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Viewing cable 06KABUL1218, PRT/PATKICA FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF A

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KABUL1218 2006-03-20 08:21 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO4593
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #1218/01 0790821
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 200821Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9020
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//JF/UNMA//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2332
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2535
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5701
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1174
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 001218 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
RELEASABLE TO NATO/AU/NZ/ISAF 
 
STATE FOR SA/FO (AMB MQUINN), SA/A, S/CR, SA/PAB, 
S/CT, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND 
OSD FOR BREZINSKI 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958 N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: PRT/PATKICA  FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF A 
FRONTIER PROVINCE 
 
KABUL 00001218  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
(SBU) SUMMARY:  :  Paktika, one of the southeasts 
largest provinces and the one with the longest 
t 
border with Pakistan, has a reputation for 
remoteness, backwardness and anti-government 
activity.  While well-earned in the past, this 
reputation is not wholly true today.  Paktikas 
stability and security have improved significantly 
in the last year, due in great measure to the 
activities of the U.S. military, as well as the 
activism of Governor Mangal and the Afghan National 
Army.  There are lessons to be learned from 
Paktikas recent experience.  Instead of an example 
of an ungovernable province, it might well prove to 
be a model of how to extend governance to a tough, 
undeveloped border region.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Paktika an Emerging Province 
 
2.  (SBU) Paktikas rugged remoteness, its lack of 
development, and its extensive -  often troublesome 
-  border with Pakistan have in the past defined the 
province.  Today, much of that is changing, as 
Paktika emerges from the shadows and in some 
respects even shows the way ahead for other 
developing provinces.  Extending the reach of Afghan 
an 
central authority into the traditional Pashtun 
heartland has been a recurring problem over the 
years.  The Karzai government is just the latest in 
a series of governments which have competed with 
traditional and outside interests for influence over 
the people of Paktika. An enlightened alliance of 
Afghan and U.S. military assets has helped set the 
stage for the appearance of a new Paktika, a Paktika 
which today is moving closer to the Karzai 
government. 
 
A Simple Formula -  Construct Roads and Develop 
District Centers 
 
3.   (SBU) Paktika, left behind by other provinces 
in development, was fortunate in 2005.  Elements of 
three Army battalions - one infantry and two 
engineer -  worked for the people of Paktika 
building roads and government infrastructure, and 
providing security.  The key to security and 
stability in Paktika seems to be the development of 
government district center infrastructure:  a police 
headquarters, a district commissioners office, a 
district communications center, a cobblestone main 
street, and - in this province without electricity - 
solar street lights in each district capital. 
Partner these developed district centers with the 
first improved roads in Paktikas history and the 
equation is complete.  Government presence and 
capacity in each district center and all-weather, 
high-speed vehicular access to the rest of 
Afghanistan equate to security and stability, as 
well as a noticeable increase in commercial and 
economic activity. 
 
ANA  Embedded Trainers, the Right Stuff 
 
 
KABUL 00001218  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
4.   (SBU)   The Afghan National Army (ANA) has a 
high profile in Paktika.  With two Kandaks 
(battalion sized units) now operating throughout the 
province, the Afghan face of security is clearly 
apparent.  Relatively well staffed and equipped, and 
mounted on new four-wheel-drive trucks, the ANA, 
with its embedded U.S. Army and USMC training teams 
(ETTs), are a very visible sign that the Afghan 
government is in charge of the province.  The 
embedded trainers are key to turning this newly 
minted army into a professional fighting force. 
Living, working, training, mentoring, patrolling, 
and conducting combat operations together with the 
ANA, the ETTs, some 17 soldiers or Marines in each 
Kandak, are daily providing the role model that the 
ANA needs to become a professional military force. 
The embedded trainers simply have it right and are 
the right stuff for this mission. 
 
ANP and Mentors, Still a Long Way to Go 
 
5.    (SBU) The Afghan National Police (ANP), while 
deployed to every district in Paktika, do not enjoy 
the same success as the ANA.  Short on training, 
personnel, communications systems, transportation, 
uniforms, boots, and training ammunition, the ANP in 
Paktika need a lot of help.  The mentors in Paktika 
are not providing the professional image that is 
required for this environment.  There are only seven 
police mentors in a province the size of the state 
of Vermont; the mentors find themselves hampered by 
contractual rules and guidelines that interfere with 
their devoting the kind time to shoulder to 
shoulder mentoring and training that can instill a 
discipline of personal conduct that influences and 
improves performance. 
 
6.   (SBU)   Comment: Over the last year, Governor 
Mangals leadership and close partnership with the 
U.S. military commanders in Paktika have helped to 
tie the province ever closer to the Karzai 
government. Although State and USAID have had 
limited presence in the province in the four years 
since the fall of the Taliban, Paktika has 
nonetheless made substantial and obvious progress. 
In particular, the coordination of road building and 
district center projects has been a great success, 
and may prove to be a model for other undeveloped 
provinces. However, Paktika has had a slow start and 
has missed out on many of the projects which have 
benefited other, less contentious and more 
accessible provinces. The first wave of post-Taliban 
an 
clinic and school construction has to a great extent 
passed by Paktika, a province with arguably the 
greatest need for both.  The military has done, and 
continues to do, yeoman work in Paktika, but the 
time has now come, with an improved security 
situation, for USAID and the NGO community to become 
much more engaged.  There is also clearly a great 
deal of room for improvement in the ANP.  OSC-A and 
the Afghan Ministry of Interior should work together 
to expand training and supply the equipment needed 
to create a viable civil police force in the 
 
KABUL 00001218  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
province. 
 
7.(U) Dushanbe minimize considered. 
 
NEUMANN