This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000329 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR SA/FO, SA/A 
NSC FOR THARRIMAN, KAMEND 
LONDON FOR S CONTROL 
TREASURY FOR APARAMESWARAN 
COMMERCE FOR AADLER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OVIP PREL ECON EAID SNAR AF
SUBJECT: LONDON CONFERENCE SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RICE 
 
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Compact with Afghanistan 
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¶1. (SBU)  President Karzai arrives in London for the January 
31 ) Feb 1 Afghanistan Conference with a two-fold agenda: 
 
--  To present to the world the face of a reborn and newly 
confident Afghanistan that, with the seating of its first 
parliament in 32 years, has successfully fulfilled the last 
major task set out in the 2001 Bonn Agreement; and 
 
--  To present to you and to the broader international donor 
community a post-Bonn vision of integrated political, 
economic and social development so compelling that we will 
commit to provide Afghanistan the support needed to see it 
through the next five years. 
 
An Afghanistan Compact that lays out these accomplishments 
and this vision is the centerpiece of the London Conference 
and will be endorsed there by over 60 national delegations. 
The Compact is a political commitment on the part of both 
Afghanistan and the international community to work towards a 
series of five-year benchmarks measuring performance in 
security; governance, rule of law and human rights; economic 
and social development; and counter-narcotics. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  In your October meeting with President Karzai in 
Kabul, and in subsequent visits by Vice President Cheney and 
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, we delivered the message that the 
United States is here to stay as long as needed, dispelling 
persistent Afghan fears that increased following our December 
announcement of reductions in U.S. troop numbers.  President 
Karzai hopes to hear you make this same commitment clearly 
and publicly during your London Conference remarks. 
Privately, President Karzai also needs to hear from you that 
decisive actions on counter-narcotics and good governance are 
essential to his country's continued progress. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  We have invested major resources and have made 
significant progress in rebuilding Afghanistan since the fall 
of the Taliban.  But failure to maintain forward momentum 
risks losing all that we have attained.  Despite the seating 
of a new parliament in December, government institutions in 
Afghanistan are still extremely fragile, riddled with 
corruption, and unhealthily dependent on the ability of just 
one man -- President Karzai -- to maintain a balance of 
ethnic and tribal power.  Most Afghans still live in 
conditions not far removed from the Middle Ages, creating 
tensions that the Taliban insurgency has been increasingly 
able to exploit.  The United States cannot afford failure in 
Afghanistan and so we must sustain our effort on Afghan 
reconstruction and support the Karzai administration,s 
efforts to govern effectively.  Your presence at the London 
Conference reaffirms our political and financial commitment 
to this effort. 
 
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Public and Private Messages to Convey in London 
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¶4. (SBU)  The most important message you can convey to 
President Karzai in London is that our commitment to 
Afghanistan remains unwavering.  Regardless of the planned 
transition from Coalition to ISAF forces in the coming 
months, the United States-Afghanistan strategic partnership 
will continue to move forward.  We will keep on working with 
and mentoring Afghan military and police forces in order to 
combat the lingering insurgency and to provide the security 
needed for Afghanistan to move forward to become a secure, 
economically sustainable nation. 
 
¶5. (SBU)  The Afghanistan Compact:  The key principle of the 
Compact is Afghan leadership of - and accountability for - 
its reconstruction and development process.  It identifies 
three interdependent areas:  Security; Governance, Rule of 
Law and Human Rights; and Sustainable Economic and Social 
Development; plus a crosscutting counter-narcotics agenda 
that need to be tackled over the next five years.  The 
Compact sets out over 90 high-level benchmarks to measure 
progress and creates a UN and GoA-led monitoring and 
coordination board to ensure appropriate GoA and 
international community engagement.  The GoA has pushed hard 
over the past months to give the Compact the flavor of a 
binding commitment on the part of the international community 
to provide Afghanistan adequate resources.  Instead, major 
donors, including the U.S., Germany and Japan, have insisted 
that the Compact text be worded to document a political 
rather than a legal commitment to support GoA security, 
political, and economic development efforts.  The GoA has 
taken ownership of this document, with the text approved by 
the full cabinet. 
 
¶6. (SBU)  The Afghan Economy:  In the four years since the 
Taliban's defeat, post-conflict Afghanistan has achieved a 
remarkable degree of macro-economic stability that is laying 
a foundation for economic growth, development and job 
creation.  Yet progress is fragile and, with an average 
longevity of only 47 years, life for millions of Afghans has 
not advanced much beyond the Middle Ages.  Sustaining a 
viable Afghan nation will require the GoA to continue 
structural reforms encouraging private sector development; 
work hard to enhance customs and tax revenue generation; 
target its limited budget resources at pro-poor spending and 
productive investment; and contain wage costs.  Until that 
point -- perhaps a decade down the road -- when the GoA can 
generate sufficient domestic customs and tax revenue to cover 
its recurring budget expenses, Afghanistan will require a 
steady, reliable and well-coordinated flow of assistance from 
the United States and from the broad international donor 
community.  This is Afghanistan's reality. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Parliament:  The new parliament faces a number of 
challenges, among them a divided and inexperienced 
membership, some of whom have dubious backgrounds of human 
rights abuses or criminal activity.  Yunus Qanooni, an ethnic 
Tajik and a leader of a loose group of "opposition" political 
parties prior to the elections, was elected speaker of the 
lower house (Wolesi Jirga) on a second ballot.  To date, 
parliamentary debate has concentrated almost entirely on the 
organization of parliament.  Wolesi Jirga speaker Qanooni and 
Meshrano Jirga (upper house) speaker Sebghatullah Mojaddedi 
(a conservative mullah and a former president of Afghanistan) 
have shown positive signs of pragmatism in these discussions. 
 Qanooni has publicly renounced his self-appointed position 
of leader of the opposition and many MP's have stressed to us 
the need for working together in harmony.  You should take 
the opportunity during your remarks at the London Conference 
to acknowledge any parliamentary representatives in the GoA 
delegation and encourage this spirit of cooperation. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Counter Narcotics:  Last year President Karzai 
declared a jihad against drugs.  Efforts following that 
declaration have had some impact:  The UNODC estimated that 
poppy cultivation has dropped 21 percent since last year, 
while a USG-funded survey reported a 48 percent drop.  (The 
actual numbers of hectares under cultivation were similar in 
both reports; the latter used a higher baseline for the 
previous year.)  However, the most recent UN estimates show a 
sharp increase in poppy cultivation in some provinces, and 
the GoA knows that it must begin an eradication program soon. 
 Karzai has continued to say the right things in public and 
private and has accepted our insistence that specific 
references to poppy eradication be included in Afghanistan 
Compact.  The next few months are critical; they determine 
the success or failure of the program.  Your message to 
Karzai must be direct:  Opium cultivation remains the single 
most significant threat to his government and to 
Afghanistan's successful reconstruction and he must bring the 
full prestige of his office to bear in this effort. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Corruption:  It is time for the Afghan Government 
to finally fight widespread, endemic corruption at the 
national, provincial and regional levels.  Corruption is 
disliked by the Afghan people, hampers counter narcotics 
efforts, diminishes respect for rule of law and slows the 
development of a viable economy due to significant diversion 
of government revenues.  In the short term, President Karzai 
must remove a number of high-profile corrupt officials and 
individuals and appoint a tough, competent Minister of the 
Interior.  In the longer term, a combination of civil service 
reform (e.g., better pay for members of a downsized police 
force) and prosecution of egregious cases need to be pursued. 
 President Karzai recently got rid of two ineffective 
governors (of Helmand and Takhar provinces) by appointing 
them to the upper house of parliament. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups:  The 
disbandment, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) program has 
disbanded over 63,000 former official combatants by offering 
them incentive packages and training.  The next phase of the 
process is the disbandment of illegal armed groups (DIAG). 
This process is more politically sensitive than DDR as many 
of the former commanders retain significant influence within 
various government ministries or ethnic groups, and have 
nothing to gain by surrendering their weapons.  Some of these 
commanders have been elected to parliament and need to be 
monitored closely and expelled if they continue in their old 
ways.  Government officials with links to illegal armed 
groups also must be put on notice and sanctioned if they do 
not sever these ties.  A recent public opinion poll put 
disarming commanders as the top security concern of the 
Afghan people.  The international community is working with 
Afghan security ministries, but the process lacks competent 
afghan leadership and strong support from Karzai.  Warlordism 
is a part of the nexus of corruption, narcotics and 
ineffective governance which must be urgently addressed. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Security Situation/Staying the Course:  Karzai is 
concerned that NATO lacks the will to fight, that we will 
withdraw too much too soon, and that Afghan forces will not 
be ready to stem greater violence.  Our long-term staying 
power is crucial to winning the political war in Afghanistan. 
 The security situation is evolving, with more recorded 
incidents of IEDs and suicide attacks in recent months. 
There has also been an increase in the number of targeted 
assassinations/ambushes.  The insurgency remains resilient 
and not likely to go away soon.  A key underlying factor of 
continuing engagement is the reality that Afghan security 
institutions are still in their infancy.  It will take 
several years and international support for those 
institutions to fully take the lead in fighting terrorism, 
extremism and narcotics.  On the regional front, you should 
thank Karzai for his willingness to postpone his trip to 
Iran.  Karzai is deeply skeptical that Pakistan can be 
enlisted in the fight against terrorism, particularly given 
the recent increase in attacks in the South ) you should 
remind him of the importance of trying to find ways to 
cooperate effectively on this issue. 
NORLAND