VZCZCXRO7646
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #0628 0891939
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301939Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4962
INFO RUCPDO/USDOC WASHDC
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 4458
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 6650
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 4532
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 1785
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 5319
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 6145
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 3899
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEHRC/USDA WASHDC

UNCLAS BRASILIA 000628 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS TO USTR FOR MSULLIVAN/KLEZNY 
NSC FOR SUE CRONIN 
DEPT OF TREASURY FOR FPARODI 
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/JANDERSEN/ADRISCOLL/MWAR D 
USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/SHUPKA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD WTRO EAGR PGOV PREL BR
SUBJECT:  BRAZILIAN INTEREST GROUPS DUG IN ON WTO DOHA ROUND ISSUES 
 
¶1. (U)  Over the past week two sets of high-level visitors, CODEL 
Grassley and representatives from the Brazil-U.S. Business Council, 
have raised WTO Doha Round issues with GOB cabinet members and 
private sector interest groups.  The week of March 20 CODEL Grassley 
met with Foreign Minister Amorim, Agriculture Minister Rodrigues, 
and Trade Minister Furlan in Brasilia, and in Sao Paulo saw 
officials from the powerful Sao Paulo State Industrial Federation 
(FIESP) and Marcos Jank, head of the influential trade NGO ICONE. 
(See septels.)  Subsequently, a lobbying delegation from the 
Brazil-U.S. Business Council, a coalition of U.S. multinationals 
that do business in Brazil, met with FIESP on March 28 and Minister 
Rodrigues and Lula Chief of Staff Rousseff on March 29. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In nearly all these conversations, our Brazilian 
interlocutors strongly resisted entreaties to move forward on issues 
such as services and Non Agricultural Market Access (NAMA).  The one 
exception was the Codel Grassley meeting with Furlan, in which the 
Minister acknowledged that Brazil needs to be less defensive on 
services and open up its markets to industrial goods - although he 
was very adamant that none of this could happen until Brazil saw 
real progress on the agricultural side and removal of U.S. ag 
subsidies.  Industry contacts were even more entrenched.  In its 
session with the Council, FIESP reps said that they would pressure 
the Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) if it appeared that GOB diplomats 
were going to cede on services and NAMA. (Comment.  In the past, in 
other contexts, the Foreign Ministry has proven impervious to FIESP 
lobbying.  End Comment.)  Meanwhile, Rodrigues told Council members 
that after attending the recent London meeting he was pessimistic 
about chances for a breakthrough. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  Nor did much come from the Council's meeting with 
Rousseff.  To break the current impasse, Council member Bob Vastine, 
President of the Coalition of Service Industries, urged the GOB to 
submit a revised offer on services which at least bound Brazil's 
current level of opening.  Rousseff, who clearly was relying upon 
prepared talking points, initially did not understand the proposal - 
viewing it as a request for Brazil to abandon its agricultural 
ambitions for nothing in return.  Once the concept was further 
clarified, however, her response was that the burden of moving 
forward should rest with the developed countries and not a G-20 
nation such as Brazil.  Rousseff opined that these issues should 
best be left to Itamaraty negotiators though she did acknowledge 
that failure to reach an agreement would hurt both Brazil and the 
U.S. 
 
¶4. (SBU)   Comment.  What we conclude from all this is that given 
the deference GOB decisionmakers accord Itamaraty on WTO issues and 
the unwillingness of domestic manufacturers to view the big picture, 
engaging the Brazilian interagency community or Sao Paulo 
industrialists on Doha Round issues will likely not be particularly 
fruitful.  Our best interlocutors (and the key decisionmakers) on 
these matters will be Foreign Minister Amorim and President Lula. 
 
Linehan