VZCZCXRO6554
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0474/01 0541402
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231402Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1599
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000474 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AF/EA, DCHA 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
USMISSION UN ROME 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JMELINE, TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KAWC SU
SUBJECT:  DISPLACEMENT TRENDS IN DARFUR 
 
REF:  (A) Khartoum 220 (B) Khartoum 230 (C) Khartoum 178 
 
------------------- 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
¶1.  After a relative lull in fighting and displacements 
for most of 2005, November and December marked an 
increase in the size and frequency of population 
movements within Darfur that has yet to subside.  Many 
movements have resulted, in large part, from struggles 
for territory and influence between the Sudanese Armed 
Forces (SAF), or those loyal to them, and the Sudan 
Liberation Army (SLA).  This has been particularly true 
in South Darfur, but other factors include continued 
militia attacks on villages and internally displaced 
person (IDP) camps, general harassment of civilians, 
ethnically based rivalry and conflict, and National 
Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) activities in 
the Kulbus corridor of West Darfur.  Primary areas of 
instability in which population movements have occurred 
include Mershing, Shaeria, and Gereida in South Darfur 
and areas of Jebel Marrah and Zalengei, West Darfur. 
 
¶2.  Overall, violence in Darfur is escalating to levels 
not seen since 2003/2004.  Field sources indicate that 
insecurity may increase further given the current 
posturing of armed factions.  The February 14 downing of 
an SAF helicopter by the SLA near Shaeria, South Darfur 
makes the scenario of increased fighting more likely.  In 
addition, proxy fighting continues along the Sudan/Chad 
border, the humanitarian implications of which remain 
unknown given the lack of access.  End Summary and 
Comment. 
 
-------------------- 
Numbers of Displaced 
-------------------- 
 
¶3.  While the numbers of displaced have been considerable 
in some cases, it is important to note that recent 
movements constitute a second or third displacement for 
many of the affected groups.  This means that the number 
of newly displaced cannot simply be added to existing IDP 
caseload figures to arrive at the new number of IDPs in 
Darfur, as many were already included in the old figures. 
 
¶4.  The overall number of IDPs reported in the U.N. 
Humanitarian Profile remained remarkably consistent at 
approximately 1.8 million in 2005 up to the latest report 
issued for November.  A decrease of 70,000 from October 
to November can be explained by the October 4 headcount 
in Kalma camp, which brought the previous artificially 
inflated figure of 163,000 down to approximately 90,000. 
Available statistics do not yet reflect the periods of 
increased violence and displacements, but the U.N. Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) 
reported that more than 26,000 people were displaced in 
South Darfur in December alone. 
 
-------------------------- 
Major Population Movements 
-------------------------- 
 
--Mershing- 
 
¶5.  Mershing is the site of the largest recent movement 
of IDPs in Darfur.  Harassment of IDPs by armed Arab 
militia had been ongoing in the area for months, and IDPs 
had asked repeatedly for a full-time AMIS presence in the 
area.  After a January 18 SLA attack on Sudanese 
government police outside of Mershing that killed 4 
police officers and wounded 10, Arab militia began 
conducting retaliatory attacks in the following days on 
Kaile IDP camp and extensive looting of Mershing market. 
According to U.N. sources, Sudanese government police 
supported these actions of the militia that killed four 
to six people and injured an additional eight.  In the 
environment of fear created by the attacks, an estimated 
55,000 people are believed to have fled toward the nearby 
village of Menawashi between January 25 and 27.  The 
number of displaced included 35,000 people that had been 
 
KHARTOUM 00000474  002 OF 004 
 
 
living in Mershing-area IDP camps and 20,000 former 
residents of Mershing town. 
 
¶6.  As of February 12, the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) reported that all but 1,500 of the 55,000 
Mershing town residents and area IDPs in Menawashi had 
returned to Mershing.  Strongly motivated to encourage 
returns, the Sudanese government Humanitarian Aid 
Commission (HAC) met a series of demands by the IDPs, 
including replacing the Mershing police commander and 
police officers, integrating local police officers from 
Mershing into the new police force, and organizing trucks 
to facilitate the return.  In addition, African Union 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) Civilian Police (CIVPOL) 
established a base in Mershing and the AMIS protection 
force increased the frequency of their patrols.  IOM is 
also verifying a non-governmental organization (NGO) 
report of the arrival of approximately 200 families from 
Mershing in Otash camp outside of Nyala. 
 
¶7.  The NGO World Vision reported that looting by 
Mershing-area IDPs and residents in the aftermath of the 
displacement caused extensive setbacks for the 
organization's programs.  One fully equipped primary 
health care center, five child-friendly spaces, a school, 
a women's center, and the agency guesthouse in Mershing 
were all completely pillaged - including the structures 
themselves.  World Vision and community leaders are 
attempting to recover stolen goods to allow local 
programs to resume operations, although this looting has 
unfortunately negated many months of progress for the 
organization. 
 
--Shaeria- 
 
¶8.  According to U.N. sources, the situation in Shaeria, 
South Darfur, is complex and involves power struggles 
between the Sudanese government and the SLA, as well as 
deepening enmity between the Birgit and Zaghawa ethnic 
groups.  The town is controlled by the government but is 
located on the edge of territory controlled by the SLA. 
In November, militia from the Arab Birgit ethnic group 
and government soldiers reportedly began to harass and 
attack non-Arab Zaghawa civilians in an effort to "defend 
Shaeria" from SLA takeover due to the assumption that 
Zaghawa are natural SLA sympathizers.  This violence led 
an initial group of approximately 400 Zaghawas to seek 
protection by moving outside of the AMIS compound near 
the town.  SLA subsequently began retaliatory attacks on 
behalf of their ethnic brethren, causing the rapid 
deterioration of security and economic activity in the 
area. 
 
¶9.  Despite an official attempt by the government to 
restrict movements out of the town, as of February 12, 
the NGO Solidarites reported that only 15,000 to 17,800 
of the original 32,000 residents remained in Shaeria. 
The displaced are scattered in a number of locations. 
More than 10,000 people believed to have come from 
Shaeria have recently arrived in Wada'a, North Darfur, 
and thousands more are thought to be scattered in the 
countryside between Shaeria and the towns of Muhajiriya 
and Labado.  Some Shaeria IDPs have made it as far as the 
North and South Darfur state capitols of El Fasher and 
Nyala.  As of February 14, the number of Zaghawa citizens 
living in the vicinity of the AMIS compound outside of 
Shaeria had risen to as many as 1,000. 
 
¶10.  On January 25, the Sudanese government conducted an 
aerial attack approximately 10 kilometers east of Shaeria 
in an apparent attempt to drive back the SLA.  While many 
IDPs were believed to be living in the area, the number 
of causalities and the humanitarian needs remains unknown 
because assessments cannot be carried out until the area 
is cleared of unexploded ordnance by AMIS troops.  As a 
result of this event, Medecins Sans Frontieres-Holland 
(MSF-H) and Solidarites evacuated staff on January 26, 
leaving no international humanitarian presence in 
Shaeria.  Furthermore, on February 14, as the SAF again 
shelled the area east of Shaeria, the SLA shot down an 
SAF helicopter, leaving many to anticipate further 
hostilities resulting from retaliation. 
 
KHARTOUM 00000474  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
--Gereida- 
 
¶11.  The U.N. reported that as many of 20,000 IDPs fled 
to Gereida from surrounding areas during November when, 
according to AMIS reports, militias looted and burned 26 
area villages.  This movement increased the total number 
of IDPs in Gereida to 63,000.  Problems in the region 
began between the Fellata and Masalit ethnic groups, and 
ensuing fighting involved numerous factions including the 
Sudanese government, SLA, JEM, and Fellata and Masalit 
militia.  In late December, SLA forces took control of 
the town.  According to ICRC who is in the process of 
verifying the number of new IDPs, the IDP population in 
Gereida has grown to between 80,000 and 90,000 as of mid 
February.  OXFAM reports that new IDP families are 
arriving in Gereida daily. 
 
¶12.  Gereida is reported to be tense and additional 
violence remains likely, with large numbers of armed 
nomads amassed in the area (reftel A, reftel B).  AMIS 
reported that it is cooperating with the South Darfur 
Wali to implement a peace process in Gereida with the 
Fullata, Masalit, Reizegat, and Habaniya ethnic groups. 
One of the principles of the process is that all militias 
should withdraw from Gereida; however, it is doubtful 
that the SLA will agree to do so. 
 
¶13.  Related to the situation in Gereida is the nearby 
town of Donkey Dereissa, which the SLA took control of on 
December 6.  As a result of the heavy fighting, nearly 
all people from Donkey Derieda are believed to have fled. 
The U.N. Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) 
estimated a total of approximately 6,500 people had fled 
in the direction of Unkunya and scattered as far north as 
Kalma Camp. 
 
--Jebel Marrah- 
 
¶14.  Jebel Marrah is a location of long-standing friction 
between government and SLA forces.  U.N. sources report 
that clashes between the SAF and the SLA on December 24 
resulted in two new groups of IDPs totaling an estimated 
21,000 people near Daya in the Rokoro locality of Jebel 
Marrah.  An estimated 10,000 IDPs took refuge in Tibon 
village; and the populations in nine villages near Kia 
accommodated approximately 5,000 IDPs and an additional 
6,000 took shelter in the surrounding mountains. 
 
¶15.  On January 23, SLA forces entered Golo town and 
engaged in heavy fighting with SAF troops (reftel C). 
The NGOs GOAL, MSF-Spain, and Danish Refugee Council 
(DRC) evacuated by road with assistance from AMIS troops 
after being unable to secure assurances of safe passage 
by the two armed groups.  It remains unknown, largely due 
to the absence of the humanitarian community, whether the 
fighting resulted in the displacement of civilians.  On 
January 25, GOAL also evacuated staff from Daya as a 
precautionary measure due to the likelihood of conflict. 
However, a technical malfunction caused the U.N. 
evacuation helicopter to crash, killing one national 
staff member. 
 
--Zalengei-- 
 
¶16.  From December 13 to 15, heavy fighting between two 
Arab ethnic groups, the Jamala and the Bagara, displaced 
more than 8,500 people near Nyangadula in the Abata 
locality of West Darfur.  (Note:  Nyangadula is located 
approximately 40 km north of Zalengei and in the vicinity 
of Golo.  End note.)  According to a USAID NGO partner, 
the violence resulted in the displacement of both Bagara 
and Fur populations south to Zalengei, and Jamalas to 
Saraf Omra in North Darfur.  Fur communities were 
generally not involved in the fighting but fled the area 
largely to avoid being drawn in to the fighting on the 
side of the Bagara, who had previously provided the Fur 
with security from other Arab groups. 
 
¶17.  According to NGO reports, nearly 2,500 Fur IDPs 
settled in the existing Hamidiya camp and nearly 3,800 
Bagara Arabs settled in a new camp in the Taiba area just 
 
KHARTOUM 00000474  004 OF 004 
 
 
outside Zalengei.  In addition, a portion of the 
displaced established shelters near the AMIS Sector 7 
Headquarters in Zalengei.  An estimated 2,500 Jamala 
arrived in Saraf Omra.  As of January 23, the U.N. World 
Food Program (WFP) reported that 10 percent of those 
displaced to Saraf Omra had returned to their communities 
of origin in West Darfur. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
Future Displacements and Humanitarian Response 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶18.  A general trend is beginning to emerge in which 
recent sites of large displacements have shared strong 
similarities in the lead up to events.  In particular, it 
has often been in locations near where government- and 
SLA-held territory border and where SLA often agitate or 
orchestrate low-level attacks on government targets such 
as police stations or SAF vehicle convoys.  Arab 
militias, in turn, retaliate on behalf of the government 
with increasing proxy attacks against individual 
civilians, then escalate to general looting and attacks 
on civilian centers in IDP camps or towns, and eventually 
heighten insecurity to a point at which civilians flee in 
large number.  As one example, Kutum, North Darfur, is 
increasingly worrisome when viewed in this light. 
Following multiple small-scale events including an attack 
on the Head of Military Intelligence, presumably by the 
SLA, Arab militia entered Kutum town and fired on 
civilians on February 12, injuring three and killing one. 
General fear and insecurity are increasing in the nearby 
IDP camps of Kutum and Fata Borno, with rumors of larger 
attacks looming. 
 
¶19.  Given that security is continuing to trend downward, 
USAID's Darfur Field Office expects to see significantly 
more displacements in the coming weeks and months.  This 
increased IDP caseload will place an even larger response 
burden on the humanitarian community in this time of 
extremely difficult access.  In addition to ongoing 
hotspots likely to produce large IDP movements, localized 
attacks and displacement continue largely unreported. 
This level of violence is a marked increase over last 
year and reminiscent of 2003/2004. 
 
HUME