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Viewing cable 06BAGHDAD549, MUQTADA SADR DEBUTS ON AL-JAZEERA WITH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BAGHDAD549 2006-02-21 18:00 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXRO4064
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHGB #0549/01 0521800
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211800Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2827
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BAGHDAD 000549 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
LONDON FOR ARAB MEDIA UNIT 
 
E.0. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KPAO KISL OPRC IZ
SUBJECT:  MUQTADA SADR DEBUTS ON AL-JAZEERA WITH 
IRAQI NATIONALIST MESSAGE, REJECTING "SECTARIAN" OR 
"OCCUPATION" FEDERALISM 
 
REF:  (A) OSC GMP20060218564004; (B) OSC GMP20060212522002 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary.  Influential Iraqi politician Moqtada al- 
Sadr has emerged from relative media obscurity into the 
regional limelight with extensive travels and a remarkable 
interview on al-Jazeera on February 18.  During a regional 
procession that included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Syria 
and Jordan (and reportedly stops still planned for Egypt and 
Lebanon), he has repeatedly called for removal of 
"occupation" forces from Iraq and said the Sadr Trend has 
entered a phase of "political engagement" to effect this. 
He has called for national unity and rejected "sectarian 
federalism," and notes that the Mahdi Army has evolved from 
being a "military" to a "cultural" force, even while 
committing it to defend Iran or Syria if they are attacked. 
Sadr is praising Hamas and copying the rhetoric of some 
regional Islamists with promises of improved service to the 
people.  End Summary. 
2.  (U)  Iraqi politician and son of the influential late 
Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr made his debut on pan-Arab 
talk shows with a February 18 appearance on al-Jazeera's 
"Open Dialog" program with Ghassan bin Jiddu.  The program 
was rebroadcast on February 19. (Ref A provides further 
readout). 
3.  (U)  Sadr in many ways elaborated on themes he has 
repeated during regional visits that began with a visit to 
the funeral of the Kuwaiti Emir in January.  Since then, he 
has visited Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria and Jordan.  In both 
Iran and Syria, he created a stir with comments that the 
Mahdi Army would protect either of those states in the face 
of an external attack; he stressed the need for positive 
relations with both. (Ref B provides readout of the Syrian 
visit.) 
Politics and Religion 
--------------------- 
 
4.  (U)  On Jazeera, Sadr said he does not accept 
secularism.  However he drew a distinction between religion 
and politics.  Religion, from God, must include all aspects 
of life, including politics.  Politics, however, need not 
include religion.  He reiterated his adherence to the 
guidance and rulings of Shia marja' Ayatollah Kadhim al- 
Ha'iri (who lives in Qum, Iran).  He said the Al-Sadr Trend 
is not a political party and has no political leaders, only 
religious leaders who aim to establish an Islamic society, 
to spread Islam among people, not governments. 
 
Sadr Role in Iraq 
----------------- 
 
5.  (U)  In Syria (on February 13), and again in the Jazeera 
interview, Sadr outlined three phases of the "Sadrist" 
evolution:  "peaceful resistance, to help Iraq get rid of 
the occupation and establish security; military resistance 
repelling U.S. attacks in the south and the center; and now 
political resistance."  He told Syrian TV that this 
resistance should lead to removal of the occupation or a 
timetable for withdrawal."  He added "the U.S. brought 
democracy to the Middle East but God turned the tables and 
made the democratic process a weapon against the U.S., as 
was the case in Palestine and in Iraq." 
 
6.  (U)  On Jazeera, he was questioned extensively on the 
role of the Sadr Trend in Iraqi politics.  Sadr refused to 
be pinned down on whether he would be directing the (thirty- 
strong) Sadr Trend bloc in parliament.  He said only that 
Sadrists would represent the people, not a group or person, 
and their votes would be determined by the needs of the 
people.  He admitted that the Trend had joined the United 
Iraqi Coalition (Shia bloc, or UIC), but said Sadr trend 
parliamentarians "will serve all sides, including Turkmen, 
Kurds, Sunnis, and Shabak." 
 
7.  (U)  Pressed again on the issue of the UIC's "clearly 
Shia trappings," Sadr said his bloc would represent anyone 
"who seeks an independent and stable Iraq."  Indeed, he 
noted the Sadr Trend would work with anyone but Saddamists 
and Takfiris.  Sadr confirmed he was talking to Iraqi Sunni 
political entities (in Jordan, as there was no place in Iraq 
where the two could safely meet) and advising them to press 
two key demands:  a just trial of Saddam, and withdrawal of 
foreign forces.  He lumped Saddamists and Takfiris in with 
the occupation forces and said the latter "wield a 
fictitious Zarqawi like a knife or a pistol" as a tool to 
blame others (Saddmists and takfiris) for crimes they commit 
themselves. 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00000549  002 OF 004 
 
 
Sadr vs. SCIRI 
-------------- 
 
8.  (U)  Sadr told bin Jiddu that his supporters in the UIC 
voted for [Islamic Da'wa Party] candidate al-Ja'aferi as 
Prime Minister because Ja'aferi had been responsive to 
popular demands to release Sadr Trend detainees.  "We are 
closer to Ja'aferi in addressing popular concerns than to 
SCIRI nominee Adel Abdul-Mahdi."  (NOTE:  Although Sadr 
never mentioned SCIRI leader Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, one Iraqi 
Sunni contact, addressing the Sadr support for Ja'aferi, 
told PAS Media Advisor on February 18 that the "clerical 
rivalry between the Hakims and Sadrs is deep and historic, 
yet rarely addressed publicly." 
 
Mehdi Army 
---------- 
 
9.  (U)  Sadr calmly deflected the attempt to put him on the 
defensive over the Mahdi Army, or Jaish al-Mahdi.  He said 
that the Jaish al-Mahdi serves the Iraqi people; at one 
point, it was a military force, but now it is a cultural 
entity.  It had earned the respect of many Iraqis for 
resisting Saddam in the first intifada; Ayatollah Sistani 
had cautioned against its disarmament. 
 
Sadr the Public Servant 
----------------------- 
 
10.  (U)  Sadr repeated comments he made soon after 
government formation negotiations began in January, that he 
does not seek any "sovereign" ministries, but prefers to 
occupy the posts of "service" ministries.  On Jazeera he 
specifically mentioned his desire for Sadr Trend to fill the 
ministry of electricity. 
 
Occupation 
---------- 
 
11.  (U)  On Syrian TV, Sadr remarked that "the presence of 
occupiers exacerbates the situation and leads to bloodshed. 
At the beginning the occupiers were targeted but now the 
targets are the Iraqi people, their shrines, land, and 
resources."   He says one purpose of his regional tour is to 
seek support for the withdrawal of foreign forces from 
Iraq." 
 
We Won't Accept any Foreign "Occupiers" 
--------------------------------------- 
 
12.  (U)  When asked on Jazeera about a possible plan for 
Arab or Muslim countries to replace troops now in Iraq, Sadr 
says that is not acceptable, he'd be the first to oppose it. 
He adds that when Najaf was under siege (in April 2004), no 
Arabs or Muslims came to their rescue. 
 
13.  (U)  He notes a double standard in U.S. statements, 
calling Syrians occupiers of Lebanon, while the U.S. 
occupies Iraq.  Even President Bush said he would resist 
occupation by foreigners.  Sadr told Syrian TV "the United 
States is targeting Islam, the Islamic and Arab states in 
the Middle East and beyond.  It wants to control the world. 
It started war in Iraq . . . then started problems with 
Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia.  It started a problem with 
the Islamic Republic of Iran.  These are pretexts to occupy 
them [politically] because it cannot occupy them 
militarily." 
 
14.  (U)  He told Syrian TV that "occupiers say that the 
Iraqi Army and Police must be prepared to run the country. . 
. but they [don't] provide weapons, funds, or equipment." 
He repeated the gist of this critique on Jazeera. 
 
Federalism and the Constitution 
------------------------------- 
 
15.  Sadr told Jazeera that federalism per se is accepted in 
Islam, but not if it is carried out under occupation or if 
it promotes sectarianism.  Sectarian federalism he claims, 
will:   1) create fear of division; 2) be exploited as 
foreigners intervene; 3) lead to friction or conflict 
between regions; 4) cause divisions between Shia and Sunnis, 
Kurds and Arabs, not to mention other minorities.  This 
would be a mistake, he adds. 
 
Kirkuk 
------ 
 
BAGHDAD 00000549  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
16.  (U)  Addressing the Kurds' demands for distinct 
regions, he said "the Kurds had a fear of dictatorship.  But 
if the occupiers leave, there will be real democracy and 
freedom, and then there is no need for regions."  Sadr says 
he opposes establishment of a southern province.  (NOTE: 
This is a keen interest of SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz al- 
Hakim.)  He dismissed Kurdish claims to Kirkuk, saying "if 
Kurds, Shia, and Sunni are all Iraqis, Kirkuk is also an 
Iraqi city."  He says that people are only focusing on it 
for its oil. 
 
17.  (U)  Asked about the constitutional provision that 
allows Kirkuk to decide its own future by census, Sadr says 
this is not feasible.  "Then Kirkuk would also have to be 
'federalized' with an area for Shia, one for Sunnis, one for 
Kurds, one for Turkmen.  Instead, Kirkuk or Kirkuk province 
should be part of a unified Iraq.  Its wealth, its benefits, 
must be shared by all.  We must fight sectarianism inside 
Kirkuk.  If the constitution calls for a sectarian solution 
to Kirkuk, I reject it. Kirkuk should promote peaceful 
existence among all Iraqis." 
 
Praise for Hamas 
----------------- 
 
18.  (U)  In the February 13 interview in Damascus, Sadr was 
asked about his meeting with the Palestinian groups there 
and replied "we want to help these forces stand against 
attacks aimed at Islamic and Arab states, whether in Syria, 
Iraq, or Iran."  He expressed hope that "political 
transformations in Palestine will be a prelude to ending 
occupation in Palestine and Iraq." 
 
Saddam Trial 
------------ 
 
19.  (U)  On February 19, Sadr told Jazeera that the new 
presiding judge in the Saddam trial is preferable to Judge 
Rizgar Amin.  He elaborated on the crimes and mass graves 
that are Saddam's legacy, and gave a "personal opinion" that 
Saddam deserved the death sentence. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
20.  (U)  Sadr is a media anomaly in Iraq.  He is associated 
with at least one newspaper, al-Hawza al-Natiq.  (NOTE:  The 
paper is named the "Vocal Hawza" to distinguish it from the 
quietist Hawza clerical tradition of Ayatollah Ali al- 
Sistani).  Incitement in Hawza al-Natiq prompted the 
coalition to close down the latter in April 2004, sparking 
clashes between the Mahdi Army and the U.S. in Najaf. 
(NOTE:  The paper is randomly available in Baghdad now.) 
Sadr has rarely taken to the airwaves; his relative silence 
to date contrasted starkly with Iraq's political "stars" 
(Ja'aferi, Hakim, Barzani, Talabani), all of whom fund their 
own TV stations.  (Allawi has gotten airtime from the 
privately funded al-Sharqiya TV and terrestrial channel al- 
Rashid, owned by Sunni politician Sa'ad al-Janabi, and he 
finances "Baghdad" newspaper.  He often directed programming 
of the public broadcaster as Prime Minister.) 
 
21.  (SBU)  Some contacts in the media speculate that Sadr 
was being manipulated by others and afraid of being caught 
short on camera.  They relate that Moqtada was only a child 
when his father and two older brothers -- both noted clerics 
-- were killed.  His credentials are shrouded in mystery. 
One contact told us he had studied at Hawza and earned the 
"intermediary" clerical title of Hojjat-al-Islam, others say 
he avoided Hawza and remained aloof, playing video games 
that earned him the nickname "Moqtada Atari."  Others say he 
disdains the media as un-Islamic, but this seems unlikely. 
Still others say he does not need TV when he controls 
influential mosques in the holy city of Najaf, Kut, Baghdad, 
Samawwa, Kerbala and Basra.  Indeed, a contact from Najaf 
who started an independent TV station in 2003 told us in 
February that Sadr controls the city through mosques and the 
Mahdi Army to a degree that astonishes apolitical residents. 
 
22.  (SBU)  In any event, camera-shy Moqtada is now a thing 
of the past.  As evidenced in his extensive interviews in 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Syria, Jordan, and now regional 
kingpin al-Jazeera, Sadr has received coaching.  In past 
public appearances he glowered at the camera with head bent 
and seemed immature.  On Jazeera, seated in Grandma Moses 
profile, facing the anchor against a Zen-like backdrop of 
 
BAGHDAD 00000549  004 OF 004 
 
 
artistically arranged branches, he was at ease and quite 
confident. 
 
23.  (SBU)  Iraqi contacts who resent Sadr's ability to 
mobilize the Mahdi Army against Iraq's "silent majority," 
commented on the transformation.  Sadr drew some jibes from 
our staff who noted an extensive use of "habibi" (a common 
term of endearment), which they said betrayed his non- 
clerical schooling.  And while he did not shake his 
youthful, pudgy and faux-cleric image, he struck at least 
three chords with this appearance among several Iraqis we 
polled:  a pledge to address the electricity shortage, a 
pledge to serve all Iraqis, even Kurds (a rarity among Arab 
politicians), and a pledge to keep Iraq united.  We suspect 
his resonance among the poorest Iraqis was even deeper. 
 
24.  (SBU)  He has not, however, presented any detailed 
plans on how he would address these issues.  His cagey 
language on Islam and politics may have been a clever intent 
to draw in non-Islamist Shia.  His tour in itself projects 
solidarity with Sunni Arab nationalists who are barely 
grappling with the concept of a Shia Iraq (no other Iraqi 
politician has conducted such an expansive regional tour). 
Certainly, taking his case to the huge regional audience on 
Jazeera while Sistani remains enveloped in the quietist 
cocoon of Najaf has now put Sadr fully on the map as the 
"Hawza al-Natiq."  Judging by comments of most media 
contacts, many unhappy with this new TV image, Sadr also 
gained stature by engaging in "summits" with regional 
leaders while his cohorts back home remain mired in sordid 
bickering over cabinet slots.