VZCZCXRO7714
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #1358/01 0871224
ZNR UUUUU ZZH ZDK
O 281224Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9207
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//JF/UNMA//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2377
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2575
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5753
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1218

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001358 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
RELEASABLE TO NATO/AU/NZ/ISAF 
 
STATE FOR SA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT), SA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB, 
S/CT, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND 
OSD FOR BREZINSKI 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT/MAZAR-E SHARIF  DOSTUM PRESIDES OVER 
WEAPONS TURNOVER 
 
REF: KABUL 840 
 
KABUL 00001358  001.8 OF 003 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: General Dostum, the paramount 
warlord in northern Afghanistan, presided over a 
Feb. 23 ceremony in Sheberghan, capital of Jowzjan 
Province north of Mazar-e Sharif, during which over 
100 of his commanders turned in 2.5 tons of boxed 
ammunition and roughly 400 small arms, RPG 
launchers, grenade launchers, and other weapons. 
Disarmament officials were impressed by the quantity 
and quality of the ammunition turned over.  Moving 
from handing in weapons to disbanding illegally- 
armed groups is, however, a longer, more difficult 
process.  END SUMMARY. 
¶2.  (SBU) At what ostensibly was a ceremony honoring 
the 565 th birthday of an ethnic-Uzbek poet at his 
palace in Sheberghan, General Dostum orchestrated a 
turnover of a significant quantity of weapons and 
ammunition by more than 100 of his Junbesh 
commanders to officials from the Afghan New 
Beginnings Program (ANBP), the international body 
which implements DIAG (Disbandment of Illegally- 
Armed Group) as over 1000 people and representatives 
of local and international news media looked on. 
During the ceremony, Dostum distributed certificates 
of appreciation to the commanders, thanking them for 
their part in the struggle to liberate Afghanistan 
from the Soviets and the Taliban, and in the ongoing 
effort to eliminate Al Qaeda in the north. 
¶3.  (SBU) Of the 389 weapons turned in, 110 were AK- 
47s.  The weapons were old and the final report from 
ANBP indicated 36% were unserviceable, which hovers 
inside ANBPs average unserviceability range of 35- 
40%.  Significantly, however, nearly all the bad 
weapons consisted of old AK-47s  only six of the 
109 submitted functioned.  On the other hand, nearly 
all the heavier weapons turned in, including RPG7s, 
82mm mortars and recoilless rifles, were operational 
and in good condition.  Personnel from ANBP and AST 
(Ammunition Survey Team) collected the weapons, 
which were then transported immediately to Mazar-e 
Sharif where they were accounted for, stocked, and 
transferred to an ammunition dump at the 209th Corps 
s 
(monitored by a U.S. embedded training team).  The 
209th Corps site was selected in lieu of the ammo 
dump in Sheberghan, where the weapons might well may 
have found their way back to the original donors. 
¶4. (SBU) The weapons turnover was the result of 
nearly six weeks of regular meetings and discussions 
between PRToff and General Dostum and his 
subordinates.  After nearly eight months of silence, 
Dostum initiated contact with the PRT, indicating a 
renewed desire to engage with the international 
community (IC) and the GOA.  He seems to have 
realized how little leverage he had gained in the 
interim by refusing to interact with ISAF forces, 
and appeared willing to work once again towards 
fulfilling GOA/IC expectations of regional stability 
and most importantly, DIAG compliance. 
¶5. (SBU) His long silence is believed to be the 
result of the Mazar PRTs initial approach to the 
Dostum problem, which began with repeated demands 
for weapons and culminated in search-and-seizure 
re 
 
KABUL 00001358  002.6 OF 003 
 
 
operations last year.  General Dostum has a great 
deal of influence across the north, as his militias 
and Junbesh political party (from which he nominally 
resigned on taking a largely ceremonial posting in 
the central government) control the provinces of 
Faryab, Sar-e Pol, and Jowzjan, and are thought to 
have strong support in Takhar and Balkh.  His 
decision to halt interaction with the PRT was a 
great concern to the north, as Junbesh continued to 
project military power in addition to playing a 
large role in the appointments process for districts 
and provinces under its control.  Lacking a clear 
channel for communication, the PRT had no 
constructive leverage over these decisions and 
activities which have a significant impact on 
regional security and stability. 
¶6. (SBU) In a meeting with Dostum following the 
ceremony, PRToff emphasized the need to build on the 
days momentum with subsequent events in other 
provinces.  PRToff argued the event in Sheberghan 
grabbed the attention of the north, particularly the 
PRTs there, and Dostum now needed to substantiate it 
by similar displays in neighboring provinces by his 
commanders.  PRToff suggested that given recent 
unrest in Faryab and Jowzjan provinces and the 
cartoon riots against the PRT in Maimana, along with 
the nearly complete political and military power 
Junbesh enjoys there, Faryab seemed the logical 
choice for the next turnover. 
¶7. (SBU)  As a result of his recent activities, 
General Dostum expects to bring more development aid 
to the north (in addition to garnering more 
political power for himself and his party). The 
impression among northern Afghans is that they are 
shortchanged on development aid that is going to the 
restive Pashtun south and east, and therefore they 
have less buy-in to the reconstruction process.  If 
Dostum is viewed as a conduit for bringing in more 
aid then the kudos will go to him first, and to the 
IC second.  Dostums move comes at a time of 
increasing unrest in the northern region (i.e., the 
cartoon riots, increased number of security 
incidents), and an effort to disarm publicly in an 
atmosphere of increasing friction between various 
competing illegally armed groups may lower tensions 
somewhat.  The IC would be well served to publicize 
more broadly ongoing development programs to remind 
the northern people of their continued importance 
and draw a link between disarmament, stabilization, 
and propensity for development spending. 
¶8. (SBU)  COMMENT: As Faizullah Zaki, a Junbesh MP 
said, For the last thirty years, every arms factory 
in the world has been exporting to Afghanistan. 
The sheer quantity of weapons in the region makes 
Dostums weapons turnover appear insignificant.  The 
importance of the event, however, is that it is a 
symbol of Dostums willingness to play ball with 
the GOA and IC.  The benefits of engaging Dostumif 
he feels it is beneficial to work with DIAG, DIAG 
will happen in the north.  If he sees DIAG as a 
 as a 
unilateral threat from an outside force (as it was 
initially presented, resulting in his months-long 
period of silence with the PRT), hell continue 
 
KABUL 00001358  003.6 OF 003 
 
 
arming his militias and acting independently.  If 
Dostum continues to play ball, then the leader of 
the largest illegally-armed network in the region 
will sanction the DIAG process, isolating and 
marginalizing noncompliant illegally-armed groups. 
Having Dostum work with the PRT, GOA and IC has 
already yielded resultshes been helping defuse 
regional tensions through orders to his 
subcommanders, for example.  The more politically 
enfranchised he feels, the less likely he is to 
sanction violence coming from his militias.  END 
COMMENT. 
¶9. (SBU) EMBASSY COMENT: Central authorities in 
Kabul have an overall plan for the disbandment of 
illegal armed groups that envisions the first five 
priority provinces for DIAG to be Takhar, Herat, 
Kapisa, and Farah.  Factors in the decision making 
process included a willing governor, a relatively 
vely 
stable security situation, and an adequate Afghan 
security presence  factors that are not yet present 
in Faryab.  While events such as the one organized 
by Dostum are helpful, in that weapons and 
ammunition are taken out of circulation, the 
ultimate goal of DIAG is the disbandment of the 
groups, not simply the handing over of weapons.  In 
addition, the international community in Kabul views 
the weapons handover in Sherberghan primarily as 
publicity ploy by Dostum to atone for his partys 
involvement in the recent violence in Maimana 
(Reftel). END EMBASSY COMMENT. 
NEUMANN