VZCZCXRO3593
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0619/01 0680620
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 090620Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1821
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000619 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AF/EA, DCHA 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
USMISSION UN ROME 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JMELINE, TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KAWC SU
SUBJECT:  WEST DARFUR - ZALINGEI UPDATE 
 
REF:  KHARTOUM 0320 
 
------------------- 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
¶1.  In mid-February, a USAID Darfur Field Office (DFO) 
protection officer visited Zalingei in West Darfur. 
Zalingei town has generally been calm throughout the 
Darfur crisis, although the Zalingei "corridor," which 
includes Garsila and Mukjar (septel), was the site of 
brutal janjaweed attacks in 2004.  Conflict between Arab 
tribes north of Zalingei since December 2005 is a 
troubling development that has resulted in the 
establishment of an Arab internally displaced persons 
(IDP) camp in Zalingei town.  In addition, in February 
2006, staff from two Scandinavian non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) withdrew from the area due to 
fallout over the Danish cartoon controversy. (Note:  The 
agencies have since returned.  End note.)  NGOs in 
Zalingei noted that local authorities continue to place 
restrictions on protection programs, and that there is no 
sign that relations will improve between the humanitarian 
community and the government.  Limited USAID funding at 
this writing will force some NGOs to lay off staff and 
reduce programs, sending an unintended message that the 
international community is losing interest in the plight 
of conflict-affected Darfurians. 
 
¶2.  Tensions between the Arab and non-Arab IDP groups are 
high, and relations between the displaced population and 
the government are strained over the question of African 
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) rehatting and the 
investigative work of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).  The situation may become more confrontational in 
Zalingei.  End summary and comment. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Humanitarian Overview of Zalingei 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  USAID visited Zalingei town in mid-February to obtain 
an update on the humanitarian and protection situation. 
Zalingei town has been largely quiet throughout the 
Darfur war, although human rights groups extensively 
documented janjaweed killings of members of African 
tribes and concentration camp-like settings in 2004 at 
sites along the Zalingei corridor, which includes Garsila 
and Mukjar.  A USAID team recently visited this area and 
will report septel. 
 
¶4.  According to U.N. Humanitarian Profile Number 22, as 
of January 1, more than 120,000 affected persons lived in 
Zalingei locality.  That figure included approximately 
64,000 IDPs in Zalingei town.  However, mid-February 
figures from the U.N. Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the NGO CARE 
International reveal a current total IDP population of at 
least 82,0000 split among several camps:  Hassa Hissa 
camp, population 38,000; Hamidiya camp, population 
27,000; Khamsa Degaig camp, population 13,000; and Taiba 
camp, population estimated to be approximately 4,000. 
 
¶5.  Taiba was spontaneously formed in December 2005 and 
currently has a population of approximately 4,000 Arab 
IDPs.  The government has authorized a USAID partner NGO 
to create some camp facilities, such as child-friendly 
spaces.  Another USAID partner is serving as the camp 
coordinator, although it does not wish to retain that 
role permanently.  In spite of these activities, the 
government does not consider Taiba to be a "camp" and 
refuses to officially recognize it as such.  The 
government anticipates the early return of Taiba's IDPs; 
however, the humanitarian community does not see 
indications of this possibility.  According to the U.N. 
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), government-led local 
reconciliation efforts were unsuccessful in Nyangadulo, 
the site of the inter-Arab clashes that led to the 
displacement of the IDPs in Taiba camp. 
 
¶6.  Tensions exist between Taiba camp, which contains 
Arab Bani Halba and Hotoia IDPs, and the other Zalingei 
 
KHARTOUM 00000619  002 OF 003 
 
 
camps, which mostly contain non-Arab Fur, Masalit, and 
Zaghawa IDPs.  According to NGO partners, the IDPs from 
the three pre-existing camps of Zalingei resent NGOs for 
providing comparable services to the Arab IDPs.  In 
addition, during the USAID DFO protection officer's 
visit, a campaign had begun, with anti-government 
messages such as "Yes to prosecution of Bashir," and "Yes 
to international intervention in Darfur," scrawled on the 
walls of NGO and U.N. compounds.  Tensions in Zalingei 
could worsen over political issues, including the AMIS 
rehatting to a U.N. force, and the work of the ICC. 
 
¶7.  According to OCHA, 15 NGOs and 12 U.N. agencies 
operate in Zalingei locality.  The humanitarian presence 
in Zalingei has grown since early January, when the U.N. 
relocated humanitarian personnel from El Geneina and 
northwest West Darfur to comply with Phase IV security 
restrictions in those areas.  Staff from the U.N. 
Population Fund (UNFPA) and the U.N. Children's Fund 
(UNICEF) have been re-assigned from Zalingei to El 
Geneina, and staff from UNMIS and the Office of the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) previously 
assigned to El Geneina are temporarily operating out of 
Zalingei. 
 
¶8.  Humanitarian agencies have largely met the 
humanitarian needs of the affected population in 
Zalingei.  Humanitarian Profile Number 22 showed coverage 
gaps of less than 10 percent in the food, shelter, 
sanitation, primary health, and nutrition sectors in and 
around Zalingei town.  However, a coverage gap of 30 
percent existed for the provision of clean water. 
 
¶9.  In early February 2006, the NGOs Norwegian Church Aid 
(NCA) and Danish Refugee Council (DRC) evacuated Zalingei 
as a result of direct threats during the fallout over the 
publication of the cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohamed 
(reftel).  NCA provides nutrition services, and DRC is 
UNHCR's main partner implementing protection programs. 
Although these agencies have resumed working in Zalingei, 
the lasting effects of the incidents are still unknown. 
(Comment:  The consensus among international actors in 
Zalingei is that authorities have sought to restrict the 
activities of the international community for some time, 
and that the furor over the Prophet Mohamed cartoons 
provided an opportunity to manufacture security incidents 
that would force the NGOs to leave.  End comment.) 
 
------------------- 
Protection Programs 
------------------- 
 
¶10.  UNHCR is the lead agency on protection, and USAID 
partners and humanitarian agencies report that 
coordination among humanitarian actors has been good. 
However, local Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC) 
representatives have pressured USAID partners working in 
the area not to engage in protection programming, and 
equate protection with spying on the government or 
politicizing issues to turn IDPs against the government. 
Partners therefore carry out programs under other names, 
such as livelihoods, water and sanitation, healthcare 
(not women's health), and coordination. 
 
¶11.  In spite of the government's stance towards 
protection, the HAC approved the opening of a joint 
International Rescue Committee (IRC) and U.N. Development 
Program (UNDP) Rule of Law center in Zalingei.  The 
humanitarian community hopes that through this program 
some protection issues can be quietly addressed. 
 
¶12.  Agencies implementing protection programs in 
Zalingei reported that some of the least successful 
income-generation activities, such as henna production, 
were the most popular among IDP women.  One USAID partner 
postulates that these activities actually had a far 
greater psychosocial benefit than economic benefit, and 
that the psychosocial benefits caused women to 
participate in the program.  The partner reported that 
personal interaction with other women in a safe, friendly 
environment appeared to assist women who had been raped. 
As a result, survivors regained a degree of self-esteem 
 
KHARTOUM 00000619  003 OF 003 
 
 
and benefited from an intimacy and contact with others. 
The USAID partner reported that they are working to 
improve the income-generation portion of women's programs 
while maintaining the psychosocial benefits women derive 
from participation.  Marketing and market assessments 
incorporated into the programs are being strengthened 
with the goal of increasing women's abilities to choose 
safer alternatives to food and fuel collection. 
 
¶13.  Comment:   The Zalingei corridor was one of the last 
areas that the NGO community served.  For a long time 
Medecins sans Frontieres-Holland was the only NGO 
operating in the area, but has since handed over most 
activities to international NGOs.  The USAID Office of 
U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) funds most 
NGOs operating in the corridor and in Zalingei town.  The 
limited funding currently available for Darfur will force 
NGOs in this area to reduce activities and lay off staff, 
and will send an unintended message that the 
international community is losing interest in the 
humanitarian plight of Darfurians. 
 
 
WHITAKER