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Viewing cable 06KHARTOUM454, NRC EVACUATES FROM SOUTH DARFUR

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06KHARTOUM454 2006-02-22 10:48 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #0454/01 0531048
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY TEXT ON SECTION 01 - MSI6894 - AD96B695 - 555)
O 221048Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1571
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000454 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AF/EA, DCHA 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
USMISSION UN ROME 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR JMELINE, TSHORTLEY 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - TEXT ON SECTION 01 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KAWC SU
SUBJECT:  NRC EVACUATES FROM SOUTH DARFUR 
 
REF:  (A) Khartoum 0320 (B) (05) Khartoum 1350 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
1.  On February 21, the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) 
evacuated international staff members working in South 
Darfur.  NRC international headquarters made the 
determination to remove staff in response to weeks of 
Sudanese government warnings that the safety of NRC staff 
could not be guaranteed.  The work of NRC is particularly 
critical in Darfur's largest internally displaced person 
(IDP) camp, Kalma, where the organization works as camp 
coordinator.  It is unknown how long the organization 
will be absent from South Darfur, and NRC is currently 
reviewing its ability to continue operations.  NRC is 
working urgently with other humanitarian agencies to 
cover its operations on the ground, particularly in 
Kalma.  End summary. 
 
------ 
Causes 
------ 
 
2.  On February 20, the South Darfur Commissioner of the 
Sudanese government Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) 
verbally directed NRC expatriate staff to leave Nyala 
purportedly due to security concerns.  NRC refused to 
leave, however, unless the HAC issued a signed order 
instructing the organization to do so.  On February 21, 
NRC's international headquarters in Oslo, Norway, made 
the determination to relocate all NRC expatriate staff to 
Khartoum, without the issuance of an official letter by 
HAC officials. 
 
------- 
History 
------- 
 
3.  In relation to the continued fallout over the cartoon 
controversy, South Darfur HAC officials verbally ordered 
NRC staff to leave the state on February 8.  Again, HAC 
stated it had issued the order because the security of 
NRC staff "could not be guaranteed."  After intensive 
advocacy by several donors and the U.N. Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Khartoum- 
based HAC Commissioner intervened and decreed that NRC 
did not have to leave Nyala, claiming to be unaware that 
such a statement had been made (reftel A). 
 
4.  The issue of NRC as Kalma camp coordinator has been 
highly contentious for some time.  In August 2005, the 
HAC refused to renew its agreement with NRC for this 
purpose.  At that time, USAID documented the critical 
humanitarian and protection services provided by NRC in 
the camp of nearly 90,000 persons in the cable listed as 
reftel B.  In addition to many other functions, NRC 
provides analysis and advocacy on the human rights issues 
and sexual violence occurring in Kalma, which many would 
argue is the source of the government's discontent with 
the organization.  After a strong request by Deputy 
S ecretary of State Zoellick, the government allowed NRC 
to resume the camp coordination role on November 15 on 
the condition that NRC could not engage in protection- 
related matters. 
 
------------------------- 
Humanitarian Implications 
------------------------- 
 
5.  NRC's absence will leave a considerable humanitarian 
gap, as its role as Kalma camp coordinator is even more 
crucial in light of the heightened insecurity and 
displacement in South Darfur.  NRC is working to 
coordinate with other NGOs operational in Kalma to take 
over camp coordination, but the issue has not been 
resolved.  As an interim measure, OCHA and the African 
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) Civilian Police (CIVPOL) 
will cooperate to fill in the gaps left by NRC's 
departure.  Two issues of particular concern are the 
registration of new arrivals and the continuation of 
joint Sudanese police and AMIS CIVPOL firewood patrols to 
protect women collecting firewood, which NRC is 
instrumental in facilitating. 
6.  Without camp coordination, the camp can become 
destabilized quickly.  For example, on February 16, 
approximately 50 Arab militia approached Kalma camp on 
horseback and intimidated IDPs in response to reported 
cattle theft in Nyala.  NRC reacted quickly to alert the 
AMIS protection force, who deployed to calm the 
situation.  Despite the South Darfur Wali also being 
immediately informed, it took 12 hours for the police 
forces to arrive in Kalma. 
 
---------- 
Next Steps 
---------- 
 
7.  NRC is currently reviewing its ability to operate in 
Darfur given the continued restrictions on its work 
imposed by the government.  Embassy Khartoum is 
coordinating with Norwegian government representatives 
here and will follow this situation closely. 
 
HUME