' humanitarian access north of Abyei. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Returns - Desires, Expectations, and Frustrations 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶9.  The willingness to return to areas of origin is high. 
Potential returnees indicated that if they had sufficient 
funds they would return in spite of a known absence of 
basic services. Spontaneous returns continue.  The 
Sudanese Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SRRC) 
reported that 25,681 people have returned to the Abyei 
area during the past year.  Similarly, UNMIS estimated 
that 25,000 have returned.  UNMIS reports that returns 
have recently decreased from more than 500 per week to 
less than 250, noting that it is too soon to know whether 
this represents a trend.  Undoubtedly the absence of 
organized returns prevents UNMIS from having completely 
accurate figures; however, the veracity of the SRRC 
numbers is also questionable. 
 
¶10.  There are approximately 20 emerging villages around 
Abyei town.  The total population of these settlements is 
approximately 11,000 to 13,000 people.  Services in most 
of these villages are generally lacking. 
 
¶11.  Returnees to the Abyei area had been led to believe 
that services would be in place upon arrival and demanded 
more assistance.  Many returnees sold assets in order to 
return.  This factor combined with the absence of 
services has increased their vulnerability and potential 
for abuse and exploitation.  UNMIS-Child Protection 
estimates that more than 200 street children can be found 
in the Abyei market as a result of returnee families' 
inability to provide for them.  The chairman of the local 
Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in Abyei told 
the team that he was only a politician and therefore it 
was the international community's responsibility to 
provide humanitarian services to the local population. 
 
¶12.  One return community consisting of both Dinka and 
Misseriya in Golai, 27 kilometers north of Abyei, 
presented the USAID team with a list of needs.  The 
requests included:  establishment of a water yard; 
installation of hand pumps; construction of a permanent 
hospital/clinic (including free drug provision); creation 
of a school, and provision of food assistance; 
livelihoods support (a flour mill and agriculture inputs 
- seeds, tools, and a tractor); establishment of pit 
latrines and baths; and sports equipment and uniforms for 
youth.  Authorities have encouraged communities to expect 
this level of services without considering resource 
availability, necessary sequencing, or time requirements. 
Similar expectations were encountered in Rumamer, a Dinka 
returnee community.  This misinformation has contributed 
to returnees' high level of frustration with the 
international community's response. 
 
¶13.  Internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees 
often obtain information about conditions in areas of 
origin from informal networks.  Information about the CPA 
is very weak in Abyei.  The local population in Abyei is 
 
KHARTOUM 00000728  003.18 OF 005 
 
 
unaware of the special protocol governing the area and 
its special status. 
 
¶14.  UNMIS radio has not received its license to operate. 
The U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) is developing radio 
segments and an information campaign managed by the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) to address 
mine risk awareness, HIV/AIDS, child protection, family 
reunification services, sexual and gender-based violence, 
and some general information on the CPA.  These UNICEF 
and IOM information mechanisms are not yet functioning 
for unclear reasons. 
 
¶15.  UNMIS Returns, Reintegration, and Recovery unit 
(UNMIS RRR) has plans for 28 way stations to be 
established throughout the south and the transition 
areas, including outside Abyei town.  The way stations 
will be managed by IOM, the Office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), or the Norwegian 
Refugee Council (NRC).  The only two way stations 
operating currently are in Kosti and Malakal.  The 
absence of a government structure has inhibited land 
allocation for the Abyei way station.  Although the 
Misseriya object to construction of the way station and 
perceive it as an attempt to settle Dinka along migratory 
routes, the way station is necessary as Abyei is a major 
transit point to the south.  With no date set to resolve 
this issue, an interim measure to support returnees 
arriving and transiting through Abyei is recommended. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Protection - The Absence of Reporting 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶16.  There is a disturbing absence of awareness, 
discussion, or reporting on protection issues in the 
Abyei area.  Although Save the Children/US (SC/US) is 
engaged in child protection issues such as family tracing 
and reunification, and UNMIS-Child Protection refers 
cases to SC/US, the USAID/DCHA team was not aware of any 
dialogue among NGOs regarding broader protection issues. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Humanitarian and Transition Issues 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶17.  There is broad consensus that access to water is the 
primary humanitarian need and significant potential 
conflict driver.  In addition, health, access to free 
education, and economic and livelihood opportunities 
beyond mere subsistence may be necessary for returnees. 
 
¶18.  Access to water and migratory routes is the primary 
conflict driver between nomads and local populations. 
Relations between the communities were complicated during 
the war due to the nomads' occasional role as Government 
of Sudan-backed militia.  Tensions linger due to abuse 
and violence that occurred during the war, resulting in 
denial of access to traditional migratory routes and 
water.  Years of conflict have left many in the local 
population unaware of nomad migration patterns or 
movements, facilitating resource and other clashes.  In 
some cases, returnees have spilled over from established 
communities and created settlements at water points along 
centuries-old migratory routes.  Consequently low-level 
but sporadic conflicts occur.  This ensuing threat to 
nomad livelihoods combined with frustration from unseen 
peace dividends is a conflict driver. 
 
¶19.  As previously reported, access to water is the key 
issue in sustaining returns, promoting recovery, and 
mitigating the potential for conflict.  In Abyei, a lack 
of drilling rigs has severely inhibited construction of 
the 80 donor-funded boreholes for the area.  Limited 
water resources exacerbate tensions between sedentary and 
returnee communities and nomadic groups, and generates 
frustration targeted at the international community. 
Water access is significantly below SPHERE standards; 
however, existing donor resources would likely prove 
insufficient to meet those standards or the expectations 
of local populations.  The confirmation of European Union 
funding for an NGO consortium and the purchase of a 
 
KHARTOUM 00000728  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
drilling rig for SC/US is a welcome development. 
 
¶20.  Access to free education was identified as the 
second priority of return populations.  A deficiency of 
trained educators, lack of a common curriculum due to 
absence of local government, and the absence of an 
agreement on the language of instruction present 
significant obstacles to ensuring quality education. 
Current programs in former GOS and SPLM/A areas continue 
in parallel, resulting in duplication of effort, risking 
fragmentation of the Abyei areas education system, and 
creating a potential for conflict. 
 
¶21.  The population values education highly.  The 
critical issue from a practical and policy perspective is 
whether or not the curriculum will be taught in Arabic or 
English.  Designation of language(s) of instruction is 
significant to ensure economic opportunities for all 
groups of the population and maximize possible linkages 
to markets in both northern and sub-Saharan Africa.  The 
lack of a government or overarching political framework 
prevents a determination on the issue.  The general 
population desires access to free education in either 
Arabic or English.  The largest pool of existing 
resources for capacity building and delivery is in 
Arabic, the local lingua franca. 
 
¶22.  People also expressed a need for economic and 
livelihoods recovery.  Basic infrastructure is a critical 
need.  Road rehabilitation and construction would 
facilitate access to services and markets for newly 
established villages and create needed short-term income- 
generation activities.  Improved road conditions would 
ease the burden of the tremendous workload that women in 
the Abyei area face moving to markets, health facilities, 
or towns. 
 
¶23.  In Abyei the combined SRRC/Humanitarian Aid 
Commission (HAC) office essentially has dissolved, with 
only the SRRC component functioning.  The Acting 
Administrator for Abyei accused the SRRC of directing 
resources to SPLM areas only, at the expense of the 
general population.  Although this claim could not be 
verified, it appeared that HAC representation on the 
SRRC/HAC was weak. 
 
¶24.  The population in Abyei was generally unaware of the 
existence of a protocol governing the status of the area. 
The major reason for this appeared to be the general 
population's daily occupation with meeting basic needs. 
The feeling of people familiar with Abyei issues is that 
pressure is mounting on the presidency to appoint a 
government.  National Security has filled the governance 
gap in the absence of movement to appoint a government in 
Abyei.  The lack of democratic institutions precludes 
formalized conflict resolution between Misseriya and 
Dinka populations.  Although to date, traditional 
mechanisms have reduced tensions and maintained peace, 
this system is fragile in the absence of a neutral 
Sudanese arbiter to work with both groups. 
 
--------------- 
Recommendations 
--------------- 
 
¶25.  Water catchments and storage facilities:  This is 
particularly urgent in Abyei.  Distribution of containers 
to store water, training in rainwater harvesting, and the 
establishment of hafirs where possible.  These activities 
should augment USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster 
Assistance (USAID/OFDA) -supported water access 
activities currently underway. 
 
¶26.  Health and hygiene awareness:  The sanitary 
situation in town is poor and should be addressed before 
the onset of the rainy season.  Garbage surrounds 
containers, which are not collected or emptied.  General 
knowledge of basic hygiene and sanitation appear to be 
absent.  There is a high risk of hygiene and sanitation 
related diseases during the rainy season if measures are 
not taken immediately to improve the sanitation situation 
and hygiene awareness. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000728  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
 
¶27.  Mapping and rerouting of migratory routes: 
Ensuring adequate water availability along current 
migratory routes through negotiation with local 
communities, augmentation of existing capacity, or 
establishment of new water points in cases where 
migratory paths are rerouted to avoid newly domicile 
populations. 
 
¶28.  Distribution of mortars and pestles to returnee 
populations:  This distribution should become a de facto 
income subsidy and reduce the travel burden on women. 
Distribution would be the first part of a two-phase 
milling project.  The second phase might involve a 
potential Global Development Alliance (GDA) partnership 
between USAID, a company selling mills and related 
services, and local communities.  USAID would subsidize 
the cost, with local communities contributing resources 
to cover the difference between the market and subsidized 
price.  The purchase price should include spare parts and 
maintenance for one -to two years.  Such an approach 
would promote ownership as well as the local economy. 
WFP will be importing manual mills (one per village), and 
the team recommends that this initiative be supported. 
 
¶29.  Family tracing and reunification:  The peace 
dividends are immense for families and local communities 
through the restoration of family and kinship units and 
the closure this brings to suffering.  SC/US implements 
this program with UNICEF funding.  USAID funds could 
augment and expand SC/US activities. 
 
¶30.  Way station:  As an interim measure, a temporary way 
station should be established in Abyei town; however, 
finding the appropriate implementing partner with spare 
capacity is challenging.  This should be seen as a stop- 
gap measure until the U.N. way station is functioning. 
 
¶31.  Civil society consultation process for 
implementation of the protocols:  Engaging local leaders, 
NGOs, and communities with information on the protocols 
and providing an opportunity for input is critical.  This 
would not only improve awareness and understanding of the 
CPA and protocols, but also enhance ownership of the 
process by the general population. 
 
STEINFELD