VZCZCXRO5752
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0637/01 0700607
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 110607Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1859
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000637 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AF/EA, DCHA 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
USMISSION UN ROME 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JMELINE, TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KAWC SU
SUBJECT: NORTHERN BAHR EL GHAZAL - SOURCES OF FRAGILITY 
 
REF:  a) KHARTOUM 0620, b) KHARTOUM 0452, c) KHARTOUM 
2140, d) KHARTOUM 0491 
 
------------------- 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
¶1.  A team of USAID staff and key USAID partners visited 
Wau town in Western Bahr el Ghazal State (Ref a) and 
Aweil town in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State from February 
22 to 26.  The trip was part of a series of visits to 
areas of USAID Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and 
Humanitarian Assistance (USAID/DCHA) programming to 
investigate causes of fragility and how USAID/DCHA 
programs might reduce the potential for conflict.  This 
is the second of two cables on the visit and covers 
meetings and issues raised in Aweil. 
 
¶2.  Interlocutors in Aweil primarily voiced concern over 
the large number of Rezeigat nomads entering the state 
with cattle herds.  Residents expressed fear that the 
nomads are motivated for a potential "land grab" that 
could destabilize the area.  Returnees face challenges 
related to essential services and resolution of conflicts 
with host populations. 
 
¶3.  Support to Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) 
officials at the state, county, and village levels is 
imperative.  Development partners should urge the GoSS in 
Juba to disburse funds quickly to state and county 
governments, so that local authorities can undertake 
projects that directly and visibly improve people's 
lives.  USAID should continue a community-based approach 
to the provision of essential services, focusing on the 
most vulnerable war-affected populations, regardless of 
their status (displaced, returnee, or resident).  USAID 
should also continue to support local peace and 
reconciliation efforts, including those that address 
nomad-farmer relations, in Bahr el Ghazal and elsewhere 
in Southern Sudan.  End summary and comment. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶4. From February 22 to 26, USAID representatives and key 
partners visited Aweil town, the capital of Northern Bahr 
El Ghazal State, to investigate how USAID programs might 
reduce the potential for conflict and promote a 
stabilizing environment to support the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA).  The USAID team included 
USAID/Khartoum's internally displaced persons (IDP) 
returnee specialist, an Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster 
Assistance (USAID/OFDA) southern sector program officer, 
the Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) southern 
sector team leader, and an education specialist.  Three 
staff from USAID/OTI partner Development Alternatives, 
Inc. (DAI), and one representative from USAID partner 
Pact, Inc., also participated in the visits.  USAID/DCHA 
is supporting a number of NGOs and U.N. agencies in 
Northern Bahr el Ghazal. 
 
------------------- 
Aweil Town Meetings 
------------------- 
 
¶5.  The USAID team held numerous meetings with NGO 
implementing partners from Aweil town, Aweil West 
(Nyamlel), and Aweil East (Malual Kon and Warawar); U.N. 
partners; and GoSS officials to discuss the potential for 
conflict and factors affecting stability in Northern Bahr 
El Ghazal.  On February 25, the USAID team held a general 
meeting in Aweil town for 40 participants at the compound 
of the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA).  Participants in the general meeting 
included GoSS officials from the Sudan Relief and 
Rehabilitation Commission (SRRC); representatives from 
USAID partner organizations, such as Concern Worldwide, 
Pact, International Rescue Committee, Tearfund, and World 
Vision; and representatives from non-USAID funded NGOs 
such as Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF), Cordaid, the 
Diocese of Rumbek, and U.N. agencies. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000637  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶6.  As in Wau town, Arabic remains the dominant language 
of commerce in Aweil town.  Like Wau, Aweil town still 
has the feel of a "northern" town, and Aweil also appears 
to lean more toward Khartoum than to Juba for 
transportation, commerce, and services. 
 
-------------------- 
Sources of Fragility 
-------------------- 
 
¶7.  Migration of armed nomads:  Interlocutors reported 
that armed Rezeigat nomads and their cattle entered Aweil 
West and Aweil North Counties allegedly without 
traditional negotiations.  The SRRC State Secretary and 
others regard this as an organized effort politicized and 
supported financially from Khartoum to occupy land in 
Northern Bahr el Ghazal.  The SRRC State Secretary 
emphatically stated that he believed this was an effort 
not only to grab land, but also to "Islamicize" 
southerners.  The persistent fear of nomads voiced in 
Bahr el Ghazal (Reftel B), Abyei County (Reftel C), Unity 
State (Reftel D), and other areas that border nomad 
migratory routes is understandable.  The GoSS has little 
capacity to address the issue, and shrinking resources in 
the north and the growing size of herds is putting 
pressure on land in the south. 
 
¶8.  Limited resources:  The recent arrival of IDPs from 
South Darfur and returnees from the north could overwhelm 
the already extremely limited essential services.  Aweil 
town is suffering from a long-lasting water and 
sanitation problem that will be exacerbated during the 
rainy season and compounded by the growing urban 
population.  The severe drought resulting in less locally 
available food could trigger conflict over limited food 
supply. 
 
¶9.  IDP returns:  Returnees are arriving in large numbers 
to the state with no support provided en route. The 
International Organization for Migration has agreed with 
local authorities to put a way station in Warawar, a key 
entry point for those coming from the north, but the 
monitoring and tracking system in the state is still not 
in place.  To date, only 2,100 returnees have been 
registered in town, although the number is believed to be 
much higher.  An accurate number will be important to 
prepare for reintegration packages and to ensure that 
communities receiving the IDPs are also assisted.  To 
date, there has been no humanitarian crisis linked to the 
IDPs that have already returned. 
 
¶10.  Grievance, revenge, and ethnic issues:  Such issues 
continue to simmer and burn.  Peace and reconciliation 
efforts should the number one priority.  (Note:  Recently 
in Akuem, despite a shortage of qualified medical 
workers, Dinka chased out qualified Equatorians applying 
for jobs with MSF, still furious over the killing of 
Dinka in Equatoria earlier this year.  End note.) 
 
¶11.  Burning of markets:  Interlocutors reported that 12 
"non-Arab" markets in Northern Bahr el Ghazal have been 
burned during the past year.  This arson is believed 
widely to be perpetrated by people with political motives 
encouraged by "Khartoum." 
 
¶12.  Weak GoSS and traditional court capacity:  The 
capacity of the GoSS in Aweil town is limited, and it is 
unable to meet or manage the expectations of the people. 
Traditional conflict resolution systems (traditional 
courts) have been disempowered during the war and need 
some limited support to become effective again. 
 
¶13.  Slow progress in implementing the CPA:  This is a 
major concern throughout Southern Sudan, and it was 
obvious that the average citizen understands very little 
about the CPA. 
 
¶14.  Small arms proliferation:  The proliferation of 
small arms continues despite a civilian disarmament 
campaign. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000637  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶15.  Alcohol-related problems:  Alcohol abuse and 
resulting conflict is increasing. 
 
--------------- 
Recommendations 
--------------- 
 
¶16.  Traditional leaders and courts need assistance in 
dealing with inter-tribal matters, such as relations with 
the Rezeigat, and other issues that involve land use, 
water, and migration routes for cattle. 
 
¶17.  Provision of water and sanitation services should be 
a high priority for the GoSS and donors, in addition to 
other basic services.  An equitable, community-based 
approach should drive the provision of assistance, 
prioritizing the most vulnerable populations regardless 
of their status.  To the extent possible, essential 
services should be established in rural areas to prevent 
returnees from overwhelming Aweil town. 
 
¶18.  Standing up an accountable GoSS state government 
system is critical.  Southern Sudanese need to have 
confidence in the ability of their government to meet the 
needs of the people.  GoSS ministries should replace NGOs 
as service providers as soon as possible.  The GoSS must 
incorporate traditional authority into new governing 
structures. 
 
¶19.  The general public does not understand the how the 
GoSS system works.  Dissemination of the CPA as well as 
an explanation of the GoSS administrative system is 
necessary. 
 
¶20.  The registration of Sudan People's Liberation Army 
soldiers, in order to effect payment, should be an urgent 
priority for supporting peace and stability.  The first 
phase of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration program is focusing on registration of 
child soldiers, women associated with armed groups, and 
the disabled.  Some individual disarmament is occurring 
in some states with weapons being cantoned for later 
demobilization. 
 
¶21.  Grievances and revenge issues between groups need to 
be confronted and addressed through reconciliation, rule 
of law, and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. 
 
WHITAKER