This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS WARSAW 000178 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/NCE DKOSTELANCIK AND MSESSUMS 
DEPT FOR NP/NE 
DOE FOR TYACKE AND BOLSHINSKY 
DOD FOR OSD/POLICY HSTRAUSS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TRGY KNNP ECON ENRG PL IAEA
SUBJECT: POLAND: DOE OFFICIALS DISCUSS SPENT REACTOR FUEL 
DISPOSITION 
 
 
¶1.  Econoff attended a meeting of DOE officials Michael 
Tyacke and Igor Bolshinsky and  GOP officials from the 
National Atomic Energy Agency (PAA), State Treasury, and 
Radioactive Waste Management Authority on 26 January 2006. 
Tyacke and Bolshinsky presented information on the DOE's 
Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) Program, created 
to repatriate Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) spent fuel to 
Russia.  PAA Director Dr. Jerzy Niewodniczanski chaired the 
meeting and showed interest in pursuing GOP participation in 
the program.  Both sides agreed to move forward, noting the 
timeline for completing all necessary agreements could take 
more than three years. 
 
¶2.  Responsibility for nuclear fuel is parceled out to three 
entities in the GOP.  The PAA oversees all safety and 
regulatory issues and acts as liaison between the GOP and the 
IAEA.  The State Treasury is responsible for the disposal of 
used radioactive material, and the Ministry of Economy 
supervises the research and use of radioactive material. 
Poland has three nuclear research reactors, only one of 
which, Maria, is currently operational.  The GOP has never 
shipped any nuclear material back to Russia, and so has quite 
a bit stored.  In fact, Tyacke and Bolshinsky said that there 
are more than 1,000 HEU assemblies in Poland, each holding 
about 50 grams of HEU.  The RRRFR stipulates a cutoff date of 
2010, by which time all HEU must be repatriated.  Poland must 
begin negotiating now in order to meet this deadline. 
 
¶3.  Poland's first step is to negotiate the smaller 
agreements that will allow DOE to begin the project's 
preparatory work.  The first agreement of this type is a 
"preparation" contract governing technical surveys of Poland 
HEU stockpile.  The GOP will also need to assume complete 
liability for all work done during the project, which 
relieves the USG of any liability.  This can be accomplished 
through a WMD Treaty or other means.  The GOP will also need 
to ensure that no taxes are levied on any USG assistance, 
money, or equipment that is provided to Poland during the 
project.  The most politically challenging move, according to 
Tyacke and Bolshinsky, will be to negotiate with the GOR 
concerning conditions and costs of repatriating and storing 
the HEU.  Once the HEU is repatriated to a Russian facility 
it will be blended and sealed in glass encasements for a 
period of twenty years, during which time the materials is 
simply too hot to move.  The fate of the material after this 
twenty-year period is open to negotiation between the GOP and 
GOR.  Tyacke and Bolshinsky noted these agreements are often 
difficult to reach, due to the uncertain costs of storing and 
monitoring spent fuel over such a long period of time.  The 
resulting information assymetry can lead to breakdowns in 
trust between negotiating parties. 
ASHE