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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM620, WESTERN BAHR EL GHAZAL - SOURCES OF FRAGILITY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM620 2006-03-09 06:23 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO3058
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0620/01 0680623
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 090623Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1824
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000620 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AF/EA, DCHA 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
USMISSION UN ROME 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JMELINE, TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KAWC SU
SUBJECT: WESTERN BAHR EL GHAZAL - SOURCES OF FRAGILITY 
 
REF: a) KHARTOUM 0452, b) KHARTOUM 2140, c) KHARTOUM 0491 
 
------------------- 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
1.  A team of USAID staff and key USAID partners visited 
Wau town in Western Bahr el Ghazal State and Aweil town 
in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State from February 22 to 26. 
The trip was part of a series of visits to areas of USAID 
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian 
Assistance (USAID/DCHA) programming to investigate causes 
of fragility and how USAID/DCHA programs might reduce the 
potential for conflict.  This is the first of two cables 
on the visit and covers meetings and issues raised in 
Wau. 
 
2.  Interlocutors in Wau primarily voiced concern over 
the large number of Fallata nomads entering the state 
with cattle herds, trampling the season's cassava crop. 
Residents also noted that nomads are armed and carry 
Thuraya satellite phones.  Residents expressed fear that 
the nomads are motivated for a potential "land grab" that 
could destabilize the area.  Returnees face challenges 
related to access to land, essential services, and 
resolution of conflicts with host populations. 
 
3.  Support to Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) state 
and county officials in Bahr el Ghazal is critical, as is 
support to local authorities at the grassroots and 
village level.  The GoSS in Juba should be strongly urged 
to get financial resources out to states and counties as 
quickly as possible and to undertake projects that 
directly help the people.  USAID should continue to 
support the community-based approach to the provision of 
essential services with particular attention to the most 
vulnerable war-affected populations, without regard to 
their status (displaced, returnee, or resident).  USAID 
should also continue to support localized peace and 
reconciliation efforts, including those that address 
nomad-farmer relations, in Bahr el Ghazal and elsewhere 
in Southern Sudan.  End summary and comment. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
4.  From February 22 to 26, USAID representatives and key 
partners visited Wau town, the capital of Western Bahr El 
Gazal State, to investigate how USAID programs might 
reduce the potential for conflict and promote a 
stabilizing environment to support the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA).  The USAID team included 
USAID/Khartoum's internally displaced persons (IDP) 
returnee specialist, an Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster 
Assistance (USAID/OFDA) southern sector program officer, 
the Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) southern 
sector team leader, and an education specialist.  Three 
staff from USAID/OTI partner Development Alternatives 
Inc. (DAI), and one representative from USAID partner 
PACT, also participated in the visits.  USAID/DCHA is 
supporting a number of NGOs and U.N. agencies in Western 
Bahr el Ghazal in sectors that include water and 
sanitation, health, and livelihoods. 
 
----------------- 
Wau Town Meetings 
----------------- 
 
5.  The USAID team held numerous meetings with 
implementing NGO partners, U.N. partners, and GoSS 
officials, including the Deputy Governor, to discuss the 
potential for conflict and factors affecting stability in 
Western Bahr El Ghazal.  In addition, on February 23, 
USAID held a general meeting at Peace Hall for more than 
20 participants, including GoSS officials from the Sudan 
Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SRRC) and Ministry 
of Education; representatives from USAID-funded NGOs such 
as International Rescue Committee and CARE; 
representatives from non-USAID funded NGOs such Islamic 
Relief and Norwegian Church Aid; and representatives from 
the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
 
KHARTOUM 00000620  002 OF 003 
 
 
Affairs, the U.N. Development Program, and the U.N. 
Mission in Sudan. 
 
6.  Wau town was a Government of Sudan (GOS) garrison 
town during the North-South civil war.  The Sudan 
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) surrounded Wau in the 
rural areas, so Wau was accessed via airlift that was 
highly dependent on weather and airstrip conditions. 
Food and commodities prices were high due to a narrow 
private sector monopoly on commerce.  Since the signing 
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), road traffic 
has opened, but land mines and poor road conditions still 
limit access.  Nonetheless, Wau is now contiguous with 
the rest of the state, an important element in the peace 
process.  Despite this, the USAID team found that Wau is 
still divided into Arab and non-Arab neighborhoods and 
business districts, although some integration is visible 
and freedom of movement is evident.  GOS flags and GoSS 
flags adorn the respective neighborhoods.  Arabic remains 
the dominant language of commerce.  Most signs in Wau 
town are in Arabic.  (Note: The wall outside the SRRC 
office has a signboard that reads "SRRC" in English, and 
above it, written in larger Arabic script is "HAC," the 
abbreviation for the northern Humanitarian Aid 
Commission.  End note.)  Radio Omdurman plays loudly 
everywhere.  It is difficult to find someone who listens 
to or has even heard of the USAID-funded Sudan Radio 
Service that broadcasts in English.  In summary, Wau town 
still retains its garrison town character and looks 
towards Khartoum rather than Juba for business, trade, 
and transportation. 
 
-------------------- 
Sources of Fragility 
-------------------- 
 
7.  Migration of Fallata nomads through the state and 
invasion of nomad cattle into farmland:  Nomad migration 
routes have changed in recent years and cattle have 
destroyed this season's cassava.  This year citizens say 
that the nomads are armed more heavily and have Thuraya 
satellite phones, suggesting to some interlocutors that 
there was another motive for their movement, such as land 
grabbing.  The persistent fear of nomads voiced in Bahr 
el Ghazal (Ref A), Abyei County (Ref B), Unity State (Ref 
C), and other areas that border nomad migratory routes is 
understandable given shrinking resources in the north and 
the inevitable pressure on land to the south.  The 
conflict in Darfur feeds this fear.  The GoSS's capacity 
to address this issue and other potential sources of 
conflict is weak. 
 
8.  Proliferation of small arms:  Although a civilian 
disarmament campaign is underway throughout Bahr el 
Ghazal, small arms continue to infiltrate the area. 
(Comment:  This might also invite protective arming by 
the nomads against a perceived threat from the local 
residents.  End comment.) 
 
9.  Lack of essential services for hosts and returnees: 
Essential services are lacking in Wau town and throughout 
the state.  As returnees and recently displaced IDPs 
continue to pass through and settle in the state, 
conflict may arise over limited resources and services. 
To some extent, there is a clash of cultures between 
returnees from the north and those who remained in the 
south throughout the war years. 
 
10.  Land and plots for returnees and settlers in and 
around Wau town:  Land issues have not been addressed 
adequately due to the lack of appropriate and equitable 
laws pertaining to land and plot acquisition.  Many 
returnees may opt to settle in town for a variety of 
reasons, such as lack of services in the rural areas and 
the presence of landmines in rural areas. 
 
11.  Weak GoSS capacity:  The capacity of the GoSS in Wau 
town is limited, and it is unable to meet or manage the 
expectations of the people. 
 
12.  Slow progress in implementing the CPA:  This is a 
major concern, and it was also obvious that the average 
 
KHARTOUM 00000620  003 OF 003 
 
 
citizen understands very little about the CPA. 
 
13.  Nonpayment of the army:  As throughout the south, 
there is concern about the nonpayment of the army and the 
implications for civil order. 
 
14.  Tribalism and corruption:  These issues continue to 
be widespread.  Traditional conflict between ethnic 
groups such as the Fertit, Luo, and Dinka in Western Bahr 
el Ghazal simmers both beneath and above the surface. 
 
--------------- 
Recommendations 
--------------- 
 
15.  Traditional leaders need assistance in dealing with 
inter-tribal matters, specifically relations with the 
Fallata, and other issues that involve land, water, and 
migration routes for cattle. 
 
16.  Provision of essential services, notably water and 
sanitation, should be a high priority for the GoSS and 
donors.  Returnees should not be targeted for special 
assistance, but rather assisted through an equitable, 
community-based approach.  Essential services should be 
established as much as possible in rural areas to prevent 
returnees from overwhelming Wau town. 
 
17.  Standing up an accountable GoSS state government 
system is critical.  People need to believe that 
government is serving the needs of the people, not the 
other way around.  GoSS ministries should replace NGOs as 
service providers as soon as possible.  The GoSS must 
incorporate traditional authority into new governing 
structures. 
 
18.  Most of the population do not understand or are 
unaware of the new administrative system of the GoSS. 
Dissemination of the CPA as well as an explanation of the 
GoSS administrative system is necessary.  In addition, 
some groups feel excluded from the CPA and perceive the 
agreement as a power-sharing arrangement only for SPLM 
and National Congress Party. 
 
19.  The first phase of the Disarmament, Demobilization, 
and Reintegration (DDR) program is focusing on 
registration of child soldiers, women associated with 
armed groups, and the disabled.  Some individual 
disarmament is occurring in some states with weapons 
being cantoned for later demobilization.  However, the 
most urgent priority for purposes of peace and stability 
is the registration of the SPLA soldiers, so that payment 
can be effected.  Even veterans have yet to be retired 
and have high expectations. 
 
20.  Grievances and revenge issues between groups need to 
be confronted and addressed through reconciliation, rule 
of law, and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. 
 
WHITAKER