Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 143912 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AORC AS AF AM AJ ASEC AU AMGT APER ACOA ASEAN AG AFFAIRS AR AFIN ABUD AO AEMR ADANA AMED AADP AINF ARF ADB ACS AE AID AL AC AGR ABLD AMCHAMS AECL AINT AND ASIG AUC APECO AFGHANISTAN AY ARABL ACAO ANET AFSN AZ AFLU ALOW ASSK AFSI ACABQ AMB APEC AIDS AA ATRN AMTC AVIATION AESC ASSEMBLY ADPM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGOA ASUP AFPREL ARNOLD ADCO AN ACOTA AODE AROC AMCHAM AT ACKM ASCH AORCUNGA AVIANFLU AVIAN AIT ASECPHUM ATRA AGENDA AIN AFINM APCS AGENGA ABDALLAH ALOWAR AFL AMBASSADOR ARSO AGMT ASPA AOREC AGAO ARR AOMS ASC ALIREZA AORD AORG ASECVE ABER ARABBL ADM AMER ALVAREZ AORCO ARM APERTH AINR AGRI ALZUGUREN ANGEL ACDA AEMED ARC AMGMT AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU ABMC AIAG ALJAZEERA ASR ASECARP ALAMI APRM ASECM AMPR AEGR AUSTRALIAGROUP ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AIDAC AOPC ANTITERRORISM ASEG AMIA ASEX AEMRBC AFOR ABT AMERICA AGENCIES AGS ADRC ASJA AEAID ANARCHISTS AME AEC ALNEA AMGE AMEDCASCKFLO AK ANTONIO ASO AFINIZ ASEDC AOWC ACCOUNT ACTION AMG AFPK AOCR AMEDI AGIT ASOC ACOAAMGT AMLB AZE AORCYM AORL AGRICULTURE ACEC AGUILAR ASCC AFSA ASES ADIP ASED ASCE ASFC ASECTH AFGHAN ANTXON APRC AFAF AFARI ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AX ALAB ASECAF ASA ASECAFIN ASIC AFZAL AMGTATK ALBE AMT AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN AGUIRRE AAA ABLG ARCH AGRIC AIHRC ADEL AMEX ALI AQ ATFN AORCD ARAS AINFCY AFDB ACBAQ AFDIN AOPR AREP ALEXANDER ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI ATRD AEIR AOIC ABLDG AFR ASEK AER ALOUNI AMCT AVERY ASECCASC ARG APR AMAT AEMRS AFU ATPDEA ALL ASECE ANDREW
EAIR ECON ETRD EAGR EAID EFIN ETTC ENRG EMIN ECPS EG EPET EINV ELAB EU ECONOMICS EC EZ EUN EN ECIN EWWT EXTERNAL ENIV ES ESA ELN EFIS EIND EPA ELTN EXIM ET EINT EI ER EAIDAF ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECTRD EUR ECOWAS ECUN EBRD ECONOMIC ENGR ECONOMY EFND ELECTIONS EPECO EUMEM ETMIN EXBS EAIRECONRP ERTD EAP ERGR EUREM EFI EIB ENGY ELNTECON EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ECOSOC EEB EINF ETRN ENGRD ESTH ENRC EXPORT EK ENRGMO ECO EGAD EXIMOPIC ETRDPGOV EURM ETRA ENERG ECLAC EINO ENVIRONMENT EFIC ECIP ETRDAORC ENRD EMED EIAR ECPN ELAP ETCC EAC ENEG ESCAP EWWC ELTD ELA EIVN ELF ETR EFTA EMAIL EL EMS EID ELNT ECPSN ERIN ETT EETC ELAN ECHEVARRIA EPWR EVIN ENVR ENRGJM ELBR EUC EARG EAPC EICN EEC EREL EAIS ELBA EPETUN EWWY ETRDGK EV EDU EFN EVN EAIDETRD ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ ETEX ESCI EAIDHO EENV ETRC ESOC EINDQTRD EINVA EFLU EGEN ECE EAGRBN EON EFINECONCS EIAD ECPC ENV ETDR EAGER ETRDKIPR EWT EDEV ECCP ECCT EARI EINVECON ED ETRDEC EMINETRD EADM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ETAD ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS ESSO ETRG ELAM ECA EENG EITC ENG ERA EPSC ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EIPR ELABPGOVBN EURFOR ETRAD EUE EISNLN ECONETRDBESPAR ELAINE EGOVSY EAUD EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EINVETRD EPIN ECONENRG EDRC ESENV EB ENER ELTNSNAR EURN ECONPGOVBN ETTF ENVT EPIT ESOCI EFINOECD ERD EDUC EUM ETEL EUEAID ENRGY ETD EAGRE EAR EAIDMG EE EET ETER ERICKSON EIAID EX EAG EBEXP ESTN EAIDAORC EING EGOV EEOC EAGRRP EVENTS ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ETRDEMIN EPETEIND EAIDRW ENVI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC EDUARDO EGAR EPCS EPRT EAIDPHUMPRELUG EPTED ETRB EPETPGOV ECONQH EAIDS EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN ESF EINR ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN EIDN ETRK ESTRADA EXEC EAIO EGHG ECN EDA ECOS EPREL EINVKSCA ENNP ELABV ETA EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EUCOM EAIDASEC ENR END EP ERNG ESPS EITI EINTECPS EAVI ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EADI ELDIN ELND ECRM EINVEFIN EAOD EFINTS EINDIR ENRGKNNP ETRDEIQ ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD EAIT ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ EWWI ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EHUM EFNI EOXC EISNAR ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM EMW ETIO ETRDGR EMN EXO EATO EWTR ELIN EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EINVETC ETTD EIQ ECONCS EPPD ESS EUEAGR ENRGIZ EISL EUNJ EIDE ENRGSD ELAD ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO ENTG ETRDECD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS
KPKO KIPR KWBG KPAL KDEM KTFN KNNP KGIC KTIA KCRM KDRG KWMN KJUS KIDE KSUM KTIP KFRD KMCA KMDR KCIP KTDB KPAO KPWR KOMC KU KIRF KCOR KHLS KISL KSCA KGHG KS KSTH KSEP KE KPAI KWAC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPRP KVPR KAWC KUNR KZ KPLS KN KSTC KMFO KID KNAR KCFE KRIM KFLO KCSA KG KFSC KSCI KFLU KMIG KRVC KV KVRP KMPI KNEI KAPO KOLY KGIT KSAF KIRC KNSD KBIO KHIV KHDP KBTR KHUM KSAC KACT KRAD KPRV KTEX KPIR KDMR KMPF KPFO KICA KWMM KICC KR KCOM KAID KINR KBCT KOCI KCRS KTER KSPR KDP KFIN KCMR KMOC KUWAIT KIPRZ KSEO KLIG KWIR KISM KLEG KTBD KCUM KMSG KMWN KREL KPREL KAWK KIMT KCSY KESS KWPA KNPT KTBT KCROM KPOW KFTN KPKP KICR KGHA KOMS KJUST KREC KOC KFPC KGLB KMRS KTFIN KCRCM KWNM KHGH KRFD KY KGCC KFEM KVIR KRCM KEMR KIIP KPOA KREF KJRE KRKO KOGL KSCS KGOV KCRIM KEM KCUL KRIF KCEM KITA KCRN KCIS KSEAO KWMEN KEANE KNNC KNAP KEDEM KNEP KHPD KPSC KIRP KUNC KALM KCCP KDEN KSEC KAYLA KIMMITT KO KNUC KSIA KLFU KLAB KTDD KIRCOEXC KECF KIPRETRDKCRM KNDP KIRCHOFF KJAN KFRDSOCIRO KWMNSMIG KEAI KKPO KPOL KRD KWMNPREL KATRINA KBWG KW KPPD KTIAEUN KDHS KRV KBTS KWCI KICT KPALAOIS KPMI KWN KTDM KWM KLHS KLBO KDEMK KT KIDS KWWW KLIP KPRM KSKN KTTB KTRD KNPP KOR KGKG KNN KTIAIC KSRE KDRL KVCORR KDEMGT KOMO KSTCC KMAC KSOC KMCC KCHG KSEPCVIS KGIV KPO KSEI KSTCPL KSI KRMS KFLOA KIND KPPAO KCM KRFR KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KFAM KWWMN KENV KGH KPOP KFCE KNAO KTIAPARM KWMNKDEM KDRM KNNNP KEVIN KEMPI KWIM KGCN KUM KMGT KKOR KSMT KISLSCUL KNRV KPRO KOMCSG KLPM KDTB KFGM KCRP KAUST KNNPPARM KUNH KWAWC KSPA KTSC KUS KSOCI KCMA KTFR KPAOPREL KNNPCH KWGB KSTT KNUP KPGOV KUK KMNP KPAS KHMN KPAD KSTS KCORR KI KLSO KWNN KNP KPTD KESO KMPP KEMS KPAONZ KPOV KTLA KPAOKMDRKE KNMP KWMNCI KWUN KRDP KWKN KPAOY KEIM KGICKS KIPT KREISLER KTAO KJU KLTN KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KQ KWPR KSCT KGHGHIV KEDU KRCIM KFIU KWIC KNNO KILS KTIALG KNNA KMCAJO KINP KRM KLFLO KPA KOMCCO KKIV KHSA KDM KRCS KWBGSY KISLAO KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KCRI KX KWWT KPAM KVRC KERG KK KSUMPHUM KACP KSLG KIF KIVP KHOURY KNPR KUNRAORC KCOG KCFC KWMJN KFTFN KTFM KPDD KMPIO KCERS KDUM KDEMAF KMEPI KHSL KEPREL KAWX KIRL KNNR KOMH KMPT KISLPINR KADM KPER KTPN KSCAECON KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KCSI KNRG KAKA KFRP KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KQM KQRDQ KWBC KMRD KVBL KOM KMPL KEDM KFLD KPRD KRGY KNNF KPROG KIFR KPOKO KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KHIB KOEM KDDG KCGC
PGOV PREL PK PTER PINR PO PHUM PARM PREF PINF PRL PM PINS PROP PALESTINIAN PE PBTS PNAT PHSA PL PA PSEPC POSTS POLITICS POLICY POL PU PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOG PARALYMPIC PGOC PNR PREFA PMIL POLITICAL PROV PRUM PBIO PAK POV POLG PAR POLM PHUMPREL PKO PUNE PROG PEL PROPERTY PKAO PRE PSOE PHAS PNUM PGOVE PY PIRF PRES POWELL PP PREM PCON PGOVPTER PGOVPREL PODC PTBS PTEL PGOVTI PHSAPREL PD PG PRC PVOV PLO PRELL PEPFAR PREK PEREZ PINT POLI PPOL PARTIES PT PRELUN PH PENA PIN PGPV PKST PROTESTS PHSAK PRM PROLIFERATION PGOVBL PAS PUM PMIG PGIC PTERPGOV PSHA PHM PHARM PRELHA PELOSI PGOVKCMABN PQM PETER PJUS PKK POUS PTE PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PERM PRELGOV PAO PNIR PARMP PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PHYTRP PHUML PFOV PDEM PUOS PN PRESIDENT PERURENA PRIVATIZATION PHUH PIF POG PERL PKPA PREI PTERKU PSEC PRELKSUMXABN PETROL PRIL POLUN PPD PRELUNSC PREZ PCUL PREO PGOVZI POLMIL PERSONS PREFL PASS PV PETERS PING PQL PETR PARMS PNUC PS PARLIAMENT PINSCE PROTECTION PLAB PGV PBS PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PKNP PSOCI PSI PTERM PLUM PF PVIP PARP PHUMQHA PRELNP PHIM PRELBR PUBLIC PHUMKPAL PHAM PUAS PBOV PRELTBIOBA PGOVU PHUMPINS PICES PGOVENRG PRELKPKO PHU PHUMKCRS POGV PATTY PSOC PRELSP PREC PSO PAIGH PKPO PARK PRELPLS PRELPK PHUS PPREL PTERPREL PROL PDA PRELPGOV PRELAF PAGE PGOVGM PGOVECON PHUMIZNL PMAR PGOVAF PMDL PKBL PARN PARMIR PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PDD PRELKPAO PKMN PRELEZ PHUMPRELPGOV PARTM PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPEL PGOVPRELPINRBN PGOVSOCI PWBG PGOVEAID PGOVPM PBST PKEAID PRAM PRELEVU PHUMA PGOR PPA PINSO PROVE PRELKPAOIZ PPAO PHUMPRELBN PGVO PHUMPTER PAGR PMIN PBTSEWWT PHUMR PDOV PINO PARAGRAPH PACE PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOVAU PGOF PBTSRU PRGOV PRHUM PCI PGO PRELEUN PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PMR PRTER PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PRELNL PINOCHET PAARM PKPAO PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA POPDC PRELC PHUME PER PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PAUL PHALANAGE PARTY PPEF PECON PEACE PROCESS PPGOV PLN PRELSW PHUMS PRF PEDRO PHUMKDEM PUNR PVPR PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PBT PAMQ

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 06BANGKOK551, MEGAPROJECTS CONFERENCE PRODUCES MORE SMOKE THAN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #06BANGKOK551.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BANGKOK551 2006-01-30 09:13 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Bangkok
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

300913Z Jan 06
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000551 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS AND EB 
STATE FOR EB/MGOODMAN 
TREASURY FOR OASIA 
COMMERCE FOR 4430/EAP/MAC/OKSA 
STATE PASS TO USTR FOR WEISEL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD ECON EFIN TH
SUBJECT: MEGAPROJECTS CONFERENCE PRODUCES MORE SMOKE THAN 
LIGHT 
 
REF: 05 BANGKOK 2137 
 
05 BANGKOK 3463 
05 BANGKOK 7124 
 
1. Sensitive but unclassified. Please handle accordingly. 
Not for internet distribution. 
 
2. (SBU) Summary. Led by Prime Minister Thaksin, the RTG 
hosted a conference to inform international companies and 
the Bangkok diplomatic corps about the "megaprojects" 
infrastructure development program. To woo those bidders 
with "cutting-edge and appropriate technology," Thaksin has 
- without reference to parliament - swept aside the need for 
bidders to abide by Thai government procurement laws. 
However, the nature of the RTG's programs are so broadly 
defined and the parameters for a successful bid so unclear 
that most companies are either skeptical about the process 
or unsure where to begin. The manifest ability of Thaksin to 
liberalize the economy based on cabinet decree could be 
considered positive in light of the degree of liberalization 
that will be required if our FTA negotiations are 
successful. But we question the durability of measures taken 
in this fashion; they could just as easily be reversed by a 
new government. We are also concerned that FTA 
implementation via decree could be perceived by many Thais 
as an undemocratic bypassing of the parliament abetted by 
the USG. End Summary. 
 
"The Potential Our Synergy May Bring" 
------------------------------------- 
 
3. (U) On January 26, about 1300 representatives of 
international companies and foreign diplomats attended the 
RTG's unveiling of "Thailand: Partnership for Development", 
a call by Prime Minister Thaksin to the world to help turn 
Thailand into "a modern, competitive, knowledge-based 
economy."  Thaksin's stated goal is to "engage in a global 
search to find the best and most suitable talents in the 
world.to be our partners in development."  This is the 
latest iteration of the US$43 billion, five-year 
"megaprojects" infrastructure development program which the 
Thaksin government has been touting for the last year (Ref A 
and B). 
 
4. (U) Following the PM's brief opening remarks, the meeting 
was divided into five groups with relevant ministry 
officials to discuss projects under their jurisdiction: 
 
  -    Infrastructure and construction with a focus on 
     expanding Bangkok's mass transit system and creating an 
     integrated, nationwide water resource management system. 
  -    Natural resources and environment focusing on waste-to- 
     energy technology, creation of a bio-diversity database and 
     a digital map of natural resources. 
-    Information and communication technology for the 
creation of a government virtual private network and 
undefined software for various ministries. Also "e- 
education" for distance learning programs. 
  -    National defense, largely the packaging of a series of 
     planned weapons procurement programs. 
  -    Agriculture, science and technology, culture and public 
     health services, to include food traceability, modernization 
     of the tuna and dairy industries, development of alternative 
     energy resources and establishment of "world class" 
     universities and medical service centers including research 
     and development facilities. 
 
"The Scope of Our Cooperation is Virtually Boundless" 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
 
5. (U) There is no bidding process and no government- 
mandated specifications to comply with. Offers can comprise 
one aspect of a project, whether mentioned specifically as a 
need of the RTG or not, or include an entire sector. 
Technical proposals are required to be submitted by April 28 
with financing proposals to follow one - two months 
thereafter. Due to an apparent concern that requiring a 
counter trade component to any proposal could mean not 
getting the best available technologies, counter trade is 
not required except for defense procurement. Every proposal 
will be reviewed by a relevant ministry "evaluating 
committee" comprised of bureaucrats, senior officials and 
"experts." Final consideration of proposals will be 
considered by a committee chaired by the PM. This approach 
is meant to assure companies of the transparency of the 
selection process. 
 
6. (SBU) The reaction of companies and analysts with whom we 
have spoken is uncertainty at best and cynicism at worst. 
All averred that they have never seen an approach quite like 
this. Several mentioned that if the RTG is to undertake all 
projects which appear to have been identified, the US$43 
billion earmarked will not come close to covering the costs. 
Others asked how proposals will be weighed against each 
other; "they will be comparing apples and broccoli" said 
one. In response to the RTG's statement that projects will 
be judged based on their "return on investment, internal 
rate of return, appropriateness of the technology and 
financing flexibility offered" an executive of a large 
multinational asked us "which of these is most important? 
Not all these goals are mutually supportive. And how about 
goals like integration with existing projects, use of local 
suppliers and personnel. How important is rapid project 
completion versus the most cost efficient approach?" 
 
"Public scrutiny by 63 million Thai People" 
------------------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Several executives expressed concern that this 
exercise is to provide cover for projects and contractors 
already secretly chosen by the government. One argued that 
his company would not want to submit any proprietary ideas 
for fear that the government could simply appropriate the 
approach and assign the project to another firm; that this 
is just a way for the RTG to get free feasibility studies. 
An analyst argued that the only firms that will make serious 
bids are those from such nations as China in which the 
government may have political motives for pursuing projects 
even if they are not profitable for the implementing 
companies. Several companies have told us that they will 
submit basic bids or "a statement of capabilities" rather 
than spend the time and money to prepare a detailed 
document. This would serve to indicate a general desire to 
appear supportive and interested without committing 
resources to what many perceive as too nebulous an approach 
to take seriously. Interestingly, the Thai language press 
has focused on Thaksin "selling the country to foreigners" 
rather than any other aspect of the event. 
 
8. (SBU) As he has since the megaprojects were announced, 
Thaksin again promised that the government would maintain 
fiscal discipline by keeping the government debt/GDP ratio 
below 50 percent and the percent of the annual budget 
devoted to debt service below 15 percent. Many observers 
believe that his original plan was to finance much of the 
megaproject's cost through revenue generated by 
privatization of such assets as the EGAT, the electric 
utility. With the indefinite delay in EGAT IPO (Ref C), the 
RTG has developed the "tell us what financing you can 
arrange" approach to infrastructure construction. Initial 
indications are that the RTG may not have much success with 
this approach. 
 
9. (SBU) Comment:  The good news is that the RTG changed its 
previous fairly restrictive government procurement 
procedures to attract as many foreign companies as possible. 
Counter trade, local partner, "Buy Thai" and other previous 
requirements for selling to the RTG have all been waived for 
this particular set of bids. How this was done without an 
act of parliament to change or suspend the three relevant 
government procurement laws is unclear.  The bad news is 
that this is another example of the PM having a broad vision 
of an end result but not a clear view of how to get there. 
If we ascribe the best intentions to this approach, it is an 
innovative way to allow companies the freedom to propose 
what they consider to be the best approach to a problem. But 
with the lack of project parameters, it is too broad for 
most companies to feel comfortable making a detailed 
proposal. At least one company assumed the worst, "all the 
doors are open for corruption because the powers that be can 
like a project simply because it benefits them."  We expect 
that ties to ministries (or ministers) will prove a critical 
factor in determining contract recipients given the lack of 
other factors by which to compare competing bids. 
 
10. (SBU) Thaksin's apparent willingness to dispense with 
normal government procurement practices (and law) could be a 
useful precedent for our FTA negotiations. In those 
negotiations, Thai negotiators have often argued an 
inability to proceed with some liberalization because of 
existing laws that prevent them from making commitments. The 
megaprojects example demonstrates that the Thaksin 
government can dispense with restrictive trade law when they 
need to. On the other hand, we would not want the changes 
needed to comply with an FTA made via questionable and 
potentially short-duration legal maneuvers.