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Viewing cable 06WELLINGTON10, PARLIAMENT'S COMMITTEE RESTRUCTURING REDUCES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06WELLINGTON10 2006-01-08 18:43 2011-04-28 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Wellington
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHWL #0010/01 0081843
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 081843Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2225
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
UNCLAS WELLINGTON 000010 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/ANP 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA LIZ PHU 
PACOM FOR J2/J233/J5/SJFHQ 
NSC FOR VICTOR CHA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL NZ
SUBJECT: PARLIAMENT'S COMMITTEE RESTRUCTURING REDUCES 
LABOUR'S CLOUT 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  As a result of the National Party's 
strong showing in New Zealand's September elections, the 
ruling Labour Party's MPs face far stronger opposition in 
Parliament's select committees, which review proposed 
legislation.  There are signs that  National is trying to 
make life especially difficult for Labour in the Foreign 
Affairs and Defense Select Committee, which has potential 
policy implications for us.  The new select committee 
configurations are also likely to reduce Labour's ability to 
pass ambitious legislation during this term.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Select Committees are an important part of New 
Zealand,s parliamentary process as they are the principle 
means by which legislation is scrutinized. Despite their key 
role, New Zealand parliamentary committees have traditionally 
been more sedate and far less public than their U.S. 
Congressional counterparts. When it comes to influencing 
policy direction, NZ political parties tend to allocate more 
resources to floor debates rather than select committees. 
However, after the 2005 election and a subsequent 
reconfiguration, Labour has lost its dominance in select 
committee membership across the board.  Opposition MPs are 
therefore more likely to begin to use the committees to 
increase their influence, and this will make it harder for 
the Labour Government to promote its legislative agenda. 
 
What's Changed 
-------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) The 2005 election resulted in a reduced majority 
for Labour, a surge in support for the National party, and a 
diminished standing for most minor parties. As a result, 
National has a far greater representation in the new 
Parliament and nearly all 18 select committees are now 
divided equally between Labour and National.  This will 
enable National to more easily disrupt Labour's attempts to 
pass new legislation.  The prominent Foreign Affairs and 
Defense Select Committee (FASC) is a case in point. 
 
4.  (SBU) FASC was previously led by United Future leader 
Peter Dunne, a center right politician with close ties to 
Labour.  The new chair is Dianne Yates, a Labour stalwart 
with strong ties to the party's left.  Yates is joined by 
fellow Labourites Jill Pettis, HV Ross Robertson, and Paul 
Swain, who was most recently Minister of Immigration.  But 
Labour's taking over the chair will not likely bring any 
benefit to the Government.  For one thing, National now has 
an equal number of MPs on the Committee. They are: Deputy 
Chair Georgina TeHeuheu, Tim Groser, John Hayes, and Murray 
McCully. Nor can Labour expect support from the committee's 
ninth member, the Green Party's Keith Locke, despite the fact 
that the Greens strongly favor Labour over National.  Locke 
is a noted radical on foreign affairs issues, who among other 
things has criticized New Zealand's military involvement in 
Afghanistan.  He is treated with considerable wariness and 
reservation by nearly all sitting MPs. 
 
5.  (SBU) In addition to having the numbers to make life more 
difficult for Labour, the National MPs on the committee 
include policy heavyweights Groser and Hayes, both former 
ambassadors with considerable field experience. They will 
bring intellectual and practical heft that has been long 
absent from the committee. McCully lacks foreign policy 
expertise, but has been given the position of National's 
foreign affairs spokesman because he is a pugnacious debater 
skilled in the art of the attack.  His target?  NZ First 
leader Winston Peters, who holds the unorthodox position of 
Foreign Minister outside of Cabinet. 
National's Cunning Plan 
----------------------- 
6.  (SBU) National regards the unpredictable Peters and his 
position outside Cabinet as the chink in the Governing 
arrangement's armor.  The party has made no secret of it's 
strategy to question both the suitability of Peters as 
Foreign Minister and the delicate arrangement that allows him 
to hold the position. Most of National's attacks have been 
during floor debates in the House.  While few Kiwis seem to 
have become interested in the issue before Parliament's 
summer recess, they may become more engaged once Peters 
returns to New Zealand from a long series of foreign trips, 
and once Parliament is back in session and members of the 
media return to work.  In order to boost its attacks on 
Peters, it's very possible that National will take a 
 
parallel, more policy-oriented strategy within the FASC by 
providing greater and more exacting scrutiny of the 
Government,s foreign affairs policies and proposed 
legislation. 
 
7.  (SBU) Indeed, National has apparently already set in 
motion a more muscular approach to contesting policy via the 
committee. Prior to the election, the previous FASC members 
conducted hearings on the 2002 Terrorism Suppression Act. 
This legislation complies with UNSC resolutions 1267 and 
1373. Because there was some controversy - on human rights 
grounds - when the legislation was passed, a provision was 
included requiring a FASC review of the Act's key provisions. 
 The review was to be reported back to Parliament by December 
1, 2005.  In order to meet this deadline, the new FASC 
members were hurriedly briefed by officials and asked to 
finalize the report. National party committee members were 
critical of the report, with McCully leading the offensive by 
publicly arguing that it rang alarm bells both about the 
legislation and the way it is being used (or not used) by the 
New Zealand authorities. Although the issue received scant 
coverage in the national media and did not substantially 
bruise the Government, it could signal a more aggressive 
strategy by FASC,s National party members. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8.  (SBU) Labour can always limit its travails in the FASC by 
limiting its foreign policy initiatives this term. Both the 
potential for dust-ups in the committee on the one hand, and 
the potential for stagnation on the other, could have policy 
implications for us.  The Embassy will continue to monitor 
the committee closely.  FASC aside, the Government will have 
to choose to fight at least some battles within the select 
committees, or risk relative impotence during this third 
Labour term. 
Burnett