VZCZCXRO8270
OO RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHPA
DE RUEHUJA #0647/01 0811630
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 221630Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4984
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC
RHFMISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHRO/USMISSION UN ROME 0070
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/ASD-HD//
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000647 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
USDA FOR FAS/OA, FAS/DLP, FAS/ICD AND FAS/ITP 
USDA ALSO FOR APHIS 
USAID REGIONAL HUB OFFICE ACCRA 
CHERYL FRENCH APHIS DAKAR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO KFLU EAID AMED EAGR NI
SUBJECT: MARCH 22 NIGERIA AVIAN FLU UPDATE 
 
REF:  ABUJA 576 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  As of March 15, reliable information, 
including from testing, was not available on the extent of 
AI in Nigeria.  State veterinarians lacked vehicles and 
equipment, and some lacked personal protective equipment. 
There was no documentation on the location and numbers of 
small flocks within Nigeria's urban areas.  A high-level 
official at the Vom laboratory said his superiors told him 
to "hold off" on releasing information on confirmed cases of 
AI in some southern states.  In some cases, AI's spread is 
facilitated by members of AI surveillance teams, as well as 
by contaminated feed sacks.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The following assessment of the avian influenza 
(AI) in Nigeria is current as of March 15 and is based on 
USAID officials' discussions with Nigerians who attended 
four days of AI training funded by USAID/Nigeria.  The 600- 
plus participants included state veterinarians and their 
staff from all Nigerian states; private veterinarians, 
leaders of the Nigerian poultry industry, feed-mill 
operators, and persons from poultry-related industries.  The 
first two days of training were held in Ibadan and the 
second two in Minna, Niger State.  A USAID official attended 
the Ibadan training and provided his impressions to the 
USAID official who attended the Minna training. 
 
Reliable information from the states is not available 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Based on firsthand information from state 
veterinarians, it is not possible to evaluate accurately the 
state of Nigeria's poultry industry.  The clinical signs of 
the extant Newcastle disease that normally infects and 
causes high mortality in Nigeria's poultry flocks during the 
harmattan (dusty) season are similar to lesions caused by 
highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI).  Because of this, 
the presence of HPAI cannot be confirmed without laboratory 
testing -- which Nigeria is not carrying out consistently. 
Extremely high flock mortality (greater than 50% in three 
days), however, is a strong indicator used to determine 
positive-flock HPAI status in the absence of laboratory 
tests.  There are no other poultry diseases with these 
specific clinical signs that kill 50% or more of a flock in 
less than a week. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Owners of small flocks, which make up as much as 
80% of Nigeria's poultry, do not report disease outbreaks 
for reasons such as mistrust of state officials, and the 
fear of losing one's business and one's personal reputation. 
When small farmers' birds start to show clinical signs of 
AI, their standard reaction is to immediately sell all the 
birds for meat, rather than report the outbreak or suffer 
losses. 
 
¶5. (SBU) State veterinary officials lack vehicles, personal 
protective equipment (PPEs), sampling equipment, and other 
materials necessary to collect the information or samples 
required for proper reporting.  Samples must be delivered to 
the Vom National Veterinary Research Institute within three 
days to be of consistent value.  Because in many cases it is 
not possible to do so, state veterinarians very often do not 
make the attempt. 
 
¶6. (SBU) There is no documentation on the location and 
numbers of small flocks within Nigeria's urban areas.  State 
veterinarians said even if they had the vehicles to permit 
mobility, it would be impossible to fully survey the virus's 
progress in denser urban areas such as Kano, the largest 
poultry producer in the north.  Kano's bird flocks are 
spread both widely and densely throughout the residential 
areas of this city of at least 4 million people.  Bauchi 
State officials reported being threatened by poultry owners 
in some parts of the state and could not fully document AI's 
spread there. The GON classified Jigawa State as free of 
HPAI -- even though all of its neighbors, including Niger, 
 
ABUJA 00000647  002 OF 003 
 
 
are confirmed for HPAI.  When a Jigawa official was asked at 
the training why his state had not reported any AI outbreaks 
on farms and had not sent in samples for testing, he said 
all of the state's flocks already were dead. 
 
GON officials suppress positive test results 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) According to reports from private veterinarians 
that cannot yet be confirmed, some farms in Nigeria's south 
experienced the high flock mortality typical of HPAI as 
early as Jan. 15, but there were no official reports of 
this.  Southern poultry farmers, however, were proactive and 
responded by initiating a private vaccination program -- 
with efficacy as high as 95% -- not sanctioned by the 
Government of Nigeria (GON).  Commercial poultry farmers in 
the north did not vaccinate their birds or conceal the early 
outbreaks in their flocks. 
 
¶8. (SBU) A high-level official from the Vom laboratory, 
however, said he heard similar reports concerning 
vaccinations in the south and was proceeding to Lagos to 
conduct farm visits and a more complete follow-up to verify 
these reports.  The Vom laboratory can determine through 
testing whether a particular flock has been vaccinated.  The 
Vom official said his motivation in following up was to 
obtain information that would encourage the GON to authorize 
a national bird-vaccination program.  The same Vom official 
said his superiors told him to "hold off" on releasing until 
the "appropriate time" information concerning incidences of 
AI, as confirmed by laboratory tests, in certain southern 
states. (Note:  AI has now been confirmed in several 
southern states.  The U.S. Mission has not received other 
reports of GON officials being instructed to suppress 
laboratory results confirming AI.  End note.) 
 
Illegal poultry imports seem certain 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (SBU) Statistical analysis indicates and common sense 
suggests that Nigeria imports large quantities of commercial 
replacement birds despite the GON's ban on poultry imports. 
Nigeria's poultry breeder/multiplier industry is not capable 
of producing the required commercial stock.  Attendees said 
unofficial hatcheries in Kano import fertile eggs from Egypt 
(which is now positive for AI) and possibly other places to 
meet Nigeria's need for commercial flocks' replacement 
birds. When the USAID officer visited Kano recently, he 
sought information regarding the breeder and hatchery 
industry and egg production to support hatcheries.  But 
neither state veterinary staffers nor the Poultry 
Association of Nigeria could provide information about 
these. 
 
State veterinarians' complaints 
------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) As of March 15, state veterinarians attending the 
training in Minna still did not have PPEs or other equipment 
or support.  They were angered by press reports that Nigeria 
recently gave some donated PPEs to the Government of Niger. 
GON officials at the training announced that state 
veterinarians could go to Abuja and pick up their PPEs and 
equipment on their way home.  According to these 
veterinarians, the GON last year sold 1,000 government cars 
and left state veterinarians without transportation.  State 
veterinarians have received reduced pay since October 2005 
and say they have little incentive to respond to the AI 
outbreak. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Veterinary staff and surveillance teams do not 
fully understand the mechanisms by which bird diseases are 
spread, and Nigerian surveillance officers themselves likely 
are major vectors in spreading AI.  The majority of 
 
ABUJA 00000647  003 OF 003 
 
 
Nigeria's reported AI outbreaks have occurred in urban 
areas.  In these cases, the virus's spread probably is not 
facilitated by migratory birds but rather by surveillance 
teams. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Nigeria's feed industry uses and reuses feed sacks 
and does not have a sanitary means to deliver disease-free 
feed to poultry farms.  If this feed distribution system is 
not corrected immediately, AI will continue to spread 
rapidly to most of Nigeria's commercial flocks.  In this 
case, only backyard noncommercial, free-range birds would be 
spared this particular method of AI's spread.  Backyard 
flocks likely will avoid much of the AI afflicting Nigeria 
because they are not associated with what appear to be the 
most common vectors:  surveillance teams and recycled feed 
sacks and egg trays.  If AI is being spread in Nigeria by 
wild birds, backyard flocks are the most susceptible 
domestic poultry and will succumb rapidly to AI -- despite 
GON officials' assertions that Nigerian free-range chickens 
are more resistant. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Nigeria's southern and southwestern commercial 
poultry industry already responded to the AI outbreak 
independent of the GON through a private-practice 
vaccination program.  As a result, the country's southern 
and southwestern poultry industry likely will save itself 
and recover.  Northern Nigeria needs international 
organizations and the USG to closely monitor its backyard 
poultry industry, because a GON monitoring system does not 
exist. 
CAMPBELL