VZCZCXRO0841
PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #1285/01 0831344
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 241344Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9107
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//JF/UNMA//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2344
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2549
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5719
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1186

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001285 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
RELEASABLE TO NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF 
 
STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A, S/CT, SA/PAB, EUR/RPM, INL 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PTER ASEC AF
SUBJECT: PRT/LASHKAR GAH - HELMAND VIOLENCE: CAUSES 
AND PROSPECTS 
 
KABUL 00001285  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  Over the past year, as the 
insurgency has gained momentum in Helmand province, 
security has deteriorated.  Causes are varied, 
complicated, and intertwined.  They include: Some 
blurring of tribal/drug trafficking boundaries; 
growing Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) strength; the 
nexus among drug traffickers, warlords, and ACM; 
corruption among law enforcement forces; and the 
inability to make much headway in provincial and 
district governance. The 2006 eradication campaign, 
which began on March 8, has attracted minor, but 
persistent attacks.  This trend is likely to 
continue and possibly increase during the 
eradication campaign.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------- 
WHAT'S HAPPENED 
--------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  From the PRT's perspective, May 2005 
seems to have been a watershed in terms of Helmand's 
security.  In that month, five Afghan sub- 
contractors working on cash for work program were 
killed, apparently by ACM.  The attack occurred in 
the Babaji area of Lashkar Gah district.  After that 
attack, Chemonics, the USAID contractor for 
Alternative Livelihoods (A/L) program, pulled out 
and did not return to Helmand until September 2005. 
From that time until now, the security situation has 
restricted Chemonics' efforts to implement A/L 
programs.  Also in May 2005, a PRT civil affairs 
patrol was hit by a suicide bomber, seriously 
wounding two soldiers. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  As in many other areas of Afghanistan, 
Helmand experienced a spike in violence during the 
run-up to the National Assembly and Provincial 
Council elections.  Several candidates were killed 
during the campaign; it was difficult to find out 
the causes of these killings.  They may have been 
political/tribal in nature.  It is also possible 
that there were ACM connections. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Arguably, the most significant security 
incident in recent months occurred on February 3. 
ACM elements launched simultaneous attacks in 
Sangin, Mousa Qala, and Naw Zad districts.  During 
the clashes, the Mousa Qala district governor was 
killed.  Afghan National Army (ANA) forces that were 
moved to the area have been attacked numerous times 
since then.  This was the first time that ACM 
elements had launched a simultaneous attack of this 
magnitude.  Since then, government control of 
Sangin, one of Helmand's main drug 
trafficking/transit areas, has been tenuous at best. 
One district chief resigned after only two weeks, 
saying that he could not do the job; shortly 
thereafter (early March), his successor was 
assassinated. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  In Helmand during the period of March 3 
to March 17, there were 20 confirmed reports of 
"troops in contact" incidents, (including one on a 
PRT civil affairs convoy); four rocket attacks; 
eight improvised explosive devices; five 
assassinations; and three incidents of intimidation 
 
KABUL 00001285  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
against public officials.  The most gruesome was the 
beheading of four ethnic-Albanian Macedonians near 
Gereshk, Helmand's second largest city.  Several 
incidents were related to the poppy eradication 
campaign.  Military sources expect a higher rate of 
security incidents associated with the eradication, 
as forces move north into areas that are more 
populated and have higher poppy density. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Over the past several months, we've also 
seen an increase in violence towards schools and 
public officials.  In Naw Zad district, schools have 
been closed for months.  During a visit to the 
district in February 2005, the district chief told 
poloff that he could not predict when they will 
reopen.  In other districts, teachers have been 
killed or intimidated into abandoning their posts. 
In early March, teachers in Lashkar Gah received a 
"night letter" warning them to stop teaching, as 
this represented cooperation with the government. 
Also in February, a local crew working for BBC 
filmed a school burning in Nad Ali district.  In 
late January, three schools were burned in Nawa 
district.  Altogether, at least 60 schools (about 25 
percent of the total) are closed.  (Note:  Since a 
large percentage of open schools are in Lashkar Gah 
and Gereshk, Helmand's two largest cities, the 
situation in the countryside is actually more 
difficult than the statistics reveal.  End note.) 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  During regular visits to districts, the 
two most common concerns that we have heard are 
security and official corruption.   That said, there 
is also widespread optimism due to the upcoming UK 
deployment.  This deployment will bring about 2,000 
troops to the province.  In addition, an ANA brigade 
will also be stationed adjacent to the UK troops. 
Around the province, citizens consider this good 
news. 
 
---- 
WHY? 
---- 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  While the May 2005 Babaji killings were 
shocking, previous events may have set the stage. 
In March 2005, Dahd Mohammed Khan, a powerful 
warlord and suspected drug trafficker from Sangin 
district, was removed as chief of the National 
Directorate of Security.  He was subsequently 
elected to the Wolesi Jirga.  His lack of an 
official position locally as well as his election to 
Parliament, has probably reduced his influence in 
the Sangin area, resulting in the exacerbation of 
tribal/drug trafficking issues between the Alozai 
and the Isakzai tribes.  Also during that period, 
the previous governor, Shir Mohammed, implemented a 
limited poppy eradication program that reportedly 
targeted his enemies and competitors.  At the same 
time, USAID launched a major Cash for Work program 
in Babaji that could have been viewed as a threat by 
those opposed to the Coalition and government.  In 
short, it appears that some of the non-specific but 
understood boundaries became blurred, resulting in 
rising tensions. 
 
 
KABUL 00001285  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Another problem has been the growing 
infiltration of ACM across the porous Pakistan 
border - from the east via Kandahar and from the 
south (Baram Cha district), where Helmand shares a 
162 kilometer border with Pakistan.  This border is 
essentially unguarded and ruled by drug traffickers 
and/or the Baluch tribe. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  The nexus of ACM, narcotics trafficking, 
and law enforcement corruption also plays a role. 
The drug traffickers and ACM elements have common 
interests that include marginalizing the government 
so that they can carry out their activities with 
minimal disruption.  There have been unconfirmed but 
persistent reports of narcotics moving via police 
vehicles and with the help of law enforcement 
officials, from the senior to the most junior.  Turf 
battles also appear to play a role, along with 
tribal issues.  In late September 2005, the Lashkar 
Gah district police chief and 17 other police were 
killed in Baram Cha, possibly due to their attempts 
to interject themselves into a drug smuggling 
operation.  In Sangin district, the long standing 
animosity between the Isakzai and the Alozai tribes, 
along with some apparent blurring of drug 
trafficking boundaries, is likely one of the reasons 
for the high rate of violence in that area. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  ACM elements also may be exploiting the 
lack of governance in the districts.  PRT district 
visits have revealed that people are generally 
disillusioned with the government.  They see 
themselves as, at best, no better off economically 
after 4.5 years of elections and democratic 
government.  Thus far, the Helmand provincial and 
district governments have done little for the local 
population.  The general perception is that most 
government officials and institutions are 
endemically corrupt.  Thus, it is not difficult for 
the ACM to stir up resentment that works against one 
of the key goals of the Coalition: extending the 
reach of the government. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  While the security situation in Helmand 
is precarious, the incoming UK and Afghan troops 
should have a positive impact.  This is the first 
time that Helmand will see a significant number of 
troops since the fall of the Taliban (the U.S. has 
had only a small presence in the province). 
Improved security is essential if Helmand is to 
develop a legitimate economy and civil society. 
Governance, or lack thereof, will remain a 
significant challenge for the foreseeable future. 
While the appointment of Governor Daud last December 
is certainly a good start, other competent and 
honest public officials are few and far between. 
Developing a viable civil society in Helmand is a 
daunting task; doing so is essential if Helmand is 
to leave violence and opium behind. 
 
NORLAND