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Viewing cable 06AITTAIPEI680, MEDIA REACTION: PRESIDENT CHEN'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06AITTAIPEI680 2006-03-05 22:55 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0680/01 0642255
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 052255Z MAR 06
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8851
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4788
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 5988
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000680 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - ERIC 
BARBORIAK 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: PRESIDENT CHEN'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF 
CESSATION OF THE NATIONAL UNIFICATION COUNCIL AND GUIDELINES 
 
 
1. Summary: Coverage of Taiwan's major Chinese-language 
dailies March 3 focused on a Taiwan towel-makers' rally 
Thursday to protest China's alleged economic dumping of the 
product, a possible corruption scandal related to the 
freeway electronic toll collection system, and other local 
issues.  The pro-independence "Taiwan Daily" ran a news 
story on its page two that quoted U.S. Deputy Secretary of 
State Chris Hill in Manila as saying that he does not 
foresee any military confrontation between China and Taiwan 
due to President Chen Shui-bian's announcement regarding the 
cessation of the National Unification Council (NUC) and 
National Unification Guidelines (NUG).  Almost all papers 
carried reports on new AIT Taipei Director Stephen Young's 
briefing with Taiwan journalists in Washington. 
 
2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, Soochow 
University Associate Professor Lo Chih-cheng opined in the 
pro-independence "Liberty Times," Taiwan's biggest daily, 
that the United States has been acting too passively and 
unenthusiastically with regard to facilitating the 
resumption of dialogue across the Taiwan Strait.  Lo added 
that Taiwan has seized the opportunity presented by 
President Chen's announcement of the cessation of the NUC 
and NUG and has grasped the right to interpret the "status 
quo."  An editorial in the limited-circulated, pro- 
independence, English-language "Taiwan News" also said 
Chen's announcement regarding the NUC and NUG has ensured 
that "the Taiwan people have the right to decide and define 
their own status."  An editorial in the pro-unification 
"United Daily News" found several aspects of Chen's 
announcement and Washington's response somewhat ironic.  An 
editorial in the limited-circulated, conservative, pro- 
unification, English-language "China Post" questioned how 
Chen could turn out to be a winner in his row with the 
United States over the NUC and NUG.  End summary. 
 
A) "Cessation of the NUC and NUG Draws Taiwan's Bottom Line" 
 
Lo Chih-cheng, associate professor of political science at 
Soochow University, opined in the pro-independence "Liberty 
Times" [circulation: 600,000] (3/3): 
 
"The process that resulted in President Chen's announcement 
of the `cessation of the NUC and NUG' highlights that the 
United States has been acting too passively and 
unenthusiastically with regard to facilitating [the 
resumption of] dialogue across the Taiwan Strait.  In the 
wake of [China's] passage of the Anti-Secession Law and the 
visits by Taiwan opposition leaders' to China, the principle 
of Beijing's Taiwan policy has been to isolate and 
marginalize the Chen Shui-bian administration.  But 
Washington's response to [Beijing's move] was nothing but 
constant reiteration of its hope that Beijing would have a 
dialogue with Taiwan's duly elected leader.  Evidently, this 
kind of verbal expression of [Washington's] wish was unable 
to persuade Beijing to return to the negotiation table. . 
 
"It is crystal clear that Washington remains the only one 
who can make Beijing seriously consider resuming dialogue 
with Taiwan. .  From now on, the United States really should 
seriously consider how to adopt more proactive ways to 
persuade Beijing to start political dialogue with Taipei. 
This event [i.e. Chen's announcement] also underscores the 
fact that Washington needs to review its role as a balancer 
of cross-Strait relations.  Washington tends to define the 
status quo across the Taiwan Strait as `no independence, 
[then] no use of force', and it tends to use `no unilateral 
attempt to change the stats quo' as a principle for its 
policy responses.  But for a period of time, the United 
States has shown far more concern over `no independence' 
than for `no use of force.' . 
 
"Washington's hands-off attitude and tolerance will only 
make Beijing push further and make Taiwan lean toward `being 
unified' and `being annexed.'  If Taiwan fails to take any 
counteraction, it will only make the status quo advance 
toward an unfavorable direction for Taiwan. .  In short, 
despite the fact that this event has in a way ended for the 
time being that `different side may have different 
interpretations over the cessation of the NUC and NUG,' 
Taiwan has actually seized this opportunity and grasped the 
right to interpret the `status quo' and `the definition of 
altering the status quo.'  This may be where the turning 
point lies [for Taiwan] following the crisis." 
 
B) "Taiwan Has Right to Define Own Status" 
 
The pro-independence, English-language "Taiwan News" 
[circulation: 20,000] editorialized (3/3): 
 
". First, the cessation of the NUC and NUG marked the final 
termination of the most important remaining illegitimate 
relics of the era of authoritarian rule by the former ruling 
Kuomintang. . The combination of external and internal 
pressures made it necessary for the DPP government to act to 
ensure that a possible new KMT government could not use the 
NUG to abrogate the hard-won right of free choice of the 
Taiwan people.  With the cessation of the NUC and NUG, any 
government pushing for an `ultimate goal' will be required 
to proceed through legal and constitutional procedures 
instead of decreeing an `ultimate goal' by fiat. . 
 
"In addition, the termination of the NUC and NUG marked a 
major step in the consolidation and deepening of Taiwan's 
democracy and the principle of `people's sovereignty.' . 
Certification of the right of democratic self-determination 
for the 23 million people of Taiwan is a major historical 
accomplishment and sufficient to be considered a `historical 
legacy' for President Chen and the DPP administration.  The 
third level of meaning is that the summation of these 
changes ensures that the Taiwan people have the right to 
decide and define our own status through our democratic 
system instead of having such definition imposed by 
authoritarians or great powers, including the United States 
and the PRC.  We should cherish and defend this 
achievement." 
 
C) "The United States' Interpretation: Chen Shui-bian Has 
Reiterated His Firm Position to Stick to [His] Inaugural 
Speech of 2000" 
 
The pro-unification "United Daily News" [circulation: 
400,000] editorialized (3/3): 
 
"How ironic!  After Chen put up a big show by announcing 
`the abolition of the NUC and NUG,' the comment made by the 
U.S. State Department immediately thereafter was: the United 
States has noticed that President Chen has reiterated his 
firm [position], made in his inaugural speech of 2000, to 
stick to his pledge of not changing the status quo.  It is a 
well-know fact that the core concept of [Chen's] inaugural 
speech in 2000 was the `Five No's' pledge.  Is it possible 
that Washington's interpretation of Chen's `announcement of 
the cessation of the NUC and NUG' and his `seven-point 
statement' turn out to be, quite unexpectedly, that [he was] 
reiterating his adherence to the Five No's pledge! . 
 
"Of course, Chen did not explicitly reiterate the `Five 
No's' pledge.  Based on the U.S. official interpretation, 
Chen did not announce that he would `abolish' the NUC and 
NUG (therefore he did not violate his `last No' pledge) and 
he publicly guaranteed that the [planned] constitutional 
engineering program would be carried out according to `the 
existing constitutional procedures' (therefore he cannot 
possibly violate the `Four No's' pledges).  The inference 
thus goes like this: Chen was `reiterating that he will 
continue adhering to his inaugural speech of 2000,' and the 
core concept of the 2000 speech was exactly the `Five No's' 
pledges.  Even though Chen and the DPP tend to want to 
expand on their `achievement' over the cessation of the NUC 
and NUG, . the ultimate right to interpret Chen's 
announcement actually lies in the hands of the United 
States. . 
 
". Taiwan independence activists may claim that `the Taiwan 
people have scored a big victory,' but the United States' 
interpretation of Chen's announcement and his seven-point 
statement is the issue of substance.  Washington already 
deemed `the pledge of not changing the cross-Strait status 
quo' as an equivalent of the `Five No's pledges, and it also 
regarded Chen's not using the word `abolish' as a move akin 
to not violating the `last No.'  As a result, Chen has, in 
terms of international politics, failed to cross the zone 
framed by the `Five No's' pledges despite the fact that he 
did not reiterate these pledge.  This is the conclusion 
drawn by the United States for this tempest in a teapot. 
 
"Chen has obediently put on his head the `incantation hoop' 
handed to him by the United States.  Washington has subtly 
linked the `Five No's' pledges with the `commitment of not 
changing the cross-Strait status quo.'  All the more, 
Washington has further interpreted Chen's announcement of 
`cessation of the NUC and NUG' and his seven-point statement 
as a `commitment [that Chen will] stick to his 2000 
 
inaugural speech of not changing the cross-Strait status 
quo.'  Was this a commendation after all or an insult?  Was 
this a big victory or a major defeat?  Chen must know what 
it feels like now without being told, so do the Taiwan 
people." 
 
D) "Why Chen Could Emerge from His Row with U.S. as a 
Winner" 
 
The conservative, pro-unification, English-language "China 
Post" said in an editorial (3/3): 
 
"Many observers are wondering why President Chen Shui-bian 
could get away with abolishing the National Unification 
Council and Guidelines without incurring U.S. punishment as 
Washington had threatened in the past month as it sought to 
stop him from doing so.  On the contrary, his relations with 
the U.S. appear to have even strengthened in the wake of the 
diplomatic row. .  So Chen, in terminating the unification 
guidelines, has actually altered a significant component of 
Taiwan's longstanding relations with China.  This quiet 
change, however, was lost on Washington.  The U.S. 
government accepted Chen's claim that he `has no intention 
of altering the status quo' and that his new action `does 
not involve the change of the status quo.' . 
 
"In the assumption that the [i.e. Chen's] statement had 
previously been cleared by Washington, this contention [i.e. 
the 23 million people of Taiwan have the freedom to decide 
their political future and the government has no right to 
force them to opt for unification] must have gained the 
U.S.'s prior consent.  If so, Washington has changed an 
important position regarding Taiwan.  Since the Clinton 
administration, U.S. government leaders have held that any 
decision on Taiwan's future must have the respect of the 
people on both sides of the strait. . 
 
"In addition to the unification matter, Chen also subtly 
changed his previously stated pledge in another sensitive 
area with or without the knowledge of the U.S.:  his 
constitutional engineering program.  To dispel domestic and 
foreign concerns about his intentions of pushing for de jure 
independence, Chen had promised in his second inaugural 
address in 2004 that his constitutional reform would not 
touch on any sovereignty issues and, besides, would be 
carried out according to the rules stipulated in the 
existing Constitution.  But he implied, as revealed in the 
statement this week, that future participation in his 
constitutional program will not be limited to legislators. 
It will be expanded and in such a way: `from bottom to top' 
and `from civil groups to political parties.'  This subtle 
change will provide room for him to make maneuverings or to 
revise the rules of the game by mobilizing popular support. 
 
"What is difficult to understand is why Chen could emerge 
from a month-long diplomatic row with Washington, sparked by 
his controversial political moves, as the final winner and 
without his U.S. relations being damaged. .  Undoubtedly, 
these latter two agreements [in Chen's statement] helped win 
the hearts of U.S. officials.  This is because a Taiwan 
remaining loyal to the U.S. with its military power greatly 
strengthened can play a more meaningful role in serving 
Washington's strategic interests." 
 
KEEGAN