Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06BAGHDAD916, THE ROAD TO AN INTERNATIONAL COMPACT WITH IRAQ

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06BAGHDAD916.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BAGHDAD916 2006-03-20 16:36 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO5580
OO RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHGB #0916/01 0791636
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 201636Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3435
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000916 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EAID PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: THE ROAD TO AN INTERNATIONAL COMPACT WITH IRAQ 
 
REF: Satterfield/Jeffrey March 14 email 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - NOT FOR INTERNET 
DISTRIBUTION 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Embassy and the donor community in 
Baghdad agree that the time is right to forge an 
international compact with the GOI, ensuring that both 
sides are committed to a clear set of principles, goals 
and actions.  To achieve this, the UN advocates 
building on existing donor mechanisms such as the Iraq 
Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) and to 
utilize two conferences: a technical preparatory 
conference in Erbil, at which representatives would put 
together the goals and proposals of the compact, and a 
larger, international "compact conference" to be held 
outside Iraq at which the compact will be presented. 
Embassy believes that such a compact should be used to 
push the new government to initiate meaningful economic 
reforms (including keeping its commitments to the IMF), 
stress the need for tough anti-corruption measures, 
strengthen rule of law, and further pursue national 
reconciliation.  An Erbil prepcom would be useful if 
there is full Sunni and Shia participation.  Embassy 
recommends as a next step that we and other donors 
reach out to Iraq's neighbors to garner regional 
support for the compact.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------- 
Compact Vice Consultative Group 
------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Recent meetings with UN and other 
international organizations and embassies in Baghdad 
show a great deal of consensus that the time is right 
to move donor countries' relations with Iraq to a more 
organized and equal footing, with each side clearly 
committing to a set of principles, goals and actions. 
While a traditional consultative group approach is 
premature, we see an opportunity to move forward with 
the Iraqis on an international compact upon which we 
intend to base this more normalized donor relationship. 
 
3. (SBU) The context for the compact provides us with 
the vehicle to achieve it.  UN Deputy SRSG Stefan De 
Mistura told EmbOffs recently that he sees the existing 
Iraq Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) 
Donors Conference framework as a natural base upon 
which to build this new relationship.  He sees the 
compact being developed in the course of two successive 
donor-related conferences, with both the UN and the 
World Bank playing leading roles.  (Comment: And we 
agree.  End Comment.)  Anti-corruption, rule of law, 
economic reform, and national reconciliation are among 
the specific policies on which the U.S. and other 
donors seek Iraqi commitments. 
 
--------- 
The Venue 
--------- 
 
4. (SBU) The venue for any IRFFI-type conference has 
been the subject of much discussion, with the Iraqis 
and some donors - the UN, Italy and Denmark - pushing 
for Erbil, but others uncomfortable with the choice for 
political ("if in Iraq, then in Baghdad") or security 
("if in Iraq, then senior international officials will 
not attend") reasons, preferring a location outside of 
Iraq.  De Mistura's idea is to utilize both venues, 
with the larger, international "compact conference" 
held outside Iraq and a technical preparatory 
conference - attended by all provincial Governors and 
Ministers, as well as regional and Baghdad-based 
international representatives - in Erbil.  The implicit 
tradeoff is that, if Salih brings the Shia and Sunnis, 
the initial meeting will be in Erbil.  The Iraqis (says 
Salih) will then acquiesce to the main event being held 
abroad. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Forging the Compact - Two Part Approach 
--------------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) The UN intends that the preparatory "Erbil" 
meeting will be a true working meeting for the GOI, 
where representatives will put together the goals and 
proposals of the compact.  A more select GOI group will 
present these conclusions to a collection of 
international players at the international "compact" 
conference.  Presently, Salih is working with the UN to 
engage the provinces in updating the National 
 
BAGHDAD 00000916  002 OF 002 
 
 
Development Strategy as a prelude to a preparatory 
meeting.  On the first day of the international 
conference, the Iraqis could present the compact, 
making a political rather than just a technical 
statement.  On the second day, building on the 
political momentum of the compact, countries hesitant 
to pledge (France, Germany) or who have been slow to 
disburse pledges already made (the Gulf States) would 
be strongly encouraged to "bring more than just a 
smile" to the table to match the Iraqi commitment in 
the compact.  De Mistura relayed Salih's full support 
for this approach. 
 
6. (SBU) The suggested timeline is tight: a preparatory 
"Erbil" meeting in May and an international conference 
in June.  Delay, however, runs the risk of missing the 
window of opportunity presented by a new GOI - if the 
new government is indeed in place by April.  However, 
if the new GOI does not materialize until June, a 
September/October combination then becomes a viable 
option. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
7. (SBU) We note that a huge amount of donor time and 
energy has been spent on venue discussions.  If Salih 
can deliver full Shia and Sunni participation from all 
the governorates, then we should support the prepcom 
idea to strengthen GOI buy-in.  While the overall 
approach of a preparatory conference followed by an 
international one is a way to broker the differences on 
venue, we are less confident than de Mistura that Salih 
can bring together Shia and Sunnis in a Kurdish venue. 
If, in fact, the scenario put forward by Salih proves 
to be upsetting to non-Kurdish members of the GOI, we 
should be prepared to revisit this.  Erbil must be an 
"all-Iraq" conference, not just one for the KRG. 
Nonetheless, if it meets with acceptance, we are ready 
to move beyond this venue discussion and get to the 
next step, namely the need to bring Iraq neighbors into 
the compact.  We believe that regional buy-in is 
essential. 
 
KHALILZAD