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Viewing cable 06MUSCAT192, SECURITY CONCERNS DAMPEN OMAN-IRAQ RELATIONSHIP

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06MUSCAT192 2006-02-13 04:14 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Muscat
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000192 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/ARPI, NEA/I 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ETRD PGOV PREL MU IZ
SUBJECT: SECURITY CONCERNS DAMPEN OMAN-IRAQ RELATIONSHIP 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Iraqi and Omani diplomats agree that security 
concerns are frustrating the growth of bilateral relations, 
but disagree over whether Iraq has requested assistance.  A 
draft joint statement forming the basis of a new bilateral 
relationship has yet to be signed, and the next binational 
committee meeting, scheduled in Baghdad late this summer, may 
be postponed or transferred to Muscat.  Meanwhile, though 
Oman's MFA claims not object to Omani business travel to 
Iraq, it disavows responsibility for citizens' security.  End 
summary. 
 
------------------ 
SECURITY A PROBLEM 
------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) On February 5, Econoff met Iraqi Embassy counterpart 
Falah Rasim (protect) to discuss the current state of 
Iraqi-Omani relations.  Rasim bluntly identified Iraq's 
security situation as the most serious impediment to moving 
bilateral relations forward.  FM Zebari's lobbying efforts 
during his November 2005 3-day visit to Oman failed to win a 
pledge to re-open the Omani mission in Baghdad.  The next 
binational committee meeting, likely to be in September, 
should be in Baghdad since the last one was Muscat, but Rasim 
conceded security fears will likely either delay it or shift 
it to Muscat again.  He acknowledged Omani companies' 
interest in investing in Iraq, but said they shelve plans 
over security worries.  Rasim could only recall a $8.5 
million detergent powder contract that an Omani firm secured 
with Iraq's Ministry of Trade, though he noted that Oman was 
exporting sugar, tea, and soup to Iraq. 
 
-------------- 
STUCK IN LIMBO 
-------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Rasim referred to the joint statement drafted during 
the seventh Omani-Iraqi joint committee, held in Muscat on 
September 26, 2005, as the basis of a new bilateral 
relationship.  The statement, yet to be approved, calls for 
the two countries to strengthen information sharing, 
encourage trade ties, and identify training opportunities for 
Iraqi government personnel.  While pleased with the fact that 
two Iraqi diplomats entered Oman's Diplomatic Training 
Institute in 2005, Rasim said Iraq is eager for training 
opportunities in petroleum and civil engineering, and more 
progress in establishing linkages between universities and 
various ministries. 
 
-------------- 
EMBASSY STATUS 
-------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Rasim said Iraq is in the process of rebuilding its 
entire relationship with Oman, which started with the 
re-opening of its embassy in Muscat on October 26, 2004.  The 
embassy now has an Ambassador, four counselors, and several 
second and third secretaries, though it recently withdrew its 
military attache (at the Iraqi Ambassador's request). 
Currently located in rented space, plans to construct a new 
chancery are on hold as Iraq continues to pursue funding 
through the Omani government.  (Note: Omani FM Yusuf bin 
Alawi has previously told us that Oman's Madrid pledge of $3 
million can be earmarked for chancery construction.  End 
note.) 
 
------------------- 
THE OMANI VIEWPOINT 
------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) In a February 5 meeting with Pol/Econ Chief, MFA 
Arab Affairs Department Chief Ambassador Ahmed bin Yusuf 
al-Harthy (protect) rejected any notion of reopening soon an 
Omani embassy in Baghdad, citing the poor security situation. 
 On trade ties, he said the MFA was not actively discouraging 
Omani businessmen from traveling to Iraq, but disavowed any 
responsibility for their security given the lack of an 
embassy.  While he did not know precise trade figures, he 
suspected that Omani-Iraqi commerce was likely creeping 
upward.  Contrary to the Iraqi diplomat's assertions about 
assistance requests, Ambassador al-Harthy said Iraqi FM 
Zebari made no such requests during his November visit. 
Al-Harthy noted Oman's impatience for a new government to be 
formed in Iraq, and urged the USG to pressure the Shia into 
including Sunni Arabs in a coalition. 
BALTIMORE