This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000036 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA A/S SHANNON FROM CHARGE CHICOLA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2016 
TAGS: PREL BR US
SUBJECT: YOUR CONSULTATIONS WITH GOB MINISTERS ON BOLIVIA 
 
REF: BRASILIA 0024 
 
Classified By: CHARGE PHILLIP CHICOLA. REASONS: 1.4(B)(D). 
 
¶1.  (C) We look forward to your visit on 10-11 January, and 
senior GOB officials seem keen to discuss the situation in 
Bolivia with you.  Our requests for meetings with Foreign 
Minister Celso Amorim, Presidency International Affairs 
Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia, Finance Minister Antonio 
Palocci, Civil Household Minister Dilma Rousseff and 
Institutional Security Cabinet Minister Jorge Armando Felix 
were enthusiastically received and have been confirmed. 
Reftel analyzes current Brazilian views of energy sector 
investments in Bolivia, which you can discuss further with 
Ministers Rousseff (who previously was Brazil's mines and 
energy minister) and Palocci. In your other meetings, you can 
focus on the GOB's outlook for what a Morales presidency 
means for regional integration, political stability and law 
enforcement.  In particular, you can stress with all 
interlocutors our concerns about a possible dramatic 
expansion in cocaine production and export -- concerns that 
many GOB officials quietly share, given the already heavy 
influx of Bolivian cocaine into Brazil. 
 
¶2. (C)  Presidential International Affairs Advisor Marco 
Aurelio Garcia was in Bolivia during the elections, and has 
been Lula's envoy in earlier missions there. He has had 
contact with a range of key Bolivian actors, including 
Morales. In meetings late last year with Deputy Secretary 
Zoellick and other USG officials, Garcia repeatedly 
underscored Brazil's primary concern that the elections be 
seen as transparent and produce a clear winner, in order to 
stave off an immediate period of instability and protests. 
Now that such a result has been achieved, you can ask Garcia 
for his perspective on Morales' ability to govern, especially 
with regard to managing pressures from his radical flank and 
reaching out to Santa Cruz.  Garcia is the most ideological 
of Lula's foreign policy advisors (Rousseff also has 
pronounced leftist views), and is quite sympathetic to 
political forces like those Morales represents.  Hence it 
will be interesting to press Garcia for explanations of 
statements by Lula last year that appeared to welcome 
Morales' looming "populist" victory, and of how the GOB sees 
itself now in relation to the "Axis of Evo" (Morales, Chavez, 
Castro). 
 
¶3. (C) In that context, it is interesting to note that both 
Lula and Amorim made statements to a meeting of senior 
Brazilian diplomats this week -- widely reported in the press 
here on 5 January -- in which they claimed the GOB intends to 
maintain "strong relations" with Venezuela, Bolivia and Cuba, 
but does not intend to "abandon" or "contaminate" its good 
bilateral relationship with Washington.  Amorim stated that 
Brazil had exercised an informal mediation role in the past 
between Washington and Chavez, and wants to continue to be 
helpful.  He implied Brazil does not want to be perceived as 
directly associated with a Bolivia-Venezuela-Cuba alliance: 
"Brazil is Brazil.  There is no reason to be worried..." he 
affirmed.  Such statements and the alacrity with which senior 
ministers accepted requests for meetings with you suggest the 
GOB is eager to reassure us.  Your meeting with Amorim will 
present an excellent opportunity to probe for how Brazil will 
operationalize this independent "mediation" role, how 
Itamaraty plans to coordinate with other agencies and 
Petrobras in dealing with Morales' "nationalization" agenda, 
and preview the upcoming Morales inauguration (Lula 
reportedly may attend), Lula's meetings in coming weeks in 
Brasilia with Morales (13 January) and with Chavez and 
Kirchner (at a 19 January energy summit).  We expect that you 
will have 15 or 20 minutes with Amorim, immediately before or 
just after an expanded discussion with Under Secretary for 
South American Affairs Jose Eduardo Felicio.  With U/S 
Felicio, it may be worth highlighting the importance of 
continued consultation between our missions in La Paz 
(Brazil's Ambassador there, Antonino Mena Goncalves, is a 
seasoned and pro-U.S. diplomat who has regular contact with 
our Ambassador). 
 
¶4. (C) Finally, your meeting with Institutional Security 
Cabinet Minister Felix offers a chance to discuss in detail 
the grittier, real-world worries of Brazilian law enforcement 
and intelligence services about the increased threats a 
Morales presidency may bring in the arenas of 
narcotrafficking and other cross-border criminal activities. 
Bolivian cocaine products are a mainstay of low-cost drugs 
consumed in Brazil and trafficked by Rio and Sao Paulo's 
violent gangs, and senior personnel in Felix's GSI have 
expressed deep concern to us and Washington visitors that 
trends will worsen under Morales.  Your meeting with Felix 
(who recently returned from consultations in Washington on 
counter-terrorism issues) is a venue for discussing bilateral 
cooperation to deal with Bolivia-origin narcotrafficking and 
present our initial assessments of where Morales is likely to 
go in terms of regulating coca production and continuing to 
work with us, the Brazilians and others on counternarcotics 
programs. 
 
 
CHICOLA