Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM694, WEST DARFUR - GARSILA AND MUKJAR UPDATE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06KHARTOUM694.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM694 2006-03-19 03:46 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO4151
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0694/01 0780346
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 190346Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1944
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000694 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AF/EA, DCHA 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
USMISSION UN ROME 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JMELINE, TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KAWC SU
SUBJECT:  WEST DARFUR - GARSILA AND MUKJAR UPDATE 
 
REF:  Khartoum 0619 
 
------------------- 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
1.  This is the second in a series of three USAID cables 
giving an overview of the humanitarian situation in West 
Darfur State.  In early March, two USAID Field Officers 
visited Beja, Deleig, Garsila, and Mukjar in the Zalingei 
- Mukjar corridor of West Darfur.  The purpose of the 
trip was threefold:  to examine the humanitarian 
situation in the area; see firsthand the effects of 
funding shortages on USAID partner programs; and attend 
the opening of a USAID-funded medical clinic in Deleig 
that is expected to improve healthcare services for 
thousands of beneficiaries.  Current limited funding only 
allows aid agencies to focus on life-saving activities in 
internally displaced persons (IDP) camps and larger 
villages in the Zalingei corridor, leaving some 
communities and conflict-affected populations underserved 
when compared to the larger concentrations of IDPs that 
are more easily accessible to humanitarians. 
 
2.  The general humanitarian situation south of Zalingei 
is stable.  Tensions are low between Arab nomads and 
settled, non-Arab tribes.  The U.N. World Food Program's 
(WFP) decision to reduce food rations by half in 
anticipation of the harvest, combined with the 
elimination of services outside major villages due to 
funding shortages, has the potential to exacerbate 
tensions and create a greater pull factor toward villages 
with non-governmental organization (NGO) services. 
Additionally, reports of increased militia activity in 
the area, including aggressive recruiting around villages 
with high concentrations of IDPs, could contribute to a 
destabilization of the security situation.  The USAID 
Darfur Field Office (USAID/DFO) will monitor the 
situation closely in the coming months.  End summary and 
comment. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
3.  From March 2 - 6, two USAID field officers traveled 
with representatives of USAID partner International 
Medical Corps (IMC) to the Zalingei - Mukjar corridor of 
West Darfur.  The USAID/DFO mission focused on the major 
villages south of Zalingei: Deleig and Garsila in Wadi 
Salih locality, and Mukjar in Mukjar locality.  According 
to U.N. Humanitarian Profile #22, the localities of Wadi 
Salih and Mukjar have a combined conflict-affected 
population of approximately 132,000, including 115,000 
IDPs.  The NGOs working in the Garsila area of Wadi Salih 
locality reported that the population has grown from 
7,000 predominantly Fur inhabitants pre-cOnfli#t to 
30,Q00 p2erEjtl{,"T`0IDXsare%Inwec3yp`#9fuG&h`}WjnOz  Arab nomads from camel-herding tribes are 
present in the countryside.  Although the nomads enter 
Garsila and Deleig daily to access the markets, no rise 
in tensions has been reported.  However, Garsila IDPs 
claim they will not go home until the "janjaweed" lay 
down their weapons. 
 
5.  Like Garsila, the IDP population in Mukjar is 
predominantly Fur and integrated into the host 
population.  The original population of Mukjar consisted 
of Zaghawa, the majority of whom now reside in Kalma camp 
in Nyala, South Darfur.  The displaced Fur currently 
occupy much of the Zaghawa land, complicating potential 
returns.  In November 2005, a headcount by the NGO Mercy 
Corps found the Mukjar population to be 14,600.  The 
population size remained stable from April to November 
2005, but has grown by 700 in recent months.  As in 
 
KHARTOUM 00000694  002 OF 003 
 
 
Garsila, there seems to be little tension between the 
Arab nomad population and the inhabitants of Mukjar. 
Suspected Chadian armed opposition from farther south 
also access the market with few problems reported. 
 
--------------------- 
Humanitarian Overview 
--------------------- 
 
6.  In general, humanitarian indicators have remained 
stable in Garsila and Mukjar in recent months.  USAID 
partners in Garsila and Mukjar have focused on health, 
water, and sanitation services mainly in larger villages. 
The Sudanese Red Crescent Society is the only 
humanitarian agency focusing on nomadic populations 
throughout the corridor.  In Garsila, the U.N. Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
coordinates the humanitarian agencies and their 
activities, including assistance to new arrivals.  In 
Mukjar, which lacks a full-time OCHA presence, Mercy 
Corps acts as the de facto coordinating agency. 
 
7.  The NGOs Tearfund and Intersos distributed seeds in 
2005, and healthy vegetable gardens are visible near the 
wadis.  A variety of vegetables are available in local 
markets.  However, the Government of National Unity (GNU) 
Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC) representative in 
Garsila reported that the grain harvest was not good this 
season in the Wadi Salih area.  According to the HAC 
representative, a small percentage of the population 
planted only small parcels of land near Garsila, and 
birds and pests damaged much of the staple crops.  In 
Mukjar, grazing cattle destroyed much of the grain 
harvest. 
 
8.  After a preliminary assessment following planting 
last year, WFP reduced the monthly general food 
distribution to one half ration for January through March 
2006, in anticipation of increased availability of 
locally produced food.  A recent WFP market analysis in 
the Mukjar area has shown an increase in grain prices. 
This increase is expected to have a negative impact on 
food availability and accessibility during the hunger gap 
season, typically May through September in Darfur. 
 
9.  Healthcare coverage is generally lacking in the area. 
U.N. Humanitarian Profile #22 reports a 47 percent gap in 
healthcare coverage in Garsila.  The USAID field officers 
visited the Garsila hospital, which receives patients 
from as far away as Chad and the Central African 
Republic.  Medecins sans Frontieres/Holland (MSF/H) has 
been providing drugs, medical supplies, charting 
materials, staffing support, training, equipment, food, 
and outpatient services.  MSF/H plans to withdraw by June 
2006, leaving no agency to fill considerable gaps.  USAID 
partner IMC runs four mobile clinics north out of Garsila 
to the villages of Ordo, Katool, Beja, and Waro, and 
three mobile clinics south out of Zalingei to the 
villages of Terej, Karti, and Irikom.  IMC also visits Um 
Kher, west of Garsila, once a week.  Through all of these 
mobile clinic programs, IMC sees more than 2,600 patients 
monthly.  IMC also provides training to community health 
educators and community midwives. 
 
10.  According to the U.N. Humanitarian Profile, Mukjar 
town and surrounding areas have a healthcare coverage gap 
of 14 percent; however, Um Dukhon administrative unit 
within Mukjar locality has a gap of 73 percent.  In 
Mukjar, IMC supports a GNU Ministry of Health clinic that 
is the only operational clinic in Mukjar locality. 
Nomads and residents from surrounding villages use the 
clinic; the daily caseload is approximately 100, 
excluding ante-natal and immunization patients. 
 
11.  Water and sanitation coverage is generally good in 
Garsila and Mukjar towns, but coverage gaps exist in some 
rural areas.  The water table is high across Wadi Salih, 
and villagers have access to water through wells. 
Several NGOs implement water and sanitation programs in 
Wadi Salih.  Water availability contributes to the high 
nomadic population and the numerous cattle in the area. 
In Mukjar, USAID partner Mercy Corps implements water and 
 
KHARTOUM 00000694  003 OF 003 
 
 
sanitation programs.  Mercy Corps provided 8 hand-dug 
wells and 15 hand pumps, and is taking on IRC's 
sanitation programs as IRC withdraws.  Mercy Corps runs a 
program through which28 women collect garbage daily from 
designated areas.  Mercy Corps also implements a hygiene 
promotion program that reaches nearly all households in 
Mukjar. 
 
12.  Despite a relatively stable humanitarian situation, 
since January 2006 the security situation has 
deteriorated.  According to OCHA, increased militia 
recruitment and the presence of suspected Chadian armed 
opposition in the area has caused some IDPs to remain in 
villages rather than leave to cultivate fields or forage 
for food.  As a result, livelihoods suffer as IDPs have 
less access to arable land, firewood, grasses, and other 
necessary items.  As of March 9, partners in the Mukjar 
area report a noticeable increase in tensions in and 
around the area related to Chadian armed opposition 
activity and attacks on commercial trucks. 
 
---------------------------- 
Effects of Funding Shortages 
---------------------------- 
 
13.  Although USAID partners and the humanitarian 
community have improved the humanitarian situation in the 
Zalingei - Mukjar corridor since 2004, NGO budget 
shortfalls threaten to quickly erode progress.  In Mukjar 
locality, Mercy Corps ceased all programs in the rural 
areas and now focuses on providing services in the 
village.  Mercy Corps has removed livelihood programs and 
all village outreach activities from its 2006 plan. 
IRC is pulling out, creating a strain on the financial 
resources of the other NGOs operating in the village. 
 
14.  In Garsila, IMC does not have funds take on support 
of the hospital as MSF/H withdraws.  Due to limited 
funding from USAID/OFDA and other donors, IMC will not be 
able to operate seven mobile clinic sites in areas north 
of Garsila after April 2006.  In Deleig, IMC previously 
operated a nutrition feeding center on the site of a 
primary health clinic.  No agency is currently providing 
nutrition interventions in Deleig, although IMC continues 
to conduct nutrition screening in the clinic and refers 
severe cases to Garsila hospital. 
 
15.  Comment:  Rural communities are already vulnerable 
because of the tense security situation and marginal 
harvests.  Without access to services during the upcoming 
rainy season, rural residents could be drawn to IDP camps 
in the larger cities.  However, the lack of security is 
likely to remain the primary factor of any continued 
displacements. 
 
HUME