VZCZCXRO8438
RR RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHUJA #0722/01 0901009
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 311009Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5088
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0005
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 3713
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000722 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
EMBASSY MEXICO PASS TO D; DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/SPG, INR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SU NI
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE TALKS: AN ACCELERATING PACE 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: USDEL is encouraging the mediation and 
parties to make progress on security arrangements text and 
has again urged African Union Special Envoy Salim to table a 
full package for discussion next week.  Khartoum CDA Hume 
outlined the contents of President Bush's letter to Bashir to 
Magzoub al-Kalifa, who reiterated his instructions from 
Khartoum were to get a comprehensive peace agreement within 
weeks.  Salim told USDEL that he would be ready to table the 
entire peace agreement once the security arrangements reached 
the same state of readiness as the power and wealth-sharing 
documents.  The AU mediation emphasized to the parties that 
that the beginning of the discussion of the modalities for 
the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue with the parties is a sign that 
the negotiations are nearing conclusion.  Overall, the 
international partners, particularly the Europeans, must be 
persuaded to drop their support for concluding an enhanced 
cease-fire, an idea that the parties themselves no longer 
support.  Further delays in the negotiations will hamper UN 
transition planning.  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
MAGZOUB MEETING ON BUSH-BASHIR LETTER 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Khartoum CDA Hume informed GOS delegation chief 
Magzoub al-Kalifa that Embassy Khartoum had been instructed 
to deliver a letter from President Bush to President Bashir. 
Hume said that in the letter President Bush stated his 
concern about the violence in Darfur and slow progress in 
implementing the CPA.  Bush called for swift progress in the 
Abuja peace talks and stated that a peace agreement on Darfur 
was essential for expanding bilateral cooperation.  President 
Bush asked for support for introduction of UN forces and 
action to disarm the janjaweed.  Hume emphasized that his 
instructions were to work for a comprehensive peace agreement 
within the next few weeks.  Any credible peace plan would 
require the government of Sudan to adopt a more forthcoming 
position.  A full peace agreement, backed by UN peacekeepers, 
would benefit both the people of Darfur and the Government of 
Sudan. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Magzoub reaffirmed that he had been instructed to 
work for a full peace agreement with the goal of completing 
this task within a few weeks.  He expressed appreciation for 
USDEL's encouragement of military talks, which he said had 
created a new atmosphere.  He briefly described his own 
efforts to persuade AU mediator Salim to speed up the work 
and to present a full package of texts on wealth- and 
power-sharing and on security arrangements (rather than an 
interim cease-fire) to the parties. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - 
SALIM ON NEXT STEPS 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  USDEL members Hume and Yates met with Salim to 
encourage him to speed up the process of preparing a full 
package of texts for presentation to the parties. Hume 
pointed out that President Bush, after his meeting with 
Nigerian President Obasanjo, had spoken to the press about 
the need for a Darfur peace agreement.  He informed Salim 
that President Bush had urged Sudanese President Bashir to 
conclude a peace agreement on Darfur as a matter of urgency 
and to cooperate in the introduction of UN forces into 
Darfur.  Hume recalled that a peace agreement soon was needed 
to facilitate the timely introduction of UN forces. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Salim welcomed the interest and support of 
President Bush for the Abuja peace process.  Salim said his 
team had worked on the wealth- and power-sharing texts; when 
the security arrangement text reach a similar state of 
readiness, he was prepared to table all three.  He thought 
there was some more work to be done in this regard.  Yates 
commented that U.S. military adviser Bittrick was busy 
working with the parties and the mediation on the security 
arrangements text and was of the opinion that considerable 
progress was being made. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
DARFUR-DARFUR DIALOGUE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  The AU mediation started discussion of the 
Darfur-Darfur Dialogue (DDD) with the parties on March 27. 
The AU Special Envoy emphasized that the parties should view 
the DDD discussion as a sign that the negotiations were 
 
ABUJA 00000722  002 OF 002 
 
 
getting closer to the end.  The Government of Sudan response 
included acceptance that the African Union should oversee the 
DDD process, which should be as inclusive as possible. 
However, the GOS wants the DDD headed by a Sudanese appointed 
by President Bashir and stressed the importance of Government 
participation in the DDD because of its role as an 
implementer of recommendations and the fact that the 
movements at that point will be part of the Government.  The 
GOS proposes the DDD be held in one of the major cities in 
Darfur and consist of two stages: stage one lasting one week 
which brings together Darfurians from all parts of society to 
make recommendations on key issues to an follow-up committee. 
 The proposed stage two involves implementation of the 
recommendations by the follow-up committee, with the Sudanese 
Government heavily involved. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Minni Minnawi's SLM faction asked the AU why the 
DDD is being discussed before a comprehensive peace deal has 
been reached.  In addition, Minni's faction stated that, in 
their view, the DDD is a venue to present the final agreement 
that is reached, not/not a "Congress".  As a result, 
SLM-Minni declined to respond to the AU questionnaire on 
venue and mandate for the DDD.  JEM's response was more 
ordered than SLM, acknowledging that the goal was 
reconciliation and support from all tribes, groups, and areas 
of Darfur for the Abuja agreement.  They insist that the DDD 
does not re-open decisions made at Abuja and emphasize that 
the DDD be used to settle long-standing, underlying issues of 
the conflict, such as land use.  JEM and SLM-Minni grudgingly 
acknowledged that the GOS should be included in the DDD, but 
not organizational responsibility.  Delegates from both 
movements argued that all GOS representatives to the DDD 
should be from Darfur and "not delegates here now at Abuja". 
SLM-Abdelwahid asked for a delay to prepare its response, 
which is expected March 31 after which, the AU intends to 
prepare a formal paper for further discussion.  The AU 
mediation feels it needs to be on the table prior to the 
presentation of the comprehensive peace agreement draft. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Two hurdles must be jumped in the next week to 
keep the talks on track for a possible conclusion before the 
end of April.  First, the mediation and other international 
partners who had previously backed the idea of an "enhanced 
humanitarian cease-fire" as an intermediate step must be 
persuaded to support a full security arrangements text.  The 
parties now prefer a full text.  Second, Salim needs to put a 
full package on the table and to open an initial discussion 
to make evident what issues remain to be resolved.  USDEL has 
pointed out to international partners that, without a full 
agreement this month, UN deployment could be delayed and 
complicated. 
CAMPBELL