VZCZCXRO6723
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0482/01 0541624
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231624Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1616
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000482 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PINS SOCI PINR PHUM SU
SUBJECT:  POST MORTEM ON CONFLICT IN JONGLEI, 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  On February 17, CG Juba met with 
Gatkuoth D. Kuich, Member of the Southern Legislative 
Assembly from the Waat Constituency in Jonglei State, 
where fighting broke out between the SPLA and Nuer 
militia two weeks past.  Kuich had traveled to the area 
and interviewed civilians, SPLA officers, SPLM officials, 
and militia fighters in order to prepare a report for 
submission to the Assembly and the GoSS.  He described a 
chaotic situation in which forced disarmament, poor 
communications, tribalism, and bad faith from all parties 
involved had contributed.  Kuich said that while the 
situation is presently stable, impending cattle camp 
migrations could cause renewed violence.  End summary. 
 
----------- 
Root Causes 
----------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Kuich cited forced disarmament of civilians by 
the SPLA, with attendant abuses, as a root cause.  On the 
orders of the Jonglei Governor, a force of 1,700 SPLA 
began disarmament following a three-day conclave with 
local tribal chiefs.  SSDF troops from Yirol County 
accompanied the mission and explained to the chiefs that 
they had become part of the SPLA.  The operation 
initially went smoothly, until an SPLA soldier reportedly 
raped a Nuer woman, and other SPLA soldiers beat a number 
of civilians until they surrendered weapons that they had 
claimed not to possess.  The SPLA confiscated 220 guns 
and recruited 180 new troops, who were able to keep their 
weapons.  Villages in their line of march began emptying 
before the SPLA troops arrived as word of the abuses - 
much embellished in the retelling - spread. 
 
¶3. (SBU) An earlier decision by the Governor that local 
Nuer cattle herders saw as partial to the Dinka Bor also 
played a part.  As water has dried up around Waat and 
Yaui in recent years, the SPLA had provided an escort to 
accompany the Nuer and their herds to pasturage along the 
Toich River, near the Dinka Bor.  Recent Dinka returnees 
to that area had expressed fear that the Nuer would 
attempt to seize cattle, and the Governor announced that 
the annual migration would not be authorized this year. 
The Nuer were outraged. 
 
----------------------- 
Details of the Conflict 
----------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Advance SPLA troops arrived in Yaui expecting no 
trouble despite the fact that it is a hotbed of the White 
Army, a Nuer tribal militia that provides security for 
cattle camps and loots and rustles livestock from 
surrounding peoples.  Among them were elements of the 
local SSDF, a more organized force that had not yet been 
integrated with the SPLA.  After initial talks between 
SPLA officers and the local chief, who had agreed to 
disarmament, a small group of armed SPLA troops went to 
the market, where they were confronted by Nuer youth 
demanding that they leave.  A SPLA soldier fired a burst 
in front of the group to drive them off, weapons appeared 
from everywhere, and a generalized firefight ensued. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The main body of the SPLA force arrived just as 
the fracas commenced, and utter chaos reigned.  Virtually 
every White Army militiaman in the town, plus local SSDF 
troops, raced toward the shooting, as did the SPLA, and 
the market was engulfed in close combat.  Realizing the 
operation had gone hopelessly awry, the SPLA commander 
ordered a retreat by his men and the smaller Yirol SSDF 
force, all of whom fled the town in disarray.  A number 
of SPLA officers were captured and other SPLA groups 
scattered into the bush nearby.  Kuich said he had 
confirmed 27 White Army dead, all men and all combatants, 
and at least 45 SPLA, the majority perishing of thirst. 
Kuich said that neither Gabriel Tang nor Gordon Kong or 
their supporters were in any way connected with the 
fight, and that the extravagant claims made by them and 
other northern Government of National Unity officials 
were false. 
 
------------- 
Who to Blame? 
------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Kuich said that he had interviewed individuals 
high and low to try and determine who was responsible. 
SPLA soldiers and officers told him that "the leadership" 
had approved the disarmament.  Minister of the Council of 
Ministers Justin Yaac had told Kuich that he did not know 
who had authorized the plan.  The Governor of Jonglei 
 
KHARTOUM 00000482  002 OF 002 
 
 
said that the chiefs and civilians had requested the 
disarmament.  Kuich spoke by telephone with the SPLA 
Chief of Staff, in Eritrea at the time, and was told that 
disarmament was SPLA policy but refused to say who had 
authorized the operation in Yaui. 
 
¶7. (SBU) In Kuich's view, there is plenty of blame to 
spread.  Two young fighters from the White Army admitted 
that the rank and file had made prior plans to attack the 
SPLA when they arrived in order to procure additional 
arms, a reverse disarmament.  Kuich said that his report 
would cite negligence, poor coordination in local 
government, and weak linkages to the GoSS as major 
failings.  He also listed poor communication between Nuer 
tribal leaders and the population as a contributing 
cause.  Kuich said that a full investigation would seek 
to determine individual accountability of those involved. 
 
---------- 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Kuich credited former SSDF general (now SPLA) 
Simon Gatwich for his role in defusing the crisis.  In 
Kuich's conversations with Yaui civilians and the White 
Army, they said they would now be willing to disarm if 
two conditions were met:  the SPLA provided adequate 
security and took measures to provide sufficient water 
for them and their herds from new boreholes.  They also 
demanded that the SPLA designate assembly points on the 
border between the Nuer and Murle people, where they 
would disarm both tribal militias at the same time to 
prevent the Murle from raiding for cattle.  And finally, 
the Governor should no longer take the side of the Dinka 
Bor.  They expressed a preference for disarmament managed 
by UNMIS or troops from Bentiu rather than SPLA troops 
they had fought in the past.  No one, Kuich stressed, had 
forgotten the bloody Dinka-Nuer clashes of 1991 and 1992. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Kuich counseled the White Army herders to remain 
where they are and not attempt to force passage to the 
Toich River, since that would guarantee fighting and 
Dinka seizure of their cattle.  He told CG that by the 
end of March all water points around Waat and Yaui will 
have run dry, and that one way or another the migration 
would occur.  He said that he would stress to GoSS 
President Salva Kiir that a solution must be found soon 
to avoid another round of violence. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Kuich said that any attempt at disarmament 
would be a challenge, because arms and munitions continue 
to come into the market.  He saw many market stalls 
selling boxes of AK-47 cartridges.  Traders bring some 
ammunition from the north for profit -- not necessarily 
politics -- and SPLA and SSDF soldiers also add to the 
mix by selling arms and ammunition for personal gain. 
 
-------- 
Bio Data 
-------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Kuich is a Nuer from Waat who resided in Omaha, 
Nebraska from 1983-1995, where he was pastor of an 
Evangelical Lutheran congregation and the director of 
several Sudanese oriented NGOs, including one that helped 
settle the "Lost Boys."  He is one of four former U.S. 
residents currently sitting in the Southern Assembly. 
Kuich, who refused an armed escort and walked alone nine 
hours into Yaui, is known for his personal honesty and 
fearlessness. 
 
HUME