VZCZCXRO9446
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #0962/01 0651515
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061515Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8723
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//JF/UNMA//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2298
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2496
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5650
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1143

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000962 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
RELEASABLE TO NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB, S/CT, 
EUR/RPM, INL 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: SNAR PREL PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT/LASHKAR GAH - SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES TO 
UPCOMING ERADICATION CAMPAIGN 
 
KABUL 00000962  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU)  SUMMARY:  Helmand Governor Engineer Daud 
told PRToffs on February 28th that adequate security 
is a prerequisite to successful poppy eradication. 
Strong coordination is needed among the Afghan 
National Police (ANA)and Afghan National Army (ANA). 
To minimize alienation of the local population, Cash 
for Work (CFW) is essential, especially for the 
poorest farmers.  The Governor expressed 
disappointment with the number of potential CFW 
recipients. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) PDAS Shweik also paid a visit to Helmand on 
the even of the commencement of the Helmand poppy 
eradication campaign.  See septel for a report of 
that visit. 
 
--------------------- 
SECURITY IS PARAMOUNT 
--------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Governor Daud said that during his mission 
to Kabul during the week of February 22, he 
explained to senior Ministry of Defense and Ministry 
of Interior (MOI) officials that in Helmand 
eradication is complex due to the ongoing 
"terrorist" insurgency.  Security is the key to a 
successful eradication campaign.  If insurgents/drug 
lords succeed in driving off the eradication forces 
in one district, this will negatively impact 
eradication efforts in other districts.  As the 
Governor stated, "we must have security before poppy 
eradication." 
 
----------------------------------------- 
SECURITY COORDINATION:  A MAJOR CHALLENGE 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Governor said that coordination among 
the security forces is very important.  He told us 
that he received promises in Kabul of significant 
augmentation of security, including 700 police (400 
from the Afghan Eradication Force - AEF - and 300 
ANA) as well as 500 local auxiliary police hired on 
a temporary basis.  (Note: The campaign cannot begin 
until all forces are in place and coordination 
mechanisms established, according to an American 
contracted advisor to the AEF.  End Note.)  The 
Governor also said that within "a day or two," a 
Joint Provincial Coordination Center (PCC) should be 
up and running.  The Governor was not aware of plans 
for relief forces, medical evacuations, and overall 
command structure, but said it was up to the ANP and 
ANA to establish these. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Discussing the logistical challenges of 
positioning significant forces in distant areas, the 
Governor said that the various units should be 
responsible for their own logistics.  He also 
expressed concern that logistics for the local ANP 
were not in place.  He said that he is working with 
a senior ANP officer to rectify this problem. 
Similarly, he said that it is up to the ANP and ANA 
to coordinate on setting up adequate security in 
eradication sites.  (Note:  The operations plan 
being worked by OSC-A and the GOA calls for the ANA 
 
KABUL 00000962  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
to provide an "outer ring" of security for the AEF, 
which will probably consist of a blocking force at 
the southern end of the area of operations.  The ANP 
is to provide an "inner ring" of security in the 
area of operations, which will include the 
establishment of checkpoints along the road and 
crowd control in the vicinity of the poppy fields. 
Security at the poppy fields and the AEF Forward 
Base Camp will be provided by AEF personnel.  End 
Note.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) Concerning the auxiliary ANP forces, the 
Governor said that there are "special funds" 
established to provide for their logistics and 
transportation.  The MOI will provide uniforms and 
weapons.  (Note:  OSC-A briefed in a March 3 
countdown meeting that its Police Reform Directorate 
(PRD) would be providing uniforms, weapons, 
ammunition, and pay to the auxiliary police forces. 
End Note.)  Concerning Coalition involvement, the 
Governor requested air support and/or flyovers on an 
as needed basis.  (Note:  These will be coordinated 
through Task Force Storm at Kandahar Air Field to 
preclude any conflict in airspace with the INL 
helicopters providing direct support to the AEF. 
End Note.) 
 
-------------------------------- 
CASH FOR WORK A CRITICAL ELEMENT 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In describing the need for CFW, Governor 
Daud said that there are essentially two types of 
farmers in Helmand.  One type includes those who 
live near the Helmand River irrigation system (built 
by USAID in the 1960s).  While the system is in 
various states of disrepair, it is still a key part 
of Helmand's agriculture (and poppy cultivation). 
However, there are many farmers who live in areas 
not covered by the irrigation system, especially in 
the far northern and southern areas of Helmand. 
These farmers must pump water, thus making 
profitability more problematic.  This also increases 
the incentive for cultivating poppy, due to its 
relatively high return.  These are the farmers that 
require the CFW most critically, the Governor 
stated.  (Note:  INL and the British Embassy Drugs 
Team (BEDT) have agreed upon target prioritization 
criteria which will direct eradication efforts 
primarily against 1) poppy fields directly 
benefiting from irrigation projects, 2) poppy fields 
exceeding one hectare (2.5 acres) in size, and 3) 
poppy fields being grown on government-owned land. 
End Note.) 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Governor Daud also expressed 
disappointment with the number of recipients planned 
under the CFW support from USAID and BEDT.  The 
Governor's plan requested CFW for about 23,000 
farmers presumably affected by eradication; yjr 
USAID and BEDT plan will assist approximately 7,000 
farmers.  Although less than the Governor proposed, 
the USAID/UK plan will employ 1,000 people in each 
of the seven districts north of the ring road (with 
the exception of the sparsely populated Washer 
 
KABUL 00000962  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
District where 300 people will be employed) for a 
strong show of GOA commitment to provide its people 
with assistance during this difficult time.  An 
official with experience in CFW also expressed 
concern that the neediest farmers will actually 
receive the necessary assistance, due to potential 
corruption at the local level.  USAID ALP South 
partner Chemonics will ensure financial 
accountability in addition to infrastructure design 
and quality while letting the GOA be the face on the 
ground for implementation.  Details on USAID's CFW 
program in anticipation of the large eradication 
campaign are reported septel. Given the operational 
limitations of AEF manual and mechanical eradication 
capabilities, typical field sizes, and the short 
duration of the eradication season (March-April), it 
is unlikely that more than 10,000 farmers will lose 
their poppy crops to AEF activity, if that. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) There are clearly many moving parts to the 
upcoming eradication campaign as well as a number of 
open issues concerning the security elements.  In 
addition, the ANA and ANP do not have a strong 
history of coordination.  In fact, this operation is 
being billed as the first joint police-military 
operation of the current government of Afghanistan. 
With greater than half the world's poppy crop being 
grown within Helmand Province this year, the success 
or failure of this eradication campaign will 
determine the success or failure of Afghanistan's 
narcotics control efforts for 2006. 
 
NEUMANN