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Viewing cable 06ANKARA1410, SCENESETTER FOR MARCH 22-23 VISIT OF CODEL WARNER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06ANKARA1410 2006-03-16 14:48 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #1410/01 0751448
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161448Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4023
INFO RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:PDUSDP/ISA:EUR/ISA:NESA/DSCA// PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/425ABS IZMIR TU//CC// PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/39ABG INCIRLIK AB TU PRIORITY
UNCLAS ANKARA 001410 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MASS TU IZ AF IR IS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MARCH 22-23 VISIT OF CODEL WARNER 
TO TURKEY 
 
REF: STATE 36986 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Your March 22-23 visit comes at a time when 
Turkey is attempting to balance its commitments to the West 
against its desire to maintain harmonious relations with its 
neighbors and to play a constructive role with other Muslim 
countries.  Turkey remains a significant contributor to the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 
Afghanistan, will host a Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI) exercise in May and is actively engaging the new Iraqi 
government and playing a more constructive role there.  The 
cargo hub at Incirlik Air Base and the Habur Gate border 
crossing with Iraq continue to provide a vital link for 
Coalition troops.  Turkey is engaged in promoting a broad 
national unity government in Iraq and is supportive on Iran 
nuclear issues.  Our relations have improved since a low 
point in 2004 - early 2005, but problems remain.  The 
reception of Hamas was a clumsy mistake; our historically 
strong defense industry relationship is deterioriating; and 
Turkey is entering a period of pre-electoral turmoil.  Your 
visit provides an opportunity to review and clear the air on 
some of these problems.  It also is an opportunity to review 
Turkey's contributions on Iraq, Afghanistan and other issues 
impacting global security.  END SUMMARY. 
 
ENGAGEMENT, NOT ISOLATION 
------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) The GOT insists that issues with Syria, Iran and 
Hamas can only successfully be resolved through engagement. 
Given Turkey's geographic location, overwhelmingly Muslim 
population and western-style democracy, the government 
believes it is well-placed to send the right messages on 
behalf of the international community.  Additionally, 
Turkey's attempts to grow its trade relationships and its 
cooperation with neighboring countries against the PKK are 
also factors in the government's position.  The GOT has 
reportedly pressed Syria to cooperate with the UN 
investigation into the Hariri assassination and to prevent 
the transit of foreign fighters into Iraq; urged Iran to 
comply with IAEA standards; and emphasized to Hamas the need 
to recognize Israel, renounce terrorism and commit to 
continue the peace process. 
 
3. (SBU) Official government statements on Iran's nuclear 
program have been noticeably stronger since Iran's decision 
to renew uranium enrichment but the same cannot be said for 
statements on Syria or Hamas, which tend to put the best face 
on the issue.  While it does not appear that Turkey's 
intervention has yet had a positive impact, the government 
insists that isolating these groups -- including financially 
-- would not achieve the desired results.  You may wish to 
emphasize the importance of public statements by the 
government that reflect the strong messages it is reportedly 
sending in private. 
 
INCREASING COOPERATION WITH IRAQ 
-------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) The GOT increasingly engages directly with Iraqi 
authorities on issues of mutual interest rather than relying 
on the US as a conduit.  In addition to its Embassy in 
Baghdad, it will re-establish a consulate in Mosul this year. 
 Turkey's Special Envoy to Iraq, Amb. Oguz Celikkol visited 
Baghdad Feb. 23-25 and met with a wide array of Iraqi 
political figures, including Kurdish leaders with whom Turkey 
has had tense relations.  Subsequently, Iraqi PM Jafari 
visited Ankara and had useful discussions on economic 
cooperation, although the visit prompted critical comments 
from Iraqi President Talabani.  Turkey's Directorate of 
Religious Affairs has said it plans to send officials to Iraq 
to meet with Shia and Sunni clerics to promote reconciliation 
and has pledged to assist in the reconstruction of the Golden 
Dome in Samarra.  Many Turks believe Iraq is headed towards 
civil war given the increased sectarian violence following 
the Samarra bombing.  You may be asked about US thinking on 
Iraq and what more we would expect from Turkey. 
5. (SBU) Significant logistical support for the coalition 
effort in Iraq is provided by Turkey.  The multi-directional 
cargo hub at Incirlik Air Base has facilitated the movement 
of over 129 million pounds of equipment for coalition troops 
since its initiation in May 2005.  Six C-17s flying from 
Incirlik deliver the same quantity of supplies it previously 
 
took 9-10 planes to deliver from Germany.  The cargo hub has 
also facilitated the return of a small number of coalition 
troops on an emergency basis.  The Incirlik air refueling hub 
has conducted 2800 sorties delivering 192 million pounds of 
fuel in support of OIF and OEF since 2003.  Twenty-five 
percent of sustainment fuel for Coalition forces enters Iraq 
through the Habur Gate border crossing from Turkey. 
Two-thirds of humanitarian fuel for the Iraqi people also 
flows through this gate, creating periodic bottlenecks.  The 
current crossing is being upgraded but sporadic discussions 
with Iraq on opening additional border crossings have not 
made significant progress.  With close to $3B in trade with 
Iraq during 2005, it is in Turkey's interest to ease 
congestion at the border.  Despite a recent agreement between 
the two governments, the current stoppage of SOMO (the Iraqi 
state oil company) humanitarian fuel shippments continues 
pending negotiation of new contracts with suppliers and 
receiving agreed installment payment on SOMO arrears. 
 
6. (U) The government has used its good offices to assist the 
democratization process by hosting Iraqi constitution 
drafters in the lead-up to the drafting process; Talafar 
tribal leaders to discuss their cooperation against the 
insurgency there; and a dialogue between hard-line Sunni 
leaders and US Ambassador to Iraq Khalilzad.  Turkey has 
provided extensive training to Iraqi diplomats and political 
parties and has spearheaded the "neighbors meetings" process 
to help Iraqi government leaders engage their regional 
counterparts.  Turkey has provided training to over 300 Iraqi 
diplomats and political party members at its NATO Center of 
Excellence in Ankara and has offered to conduct training 
there under NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) auspices. 
Turkey has 4 personnel serving in the NTM-I Headquarters in 
Iraq.  You may wish to welcome Turkey's increasing support 
for Iraq's democratization process and note US appreciation 
for the logistical support provided to the US and coalition 
troops. 
 
BUT THE PKK PRESENCE IN IRAQ RANKLES 
------------------------------------ 
 
7. (SBU) The PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) terrorist 
organization presence in northern Iraq remains a major 
preoccupation for the GOT.  Attacks attributed to the PKK 
continue against Turkish soldiers and Jandarma in Turkey's 
southeast in what the GOT presumes are cross-border 
operations emanating from Iraq.  Istanbul and the far eastern 
city of Van witnessed major terrorist attacks in Feb.- Mar. 
While recognizing Iraqi and USG limitations to assist Turkey 
to combat the PKK at this time, the government finds this 
difficult to explain to a Turkish public fed on a steady diet 
of news reports about the funerals of Turkish police and 
military.  Ultimately it holds the US accountable.  We are 
working with Turkey and European allies to staunch the flow 
of funds and logistical support that comes from PKK-connected 
criminal activities in Europe.  The media is predicting an 
escalation of PKK attacks in Turkish cities beginning on the 
March 21 annual celebration of Newruz (Kurdish New Year). 
 
SUPPORTING NATO IN AFGHANISTAN 
------------------------------ 
 
8. (U) Turkey has contributed significantly to NATO's 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in 
Afghanistan, successfully commanding ISAF II in 2003 and ISAF 
VII in 2005.  It is currently planning for a joint command of 
Multinational Brigade Central in Kabul with France and Italy 
beginning in summer 2006 and will simultaneously open a 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in neighboring Wardak 
Province.  Following PM Erdogan's spring 2005 visit to 
Afghanistan the government increased its bilateral aid to 
$100M, including for the reconstruction of schools, and is 
evaluating the provision of counter-narcotics training.  You 
may wish to recognize Turkey's high level of assistance to 
this key front in the Global War on Terrorism. 
 
DEFENSE INDUSTRY COOPERATION A DISAPPOINTMENT 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Historically the strongest area of the relationship, 
bilateral defense industry cooperation is deteriorating. 
Boeing was the last firm to win a direct sale when Turkey 
awarded it a contract for an Airborne Early Warning and 
 
Control (AEW&C) system in 2002.  Protracted and contentious 
negotiations on that contract were not completed until fall 
2005 and the first plane landed in Turkey on Mar. 14, 2006. 
Boeing and Bell Textron decided not to participate in an 
attack helicopter tender due to onerous terms and conditions 
that placed extensive liability on the contractor and 
required upfront contractor guarantees of technology transfer 
rights and licenses.  For the same reasons, Sikorsky -- which 
had considered establishing its International Blackhawk 
production facility in Turkey if it won a tender for 52 
utility helicopters for the Turkish Armed Forces and Forestry 
Service -- may choose not to bid on that tender.  Raytheon 
may also opt against participation in a tender for a 
propeller airplane trainer.  In the last five years, three US 
firms -- General Dynamics, Bell Textron and General Atomics 
Aviation - have closed their offices in Turkey.  You could 
express US disappointment at the difficult conditions for US 
defense firms in Turkey and remind your interlocutors that 
both countries benefit from having US firms compete for 
Turkish tenders. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON