This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 PARIS 000718 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR PM/SNA, EUR/WE; OSD FOR OSD/PA&E, OASD/ISA/EUR, 
OASD/ISA/NP, OASD/ISA/AP, OASD/ISA/NESA AND OASD/ISA/BTF 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MARR MCAP FR
SUBJECT: EMBASSY PARIS SUBMISSION TO THE 2005/2006 REPORT 
TO CONGRESS ON ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COMMON DEFENSE 
 
REF: A. STATE 223383 
     ¶B. PARIS 000005 
 
 
This message is sensitive but unclassified.  Not for 
Internet dissemination. 
 
 
Due to its length, this is part one of a three part message 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary:  This telegram constitutes Embassy Paris's 
country submission for the 2005/2006 Report to Congress on 
Allied Contributions to the Common Defense (requested Ref 
A).  We report on developments that took place during 
calendar years 2004 and 2005 and offer cost sharing 
information for U.S. fiscal years 2004 and 2005.  Embassy's 
contributions to the Report to Congress are keyed to 
paragraphs in Ref A where specific information is 
requested.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------- 
--------------------------------- 
Ref A Para 8:  General Assessment 
--------------------------------- 
--------------------------------- 
 
Overview 
-------- 
¶2.  (U) France bears a significant share of the burden of 
defending international security and stability.  It is 
firmly committed to conflict resolution, non- and 
counterproliferation, as well as to maintaining adequate 
conventional and nuclear capabilities.  Only a few nations 
have the military capability to project power to a distant 
theater and sustain operations.  France is one of these 
nations.  It has the military personnel, equipment, and 
command capabilities as well as the will to employ them 
throughout the world.  It is this total operational 
capability, and the resolve to act on the international 
stage, which allows the French military to participate and 
lead in an international framework, including through the 
European Union and NATO.  Africa comprises the heaviest 
French military commitment abroad.  However, France is also 
a significant contributor to international military 
operations in Central--Southwest Asia and the Balkans.  By 
helping to stabilize sensitive areas in Central Asia, the 
Balkans, or in Sub-Saharan Africa, overseas operations led 
by the French Armed Forces have helped to prevent those 
areas from becoming safe-havens for terrorist activity. 
Throughout 2004 and 2005, France has been a major 
contributor in the fight against terrorism as part of the 
international coalition in Afghanistan.  As such, France 
volunteered to participate under the command of the United 
States in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).  Moreover, 
security, stabilization and training operations led by the 
French Armed Forces within the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) is helping Afghanistan in its 
transition from a terrorist sanctuary to a growing 
democracy. 
 
¶3.  (U) France maintains the largest active duty military 
force in the European Union and the second largest active 
duty military force in NATO, with an active force of 
approximately 355,000.  Furthermore, France sustains a 
large percentage of this active duty force deployed in 
operations in overseas French territories or in sovereign 
territories around the world.  The average number of 
deployed forces outside of France was 35,000 in 2004, and 
32,500 in 2005.  Over 13,500 of those deployed are actively 
engaged in international mandates supporting counter- 
terrorist operations, humanitarian operations, peacekeeping 
operations, stability operations, and capacity building. 
To support this level of external international mandate 
operations, France spends approximately USD 790 million per 
year from a defense budget of 52 billion dollars. 
 
 
France's Global Reach: Peace Support Operations Worldwide 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶4.  (U) France eagerly participates in international peace 
support operations and is a leading force contributor to 
stabilization operations in the Balkans and in Africa.  In 
Cote d'Ivoire, France's most significant overseas 
operation, French troops enforce a tenuous cease-fire and 
are providing the backbone to the United Nations operation 
as a quick reaction force.  French troops have been 
actively engaged since the summer of 2004 in preventing the 
Darfur crisis from expanding into Chad.  In the Balkans, 
French troops are present in every military mission across 
Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia: SFOR/EUFOR, KFOR, UNMIBH, 
UNMIK, EUMM, and ALTHEA. During "Operation Secure 
Tomorrow," to stabilize Haiti, France deployed the second 
largest contingent alongside the United States. 
Contributing troops under international mandate is a point 
of principle in Paris.  The UN, where France has a veto as 
a permanent member of the Security Council, is its 
preferred forum for crisis resolution.  France has 
observers currently participating in UN missions in the 
Balkans, Georgia, Lebanon, Israel, Ethiopia/Eritrea, 
Burundi, DROC, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Western Sahara, and 
Haiti.  It also participates in the multinational force in 
the Sinai. 
 
 
France and the War in Iraq 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (U) The French government has forbidden its military 
from contributing troops to the NATO training mission 
inside Iraq (NTM-1).  One French officer is working on the 
training mission staff at SHAPE Headquarters in Belgium, 
and the GoF pledged 660,000 euros in February 2005 to help 
finance NTM-1.  In 2005, the GoF took initial steps to 
contribute to the development of Iraqi defense and security 
capabilities.  Under the European Union's EUJUSTLEX 
program, France has pledged to train 200 Iraqi police 
officials and judges in rule of law training in France, 
making France the top EU contributor to this program. 
Approximately 40 Iraqi police officials (non-military) 
completed month-long training at the Ecole Nationale 
Superieure des Officiers de Police and the Ecole Nationale 
de Police in 2005.  A third course started at the end of 
2005 for judicial instruction at the Ecole Nationale de la 
Magistrature.  At the same time, a French offer to train up 
to 1,500 Iraqi paramilitary police (gendarmes) outside Iraq 
remains unimplemented, although an Iraqi Ministry of 
Interior delegation visited France in July 2005 to further 
discuss the proposal.  Currently there is a single Gendarme 
Officer in Iraq, responsible for provision of security for 
French embassy staff in Baghdad. 
 
 
France and the War on Terrorism 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (U) France is currently the third-largest contributor 
to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) in Afghanistan, and one of the few nations other 
than the U.S. to have had troops engaged in Operation 
Enduring Freedom, ISAF and training programs for the Afghan 
army since these efforts began.  French Mirage-2000 
fighters have flown with USAF fighters to assist American 
and Afghan ground troops.  French deployments to the Horn 
of Africa remain focused on counterterrorism; the French 
assisted in the establishment of USCJTF Horn of Africa, and 
otherwise continue to allow the U.S. to share their base in 
Djibouti in connection with operations in the Indian Ocean, 
Red Sea and Persian Gulf.  France is a part of Task Force 
150, a multinational naval force that patrols the Red Sea 
and the Persian Gulf to interdict the movement of suspected 
terrorists from Afghanistan to the Arabian Peninsula. 
 
¶7.  (U) France participates in Operation Active Endeavor in 
the Eastern Mediterranean.  France is also actively 
involved with the Proliferation Security Initiative.  It is 
also a party to all 12 existing international terrorism 
conventions and is active in the UN and G8 counterterrorism 
committees. 
 
¶8.  (U) In 2005, France continued to discover and dismantle 
terror networks present on its soil, including several that 
recruited jihadists to Iraq.  Following the July 2005 
bombings in London, French officials worked closely with 
their British counterparts.  They also identified a number 
of deficiencies in their counterterrorism capabilities, and 
proposed legislation to remedy these deficiencies.  This 
fast-tracked legislation became law in late January, 2006. 
The French government is also expected to issue in February 
2006 a "white book" on terrorism that will underscore their 
belief that terrorism is a primary strategic threat to 
France, and that dealing with it is consequentially a 
central priority.  France consults extensively with the 
U.S. on terrorism, at the tactical and strategic level. 
 
Africa 
------ 
 
¶9.  (U) The French military has shown an increasing 
interest to cooperate with others, particularly with the 
U.S., in Africa.  In the past three years, there have been 
Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) executed in three 
African countries, NEO planning for four other potential 
crises, as well as U.S. and French multilateral programs, 
such as GPOI - ACOTA, RECAMP, and joint financial and 
logistical support for ECOWAS, ECCAS, and the African 
Union.  In the Gulf of Guinea and Trans-Sahel region, 
France has expressed interest in the U.S. effort to improve 
the posture of African countries in the fight against 
terrorism.  Both the U.S. and France continue to broadly 
support capacity building for African militaries.  (See 
paragraphs 12, 32 40, 42-43, 46, 59, 72, 82-86, 89 and 94 
for more on French involvement in Africa.) 
 
 
France, NATO and ESDP 
--------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Despite its singular stance on alliance 
membership (France is not a member of NATO's integrated 
military command), France has continued to demonstrate 
willingness to engage in NATO responses to common 
challenges.  France has been a major contributor to 
operations in the Balkans (SFOR, now EUFOR, and KFOR) and 
in NATO's operations in Afghanistan (International Security 
Assistance Force). In KFOR in Kosovo, French troops are the 
second-largest national contingent, significantly 
outnumbering U.S. units.  In Afghanistan, France has some 
900 troops, which will increase to approximately 1400 in 
August 2006, when France assumes command of the Kabul 
region of ISAF.  During December 2004-August 2005, France 
held the rotating command of ISAF.  France also contributed 
to NATO Humanitarian Relief Operations in Bagh, Pakistan. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The French have consistently expressed their 
support for NATO's transformation, and are contributing 
substantial resources to the NATO Response Force:  the 
French military has identified forces that at initial 
stages will amount to 40 per cent of ground units, 30 per 
cent of air assets, and 20 per cent of naval capabilities, 
and has proposed contributing EUROCORPS to the NRF at a 
later stage.  France has restructured some of its own 
forces with land, air and sea High Readiness Response force 
fully compatible with the NATO Response Force.  It has 
offered headquarter slots in Lille for fellow NATO members. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  Interest in being part of NATO transformation 
has not diminished the deep commitment of the GoF to 
fostering European security and defense arrangements.  Many 
in the GoF envision that transatlantic security relations 
of the future will increasingly include bilateral U.S.-EU 
cooperation. Throughout 2004 and 2005, the French 
vigorously pursued their goal of establishing independent 
European defense structures and supporting increased EU 
missions.  France supported an EU assistance mission to 
Darfur in the Sudan, to support the African Union's 
intervention.  France continues to push its EU partners for 
completion of a separate EU planning headquarters, a small 
but independent EU operational planning unit, as well as an 
EU cell at SHAPE. EU operations may also continue to be 
planned at national headquarters.  Additionally, France has 
been a key player in setting up and funding the European 
Defense procurement agency (EDA), designed to coordinate 
defense procurement among EU allies, and which became 
operational in 2005 with a small staff numbering some 80 
persons and a budget of 20 million euros. 
 
¶13.   (U)  In January 2006, the European gendarmerie force 
was formally inaugurated in Vicenza, Italy.  The concept 
dates back to October 2003, when French Defense Minister 
Michele Alliot-Marie proposed the creation of the European 
gendarmerie consisting of some 800 gendarmes from Spain, 
Italy, Portugal and the Netherlands to take on police 
training and other police functions as part of the EU's 
response to crises. 
 
French Training and Participation in Joint Exercises 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶14.  (U) In the European AOR, in cooperation with the US 
Commander Naval Forces Europe, the French Navy participated 
in 3 Non-NATO exercises and 6 NATO exercises in 2004 
including a Proliferation Security Initiative exercise, a 
NATO anti-submarine exercise, a Multi-lateral Livex, PFP 
exercise BALTOPS 04, and a NATO Joint fleet training 
exercise (a major NRF event sponsored by NATO). 
 
¶15.  (U) In 2005, France participated in 6 Non-NATO 
exercises and 13 NATO exercises.  The French Navy 
participated in RECAMP IV, JMC 05-1 and 05-2, a 
multilateral FTX helping qualify the Italian maritime High 
Readiness Force (HRF), two multilateral anti-submarine 
exercises, Trident D'Or (the exercise to qualify the French 
maritime HRF, a LIVEX Mine Warfare Exercise in the North 
Sea, FRUKUS (CPX/FTX with French, Russian, U.S., and U.K. 
navy participation, Sorbet Royale (a LIVEX Submarine Rescue 
Exercise), Bright Star (a multi-national, multi-warfare 
LIVEX executing in Egypt), Loyal Midas (a multilateral FTX 
to qualify a stand-by Maritime Component Commander for a 
future NRF rotation. 
 
¶16.  (U) Overall objectives for Navy training in 2005 were: 
100 days at sea per ship, 13 exercises, four of which were 
Amphibious exercises, three of which were mine warfare 
exercises, two deployments of the Charles de Gaulle CVBG, 
participation in one major NATO exercise, participation in 
one major EU exercise and five Joint exercises. 
 
¶17.  (U) The French air force continues to seek 
opportunities to exercise and train with the US.  During 
2005, the French air force participated in Exercise Bright 
Star in Egypt, and Exercise Air Warrior in the US.  France 
also continues to offer the US opportunities to use their 
training ranges and training airspace associated with 
Corsica in the Mediterranean Sea. 
 
 
French Support for Space Launch Activities 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶18.  (U) France supported multiple space launch activities 
from their facilities in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and 
the south of France.  The French government approved a US 
request to use the islands of Reunion and Nuka Hiva for 
telemetry tracking missions supporting NASA space launches. 
Additionally, the French support US space shuttle launches 
with access to the French Air Base in Istres France as an 
alternate shuttle landing site. 
 
 
Defense Trade and Industrial Cooperation 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶19.  (U) Source priorities in order of importance for 
French defense acquisition remain France, EU, and all 
others (to include the U.S.).  National pride and limited 
budgets govern this order.  The French defense industry 
continues to provide the greatest depth and breadth of any 
western European country.  While its technology is 
sometimes peer-level with the U.S., it is actually superior 
in specific niche areas (e.g., thermal imaging and optics). 
The single most limiting factor is defense spending. 
 
¶20.  (U) In the past year, the French Ministry of Defense 
continued its pursuit of revitalization of forces.  Despite 
competing government interests, the budget of the Defense 
Ministry remained untouched (the Interior was the only 
other ministry spared from budget cuts).  Highlights for 
2005-2006 spending include: a second aircraft carrier; 
introduction of the Rafale fighter aircraft; the European 
Multi-Mission Frigate (FREMM); Network-Centric command and 
control systems; Tigre and NH-90 helicopters; transport 
aircraft; third and fourth strategic missile submarines; 
and cruise missile development.  Only minor increases in 
research and development, as compared to previous years, 
were approved. 
¶21.  (U) Foreign Military Sales from the US increased from 
FY03 to FY04 (USD 45.6M to USD 66.9M), while direct 
commercial sales decreased  (USD 18.9M to USD 12.7M.) 
Pending US sales include the Aircraft Launch and Recovery 
Equipment (ALRE) for the second French aircraft carrier, 
and a cruise missile simulator.  FMS training funds were 
expended as in previous years, with the majority centered 
on carrier aviation training and support. 
 
¶22.  (U) Service-specific Data Exchange Agreements (DEAs) 
remained essentially stable, yet significantly, 
renegotiation of four Navy DEAs was concluded, extending 
their expiration dates to 2010.  Discussions continue 
regarding remaining DEAs and four newly proposed 
agreements.  Foreign Comparative Testing programs continue 
to show interest in French technologies, with recent focus 
on underwater GPS, perimeter defense, shipboard self- 
defense, and bomb casing design.  Benchmarking studies have 
been conducted on ship design and manpower reduction. 
 
¶23.  (U) U.S. defense acquisition and sales interests in 
France are significant and include (by service): for the 
Air Force, C-130J, KC-130J, C-17 sales and French AWACS 
upgrade; for the Army and USMC, Sophie, 120mm rifled 
mortars, Active Protection System armor for ground 
vehicles, and hybrid electric vehicles; for the Navy, ALRE 
sale, unmanned submerged/underwater vehicles, and maritime 
domain awareness, and network-centric enabled operations. 
All services are focused on any technology that can assist 
in the efforts of the IED Task Force. 
 
¶24.  (U) Privatization of the defense sector has continued, 
albeit at a slow pace.  Although the GoF still maintains 
so-called "golden shares" in several firms, globalization 
has eroded their total control in this arena.  For example, 
the recently privatized shipbuilding firm DCN has again 
partnered with Thales in planning the second French 
aircraft carrier, and was recently awarded a contract by 
the French Navy for total lifetime maintenance support for 
their fleet warships and major combat systems. 
 
¶25.  (U) The anticipated absorption of OCCAR (the 
Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation) into the 
European Defense Agency has stalled, although OCCAR did 
play a role in guiding the French and Italian defense 
ministries to select the General Electric engines for the 
European Multi-Mission Frigate (FREMM) in late 2005. 
 
¶26.  (U) The EU's European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) 
goal is to coordinate financing processes and to get 
European defense industry involved in identifying and 
filling gaps.  There is also a recent effort to engage 
university research labs through funding made available 
from private industries.  Further privatization and 
increased competitiveness of the French defense sector 
should support these trends. 
 
¶27.  (U) Tangential but significant issues to defense 
cooperation include continued pursuit of a Declaration of 
Principles (DoP) on armaments and end-use controls required 
by the U.S. on jointly produced systems, which prevent 
French sales to third parties without USG approval (viewed 
with concern by French government and private industry 
alike though France requires similar guarantees from their 
customers for French products).  On the other hand, U.S. 
Presidential intervention in rejecting the so-called "buy 
American" provisions in the recent U.S. defense bill was 
well received. 
 
¶28.  (U) Recent overtures on the part of both the U.S. and 
French governments have led to an increase in official 
bilateral defense discussions and activity.  The impending 
change of government in 2007 will have a significant impact 
on whether or not this trend continues.  While France's 
2005 vote against the EU referendum was seen as a setback 
to both the French government and to the EU's future, its 
full effect remains to be seen.  As noted above, there are 
signs of consolidation of efforts among EU institutions, 
specifically in the defense arena.  Economic realities and 
collective resolve should eventually determine whether 
these trends continue. 
 
The Future of French Defense Spending 
------------------------------------- 
¶29.  (U) Future French Defense budgets must conform to a 
new inter-governmental finance law known by the acronym 
LOLF (Organic Law of the Finance Law).  In this new 
framework, the funding made available to the Ministry of 
Defense abandons the traditional budget distributions by 
'Titles' and instead is presented as 'missions and 
programs'.  The most significant of these is the mission to 
'Put into action the National Defense Policy'.  Two of its 
supporting programs are 'Prepare the Force' and 'Equip the 
Force'.  In all, the Defense Ministry budget will be 
organized around four missions and nine supporting 
programs.  In an effort to improve the coherence of the 
defense budget, the LOLF ties budgetary allocations to 
performance.  Also, for the first budget cycle under this 
new system, the Chiefs of Staff of the services have less 
influence on service budgets. Their role is now to assure 
the coherence of the budget rather than the direction of 
it.  In a May 21, 2005 Presidential decree, the Chiefs of 
the Armed Services are now subordinate to the Chief of 
Defense (CHOD).  The CHOD now controls all budgets and 
procurement financing.  Service budgets now must pass 
through the CHOD before they go to the Minister's office 
for approval. (For more information on defense spending and 
the LOLF see paragraphs 111-113.) 
 
¶30.  (U) The 2006 defense budget represents a 2.2% increase 
over the 2005 fiscal year.  In spite of the Defense 
Minister's ability to protect the defense budget from cuts, 
there continue to be difficulties for the French military 
in the future.  These difficulties stem primarily from 
three areas:  first, the inflationary pressures of the 
price of energy; second, cost overruns/delays in 
procurement; and third, increased maintenance costs.  Most 
of the planning for the current five-year budget requests 
was predicated on the cost of a barrel of oil at half the 
current price.  This increase will translate into fewer 
flying hours, fewer training days, and fewer days at sea in 
the next few years.  Procurement of several current 
military systems is behind the original schedule or 
experiencing technical problems.  These delays include the 
Tigre helicopter, Rafale fighter aircraft, A-400M transport 
aircraft, and the new command ship (BPC).  The final 
expense increase will be the result of maintaining the 
older systems in the French military until sufficient 
numbers can replace them. 
 
 
Transforming Military Capabilities 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶31.  (U) In spite of not being part of the integrated 
military command structure of NATO, in January, 2004 France 
received two general officer billets within the command: 
one at Atlantic Command Operations (SHAPE) and one at 
Atlantic Command Transformation (Norfolk).  The French have 
assigned 110 military personnel to the two headquarters, 
representing 2.04% of overall NATO staff posts.  The French 
have also agreed to increase their contribution to Alliance 
military budgets from 4.9% to 7.4%.  Nonetheless, despite 
disclaimers to the contrary, the French have given mixed 
signals over the past two years on their vision of the 
future NATO.  These views have ranged from a desire for 
closer integration with NATO to generally limiting the 
scope of NATO's operations or in favor of an EU defense 
force. 
 
¶32.  (U) France has been a leading proponent to advance a 
"battle-group" concept to create rotational 1500-man size 
forces for use in Chapter VII mandates by the European 
Union.  Based on the EU Operation ARTEMIS model (the French 
led deployment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 
2003) the force would be capable of responding to a crisis 
within 15 days and be sustainable for 30 days minimum, 120 
days maximum.  Full operational capability is scheduled for 
¶2007.  The French insist that these battle groups would be 
compatible with NATO NRF rotations, with either taking the 
lead on the basis of a mutually-agreed decision.  Africa 
has been mentioned as a primary venue for the battle- 
groups. 
¶33.  (U) The French Army is investing in UAVs, the Improved 
Infantry Armored Vehicle (VBCI), advanced communications 
equipment, counter-fire radars, and lighter equipment for 
armored units.  They are beginning the process of 
digitization of the Army's battlefield systems and 
purchasing an individual soldier system - the Felin, the 
French Army's equivalent to the U.S. Army's Land Warrior 
system.  These initiatives will enhance French abilities to 
interoperate with US forces and systems. 
 
¶34.  (U) The French Navy has stood up and qualified the HRF 
(M) headquarters staff, the naval component headquarters of 
France's NRF, in Toulon in 2004 and 2005.  This force will 
deploy to the Gulf of Oman and Indian Ocean in 2006. 
Additionally, the Admiral, Naval Action Force (ALFAN) in 
Toulon has continued to develop over 2004 and 2005.  This 
command is now roughly equivalent to the U.S. Fleet Forces 
Command and has responsibilities for training, certifying, 
and equipping French naval forces.  In an effort to improve 
intelligence support to the French Navy, the French stood 
up a French intelligence command called Centre de 
Renseignment Martime (CRMar). 
 
¶35.  (U) In the context of trying to become more efficient 
and capable of joint and international operations, the 
French Air Force is in the process of a major 
reorganization.  In November 2003, a project team of senior 
staff officers, outgoing base commanders and civilian 
consultants was created and given the mission to develop a 
plan to create a better Air Force. The project team started 
its work in September 2004 and unveiled the plan in October 
¶2005.  The ideas will be progressively implemented 
beginning in 2006.  This ambitious reorganization project, 
named Air 2010, aims in particular at removing duplication 
and creating synergy.  It will serve to optimize the air 
base network while preserving existing capabilities. In 
summary, the Air Force will replace the twelve current 
commands with four large functional 'poles.'  The 
Operations Pole will be in charge of current operations in 
France and abroad.  The Forces pole will be charged with 
leading the preparation and training of the whole of the 
combat forces. The Support Pole will bring together within 
the same staff all the maintenance, logistics, and life 
support.  The Personnel Pole will join together all the 
personnel training and staff management functions. 
 
¶36.  (U) The French military is actively exploring ways to 
increase interoperability with the U.S. with respect to the 
global information grid and uses of information on the 
modern battlefield.  As of late 2005, the French MOD has 
directed increased contact between French military 
officials and U.S. military officials in an effort to 
ensure the French capability to interoperate with the U.S. 
is maintained and improved.  This French initiative is 
aimed at keeping up with the U.S. lead in information 
technology, particularly targeting data and friendly force 
tracking.  The French desperately want to preserve the 
ability to conduct combat operations with the U.S. in every 
domain - air, land, and sea. 
 
 
Recent Contingency Operations, Military Assistance, 
Humanitarian Relief Operations, Peacekeeping, Capacity 
Building, Counterproliferation and Nuclear Threat 
Reduction. 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶37.  (U) The French continue to show their support for 
operations in Afghanistan.  In 2006, they are planning to 
augment their forces to support the increased 
responsibilities of the Kabul regional command in addition 
to the military assets already in place in support of ISAF 
and OEF (see paragraphs 53-56 for more detail). 
Furthermore, the French continue to be actively involved in 
the fight against terrorism through the OEF Task Force 150 
and in the US Counter-Drug effort (see paragraphs 59-60 for 
more detail.) 
 
¶38.  (U) The French Army has been training the Afghan 
National Army within the overall U.S.-led program since its 
inception and the French have consistently expressed a 
desire to be part of NATO's transformation and 
interoperability initiatives as evidenced by their 
significant national contributions to the NATO Response 
Force (NRF) (see paragraphs 66-67 for more detail). 
¶39.  (U) In the Balkans, French forces remain among the 
largest contributors to operations in Kosovo and French 
participation in the former NATO SFOR mission in Bosnia 
continued under the EU Force, Operation Althea.  The French 
continue to maintain a small French military presence in 
Macedonia.  They also provide a small presence force in 
Georgia. (See paragraphs 70-71 for more detail).