VZCZCXRO2433
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0607/01 0671732
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 081732Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1808
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000607 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AF/EA, DCHA 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
USMISSION UN ROME 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JMELINE, TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KAWC SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN - IRC CEASES HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN 
HAMESH KOREIB ENCLAVE, EASTERN SUDAN 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) The IRC has decided to end cross-border 
operations from Eritrea serving the eastern enclave of 
Hamesh Koreib following government and UN-OCHA pressure. 
Samaritan's Purse, however, continues to work in the 
area.  The SPLM is scheduled to depart Hamesh Koreib over 
the next three months, potentially leaving a humanitarian 
relief void and raising tensions.  High-level UN 
attention is needed to address rising concerns.  End 
summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
IRC Ceases Cross-Border Services to Hamesh Koreib 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2. (SBU) USAID-funded partner International Rescue 
Committee (IRC) has decided to cease cross-border 
humanitarian activities from Eritrea into the SPLM- 
controlled Hamesh Koreib enclave of eastern Sudan.  The 
decision was made on March 2 following the receipt of a 
letter from the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) 
questioning why a polio vaccination team had entered 
Hamesh Koreib town via Eritrea. (Note: the town of Hamesh 
Koreib is occupied, since January 11 by SAF supported 
Popular Defense Forces, the SPLA, as well as UNMIS 
military observers. The arrival of the IRC/Eritrea team 
was not coordinated with IRC/Sudan.  End note.)  In 
addition to the letter received from the HAC, the NGO has 
been pressured by UN-OCHA to cease activities because the 
presence of the NGOs in the enclave made it "difficult to 
negotiate with the HAC" on access to the enclave from 
Kassala.  IRC was told by the UN that the HAC might "take 
action" against IRC programs elsewhere in the country 
(i.e., Darfur) if the assistance program were not stopped 
in Hamesh Koreib.  In addition to Darfur, IRC also 
operates relief programs in Kassala, Red Sea, South 
Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Khartoum States as well as 
throughout Southern Sudan. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Beja Congress Raises Complaint, Blames GNU 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (U) The news of this action was carried somewhat 
erroneously in the Sudan Tribune on-line news bulletins 
of March 6 and in a headline story in the Khartoum 
Monitor on the same day.  The articles stated the "the 
government ordered" the U.S. aid agencies out of the 
enclave.  In the article, the Beja Congress responded, 
stating this is an attempt to "make the lives of our 
people even more miserable and much more difficult...we 
know definitely the result of this action will be even 
more deaths for our children and women from food 
shortages and health care." 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
Samaritan's Purse Still Operating, but Under Pressure 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) In addition to IRC, USAID partner Samaritan's 
Purse (SPIR) operates life-saving humanitarian programs 
in the enclave and is under pressure also from the UN to 
cease operations while the UN attempts to negotiate 
access to Kassala for SPIR with the HAC.  The NGO has not 
received any correspondence from the HAC, similar to 
IRC's, at least as of March 6, and has not withdrawn 
officially from the enclave.  SPIR does not operate in 
other areas of eastern Sudan, although it has been 
waiting for months for permission to travel to Kassala 
and Port Sudan so as to shift eventually the base of 
operations for the Hamesh Koreib area from Eritrea to 
Kassala in conformity with the CPA- mandated handover of 
the enclave to the GNU.  (Note:  the SPIR program 
includes a food pipeline of 11,000 MT that would be sent 
to Port Sudan instead of Massawa, Eritrea, under the new 
program configuration.  End note.) 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
SPLM Departure from Hamesh Koreib on Horizon 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00000607  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) Withdrawal of SPLA troops from Hamesh Koreib is 
slated to begin in March and culminate on May 10, 2006, 
when the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) will take possession 
formally of the territory.  At that point, all 
humanitarian programs operating in the enclave would 
operate from Kassala under the umbrella of the GNU and 
its ministries.  USAID is working with the partners on 
funding that will accommodate these adjustments.  In the 
meantime, the UN has been negotiating with the HAC to 
obtain permission for SPIR to travel to Kassala to begin 
the planning for this transition. UN-OCHA is skeptical 
that the HAC will give permission as long as SPIR is 
working cross-border from Eritrea.  IRC already has 
offices in Kassala. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Possibility of Humanitarian Shortfall Looms 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Until the handover, the issue of providing 
assistance to Hamesh Koreib must be resolved.  Absent an 
agreement among the government, Eastern Front, and 
SPLM/GoSS that clarifies modalities of access and 
guarantees the safety and security of the humanitarian 
groups, USAID-funded partners (the only NGOs operating in 
the enclave) will have no choice but to consider 
continuing assistance from Eritrea.  The other option, to 
stop all humanitarian action from Eritrea from now until 
May 10, without any guarantee of access from either the 
government or the Eastern Front from Kassala, will 
contribute to a further decline in humanitarian 
indicators in the area and punish innocent civilians by 
depriving them of access to food and health care. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) It is worth noting that in Darfur, humanitarian 
access to rebel areas has been permitted, with some 
hiccups, throughout the crisis.  The government was very 
worried in 2004 that the international community would 
start another "Lifeline Sudan" in Darfur and thus was 
accommodating in its treatment of humanitarian requests 
to serve rebel areas from government-held cities.  This 
model could be looked to for an arrangement with the 
Eastern Front until May 10.  In order to achieve such an 
agreement, the UN needs to assign a high-level diplomat 
to work on these issues on a near continuous basis; post 
will encourage such to take place.  The UN also needs to 
be transparent with donors, such as the U.S., which is 
the only donor in the enclave and the one most concerned 
with the implications of any pressure on IRC and SPIR. 
 
WHITAKER