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Viewing cable 06CAIRO689, EGYPT FERRY DISASTER UPDATE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06CAIRO689 2006-02-05 16:21 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Cairo
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000689 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL ECON EWWT MARR EG
SUBJECT: EGYPT FERRY DISASTER UPDATE 
 
REF: A. EMBASSY CAIRO - OPS CENTER TELCONS 
     B. 05 CAIRO 08036 
 
Sensitive But Unclassified.  Please protect accordingly. 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Despite some recent rescues, hopes are fading for 
the approximately 830 passengers still missing after the 
sinking of the Egyptian passenger ferry "Al Salam Boccacio 
98" during its transit from Dubah, Saudi Arabia to Safaga, 
Egypt.  Embassy Cairo has been in close contact with GOE 
counterparts to offer condolences, offer and coordinate 
assistance in search and rescue and the investigation, and to 
confirm that no Americans were known to be involved in the 
disaster.  The GOE has been appreciative of U.S. efforts in 
aiding the search and rescue, noting that the U.S. was the 
first nation to offer assistance.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------ 
Update 
------ 
 
2. (SBU) As of February 5, many questions remain as to the 
exact cause of the February 3 sinking of the Egyptian 
passenger Ferry "Al Salam Boccacio 98."  Rescue efforts are 
ongoing, with MoD contacts informing OMC that one further 
survivor was rescued at approximately 1500 hrs local time on 
February 5.  Despite that, the number of victims far exceeds 
the number of rescued, and the final death toll will approach 
1,000.  Ministry of Transport officials are in the port of 
Safaga to help coordinate rescue efforts and begin the 
investigation process. 
 
3. (SBU) As unrest continues in Safaga between passengers' 
families and Egyptian police, the GOE has provided few 
details as to the formation of an investigation team, 
although industry contacts tell us that a broad panel is 
being formed that will include private sector and academic 
participants.  Ministry of Transport officials are stating 
that a fire in one of the car parking areas precipitated the 
incident, but survivor accounts are pointing to serious 
breaches of safety protocols aboard the aging ferry.  One of 
the ferry's sister ships, the "Al Salam 95," sunk in October 
2005 after colliding with a Cypriot cargo ship near the 
southern entrance of the Suez Canal (Ref B), albeit with 
minimal casualties. 
 
---------------- 
USG/MFO Response 
---------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Upon learning of the incident on Friday, February 3 
around 1245 hrs Cairo time, Embassy sections reached out to 
GOE counterparts, industry contacts, coalition military 
allies and the MFO.  CONS contacted Egyptian State Security 
to request a passenger manifest and receive an initial 
estimate of casualties and breakdown of passenger 
nationalities.  State Security responded about 60 minutes 
later, indicating that there was possibly one Canadian among 
the passengers but apparently no Amcits on board.  CONS and 
ConGen Jeddah confirmed through host nation contacts that 
there were no known Amcits aboard the ferry.  Egyptian State 
Security announced that of the 1,318 manifested passengers 
and crew, there were 1201 Egyptians (including 99 crew 
members), 99 Saudis, 6 Syrians, 4 Palestinians, 1 Omani, 1 
Emirati, 1 Yemeni, 1 Sudanese, 1 Indonesian, 1 Jordanian and 
1 Canadian on board. 
 
5. (SBU) Cairo Naval Attache contacted NAVCENT Bahrain to 
inquire about available assets to assist in the operation. 
NAVCENT initially ordered the UK warship the HMS Bulwark to 
turn around and head to the site and assist operations, with 
an estimated 36-48 hours steaming time to sunken ferry's 
position.  Cairo DAO contacted Egyptian Navy Commodore 
Mamdouh to ask if the Egyptian Armed Forces desired 
assistance in the search and rescue operation if USG assets 
were in a position to respond.  After initially turning down 
assistance, the GOE asked for help.  When conveying Egypt's 
willingness to accept the assistance, Commodore Mamdouh 
expressed the GOE's appreciation and noted that the U.S. was 
the first country to offer assistance. 
 
6. (SBU) NAVCENT recalled the HMS Bulwark when word arrived 
that the USNS Benavidez was transiting the Suez Canal on 
February 4 and would be redirected to the rescue mission, 
arriving at approximately the same time estimated for the 
Bulwark.  The USNS Benavidez passed through the area but did 
not report any sightings of bodies, wreckage or survivors. 
 
7. (SBU) NAVCENT also readied a Djibouti-based U.S. Navy P-3 
aircraft awaiting GOE request for assistance.  Upon receipt 
of the request for assistance from Commodore Mamdouh, the 
aircraft was sortied at 2100 hrs February 3, arriving on 
station at about 0500 February 4 to begin operations with 
Egyptian Navy and MFO assets on the scene.  MFO dispatched 
two Italian ships from Sharm El Sheikh, a Twin Otter aircraft 
and a UH-60.  The MFO vessels, working with the airborne P-3 
aircraft, rescued 8 survivors and recovered 3 dead.  The P-3 
stayed until about 1630 on February 4 and returned to base 
due to mechanical problems.  The aircraft was prepared to 
return but the GOE did not request that it do so. 
 
8. (SBU) Legatt is in communication with FBI Headquarters to 
determine what, if any, technical assistance or resources 
could be brought to bear if requested by the GOE.  DAO passed 
to Commodore Mamdouh the NTSB's offer of sending a maritime 
investigation officer to assist with the inquiry.  Mamdouh 
said he would consult with the various stakeholder 
ministries.  A/DCM also passed this offer to the Ministry of 
Transportation.  ECPO reiterated Embassy condolences and 
offers of U.S. assistance to the office of Admiral Shireen 
Hassan, head of the Maritime Transport Sector of the Ministry 
of Transportation.  Admiral Hassan is currently in Safaga 
managing Egyptian response efforts.  PA posted a press 
release on the Embassy website offering condolences and 
re-emphasizing U.S. support, and handled press inquires. 
 
----------------------- 
Initial Press Reactions 
----------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) The ferry disaster garnered immediate international 
and domestic press attention.  As of February 4, all papers 
and television news led with the story of the ship's 
disappearance and Mubarak's visit to Hurghada.  Television 
images showed protesting families stoning police at port 
stations, and both satellite and terrestrial stations hosted 
transportation and safety officials on evening talk shows 
describing compensation schemes for victims' families, and 
defending against accusations of a lack of safety standards. 
By February 5, commentators in independent and pro-government 
papers began critical remarks about the government's 
response.  For example, columns in Al-Masry Al-Yom railed 
against the government's "rush to make denials about the 
sunken ferry before an investigation has been conducted", 
while Al-Ahram published a call on the government "to deal 
with the catastrophe openly and honestly" and Al-Akhbar 
printed the claim that "accidents happen not coincidentally, 
but as the result of a long hi 
story of negligence and poor planning."  Al-Gomhouriyya 
published columns supporting the government and praising 
Mubarak "for standing by the people in the disaster" and 
"encouraging the search and rescuing of many people." 
 
RICCIARDONE