VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKT #0600/01 0611349
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 021349Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0552
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 9287
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 9327
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 4251
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2237

UNCLAS KATHMANDU 000600 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA (CAMP, DONALD) 
DEPT FOR SCA/PPD (SCHWARTZ, LARRY) 
DEPT FOR SCA/INS  (GOWER, MOLLY) 
DEPT FOR PA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OEXC SCUL PREL KMDR OPRC KPAO NP
SUBJECT:  ALTERING THE DISCUSSION: EMBASSY PUBLIC 
DIPLOMACY SPURS MEDIA INTROSPECTION ABOUT MAOIST 
INTENTIONS 
 
REFS: A) KATHMANDU 000552 
 
      B) KATHMANDU 000107 
      C) KATHMANDU 000244 
      D) KATHMANDU 000379 
      E) KATHMANDU 000450 
      F) KATHMANDU 000390 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. In a case study of the value of public diplomacy, the 
Embassy has recently waged a broad and largely effective 
public discussion about the goals and intentions of the 
country's Maoist insurgents.  Our centerpiece was a 
February 15 speech by Ambassador Moriarty that raised 
concrete questions about Maoist intentions and warned 
that the Parties' partnership with the insurgents was 
"wrongheaded" and even dangerous for the major political 
parties.  The address ignited a wave of media coverage, 
commentary, and news articles in Nepal that has yet to 
abate.  To keep the argument going, the Embassy sent 
letters under the Ambassador's name to editors of major 
newspapers critical of the speech, and the Ambassador 
conducted lengthy interviews with two major broadcast 
media outlets. Our efforts followed several weeks of 
media statements and interviews of top Maoist leaders, 
(Refs B, C, D, E) who touted their desire for peace and 
democracy (but also made some chilling statements that 
Nepal media commentators often overlooked). 
 
¶2. The Ambassador's speech caused media and public 
attention to refocus on Maoist intentions, reviving "a 
sort of introspection everywhere," as one commentator put 
it.  The address also spurred the Maoist second-in- 
command to publish two lengthy op-eds in response.  While 
much media commentary attacked the Ambassador and U.S. 
policy for allegedly hindering the parties' attempt to 
bring the insurgents into the political mainstream and 
ending Nepal's 10-year insurgency, the speech and ensuing 
media interventions clearly have caused media opinion 
makers to re-examine and question the sincerity and goals 
of the Maoist insurgents.  This soul-searching has 
intensified as Maoist violence in the countryside has 
mounted.  END SUMMARY. 
 
A Speech that Questions Maoist Intentions. 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. Ambassador Moriarty's speech on February 15, "Nepal's 
Political Crisis:  A Look Back, A Look Forward," ignited 
a continuing chain of news articles, editorials, letters 
to editors, and commentaries - including at least two by 
a senior Maoist leader - in Nepal's media.  The 
Ambassador's speech, coming one week after Nepal's failed 
nationwide municipal elections (Ref F) and two weeks 
after the first anniversary of King Gyanendra's seizure 
of power, was much anticipated by Nepal media.  This was 
the Ambassador's first policy address in six months, and 
coming as it did so soon after the February 8 municipal 
elections, the media no doubt expected strong criticism 
of the King, his failed rule, and his failure to 
reconcile with the political parties.  The speech 
included all of that, but the news for reporters and 
editors was the strong questioning of Maoist intentions 
and the warning to the parties that, instead of leading 
the insurgents back to the political mainstream, the 
parties themselves were in danger of being co-opted by 
partners committed to using violence to topple Nepal's 
government.  The speech urged the King to reach out to 
the parties to find a way to return to democracy and also 
effectively address the Maoist insurgency. 
 
. And Conventional Wisdom 
------------------------- 
 
¶4. The questioning of Maoist intentions and the 
cautionary note about the insurgents-parties 
understanding went against conventional editorial wisdom 
of most independent media.  Editors had embraced the 12- 
point understanding signed between the seven major 
political parties and the Maoists in November, which 
promised to establish "absolute democracy by ending 
autocratic monarchy."  Editors, exhausted by the bloody 
 
 
10-year Maoist insurgency and incensed at the King's 
authoritarian rule (and harassment and pressure on 
independent media), had touted the understanding as 
Nepal's best chance for peace and democracy.  They 
harshly criticized the Ambassador for warning against 
Maoist intentions and for arguing that the insurgents 
seek to bring the parties closer to their violent orbit. 
To keep the debate going in days after the speech, PAS 
sent letters under the Ambassador's signature to three 
leading newspapers - Kantipur (Nepali language, 
circulation 150,000); The Kathmandu Post (English 
language, circ. 30,000); and The Himalayan Times, 
(English language, circulation 40,000). All were 
published.  In still wider interventions, the Ambassador 
gave an interview to BBC's popular Nepali Service, which 
aired across the county on the February 18-19 weekend. 
And, on February 26 in prime time, popular Kantipur TV's 
"Frontline" political talk show aired a 40-minute 
interview with the Ambassador, focusing largely on points 
raised in the speech.  In short, in the 10-day period 
after the speech, the Embassy mounted a public diplomacy 
full court press, responding to critics and repeating 
points of concern about Maoist intentions. 
 
The Maoist Response 
------------------- 
 
¶5. Media reaction to the speech has continued daily, with 
editorials, op-eds, and letters to the editors taking 
issue with or mentioning points from the Ambassador's 
speech, his letters, his BBC interview, or his TV 
appearance.  In an unusual response, Maoist second-in- 
command Baburam Bhattarai published two lengthy responses 
to the Ambassador's speech.  The first, "On Moriarty's 
Pontification," appeared in the February 23 Kathmandu 
Post (Ref A).  The second, "Why So Excited, Mr. 
Ambassador?," appeared in the March 1 editions of Jana 
Aashta weekly newspaper (Nepali language, circ.: 10,000). 
The Maoist leader called the speech "vitriolic" and the 
BBC interview "provocative" and took issue with various 
parts of the address.  In publishing these rejoinders, 
though, the Maoist leader unintentionally appears to have 
confirmed the effectiveness of our efforts to effectively 
raise questions about the Maoists and their goal to 
secure power. 
 
The Message Getting Heard. 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6. To be fair, independent media, particularly the large 
Kantipur Group (including Kantipur TV, Kantipur FM, The 
Kathmandu Post, and Kantipur newspaper -- the nation's 
largest) have provided their audiences ample opportunity 
to access the Ambassador's thoughts.  On February 16, 
Nepali-language Kantipur published the entire text of the 
speech, translated by PAS.  On February 27, it published 
a transcript of the Ambassador's interview on Kantipur 
TV.  And while The Kathmandu Post and many of its op-eds 
have strongly criticized the Ambassador's remarks, the 
paper has continued to report Maoist attacks and 
atrocities since the insurgents broke their self-imposed 
four-month ceasefire on January 2. 
 
. And Understood 
---------------- 
 
¶7. Encouragingly, the Post also heard the Ambassador's 
message.  In a lead editorial on March 1, the newspaper 
took note of recent Maoist violence and commented:  "When 
the international community has been claiming that the 
[Maoist] party is more a terrorist outfit than a 
political organization, it (the recent Maoist violence) 
has only provided credibility to that voice.. When the 
Maoists were required to show their humane face, and to 
show intention to join the mainstream, they have taken 
just the opposite route."  It urged the insurgents to 
renounce violence "and show their commitment to join the 
political mainstream." 
 
¶8. In a March 2 op-ed in the same newspaper, lawyer- 
commentator Bipin Adhikari wrote approvingly of the 
Ambassador's speech, noting:  "Moriarty's remarks have 
revived a sort of introspection everywhere, and many 
 
 
politicians are already trying to respond [to] him with a 
sort of vague denial.  He has at once reminded many in 
the diplomatic community circle in Kathmandu, and the 
international donors, that the United States stands for a 
democratic future of this country and does not accept 
their vacillating stance vis-...-vis the Maoists and the 
political parties." 
 
Winning the Battle of the Polls 
------------------------------- 
 
¶9. One interesting (if unscientific) sign of the impact 
of the Embassy's public diplomacy effort has been an 
online poll by The Nepali Times, a 15,000 circulation, 
English-language, generally respected weekly journal of 
news and opinion.  The poll has appeared for almost a 
week on nepalnews.com, the leading news portal in Nepal. 
The poll asks if visitors agree with recent statements by 
Ambassador Moriarty on the Maoists.  As of late March 1, 
the response from 5,880 respondents was: Yes, 50.9 
percent; No, 45.6 percent; and Don't Know, 3.5. 
Similarly, a Himalayan Times article on February 28 
quoted a political party official cautioning against 
Maoist figure Bhattarai's comments on "bourgeois 
democracy."  The Ambassador had raised exactly that issue 
in his interview on Kantipur TV on February 26.  And a 
western wire service reporter based in Kathmandu told the 
PAO he had never seen such intense media reaction to an 
ambaQadorial speech, and added:  "It does really seem to 
have hit home." 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10. Our two-week public diplomacy offensive did generate 
commentary that initially seemed to focus more on U.S. 
intentions in Nepal, and these were frequently dubbed 
nefarious.  But our efforts clearly pushed the media to 
begin to question more seriously the goals and violent 
actions of the Maoists.  Even as they have blasted U.S. 
policy, commentators repeated our questions about the 
insurgents or asked new ones.  This is positive, as 
independent media opinion makers had greeted the parties- 
Maoists partnership almost with euphoria and had 
willingly overlooked uncomfortable statements and actions 
by the Maoists that undercut the insurgents' purported 
peace-and-democracy credentials.  The mission's public 
diplomacy campaign challenged this attitude, forcing 
opinion makers to respond to the assertions made in the 
Ambassador's speech, letters, and broadcast interviews. 
Moreover, our efforts countered a media blitz by the 
Maoists, who  -- in granting interviews with their 
leaders and publishing op-eds by one of them -- had shown 
dexterity in the war of ideas.  We believe the questions 
the Embassy raised publicly about the Maoists and their 
intentions will continue to resonate, helping pressure 
the parties and their media supporters to question 
seriously the intentions of the Maoists. 
 
MORIARTY