This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 AMMAN 000691 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARN, NEA/PA, NEA/AIA, INR/NESA, R/MR, 
I/GNEA, B/BXN, B/BRN, NEA/PPD, NEA/IPA FOR ALTERMAN 
USAID/ANE/MEA 
LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
 
TAGS: KMDR JO
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION ON PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS 
 
                        Summary 
 
-- Jordanian newspapers published over the past three 
days, January 27-29, were dominated by reports on the 
aftermath of the landslide victory of Hamas in the 
Palestinian legislative elections.  Many opinion 
editorials discuss Hamas's win, examining the reasons 
that led to Hamas's rise to power and/or attempting to 
forecast the future of the peace process and that 
victory's impact on the region.  A majority of writers 
agree that Hamas is facing a "difficult test" that 
will judge the very ideologies that put Hamas in a 
position of authority.  Some writers specifically look 
at the relationship between Hamas and Jordan, and 
some, particularly East Bank writers, warn that 
Hamas's win could signal a merger between the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Jordan and the Hamas government in 
Palestine, raising the "apprehension of the 
alternative homeland" and resolving the Palestinian 
issue at the expense of Jordan's existence.  One 
columnist even cautions that Jordanians must be 
careful how they reform the Jordanian election law as 
it might democratically bring the Brotherhood to 
power.  Some other writers view Hamas's win as 
something that America wanted and sought, whether to 
get rid of Fatah and the corrupt Palestinian Authority 
or to prove that Hamas would be a failure as a peace 
partner. 
 
                 Editorial Commentary 
 
-- "Jordan and Hamas: Overcoming the rupture of 
relations" 
 
Columnist Fahd Kheetan writes in the inside page of 
independent, mass-appeal Arabic daily Al-Arab Al-Yawm 
(01/29):  "Jordan's relations with Hamas since its 
inception were very good.  One could even say that 
Hamas was born in Amman before it prospered in Gaza 
and the West Bank.  But this relationship suffered a 
major setback almost five years ago when the Jordanian 
government decided to close down the Movement's 
offices in Amman and deport its leaders..  Now we are 
facing a new situation and the boycott policy will no 
longer work out.  After the shock of the results of 
the Palestinian elections, people realized that they 
are before a new reality and that they have to deal 
with Hamas as the official representative of the 
Palestinian people..  Is the government ready to hold 
direct contacts with Hamas now?  This is very likely. 
We may hear of a direct contact between the government 
and Hamas in terms of congratulatory remarks, but what 
Jordan needs to know immediately is Hamas's stance vis- 
-vis the peace process and the roadmap.  Jordan must 
not expect Hamas to adopt a stance like that of Abu 
Mazen vis--vis the peace process, at least not in the 
short-term.  After all, the Movement, which is 
celebrating its victory, cannot immediately deny the 
very slogans that got it the ruling power.  While 
Israel and the U.S. administration lean towards being 
hard-line with the Palestinians, Hamas is not required 
to continue negotiations with Israel using the same 
old strategy of the Palestinian Authority, since this 
strategy simply proved to be a failure and the proof 
of that is the defeat of Fatah and its program in the 
elections.  In this sense, it is not in the interest 
of the Arab countries, including Jordan, to exercise 
pressure on the Hamas government to enter the game 
according to existing rules, because the series of 
Palestinian concessions that have received Arab and 
American support were always met by a hard-line stance 
on the part of Israel." 
 
-- "What lies before Hamas?" 
 
 
 
Columnist Dr. Abdul Rahim Malhas writes on the op-ed 
page of independent, mass-appeal Arabic daily Al-Arab 
Al-Yawm (01/29):  "Hamas's success means that the Arab 
street has become extensively and clearly Islamic. 
Islam has become the refuge in view of the regression 
of the nationalists . and the leftists..  The 
Islamists' advent into the legislative authority in 
Palestine, Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan occurred through 
popular choice, which is likely to make them stay on 
and work through it with strength and confidence.. 
But Hamas faces major and numerous battles ahead.  It 
must draw clear borders and relations between itself 
and Fatah in order to avoid losing its strength in 
side battles.  It must draw clear borders and 
relations between its own military wing and other 
military wings, between its own political and military 
wings, between itself and Jordan and the new Iran.  As 
for relations with Europe, America, and Israel, these 
cannot be determined now, but rather left on their own 
to develop and grow.  The most important battle for 
Hamas, should it choose to carry the burden of ruling, 
is going to be maintaining credibility, a battle that 
will require a great deal of intelligence.  Hamas 
cannot maintain its credibility, coordinate between 
its military and political wings, balance between 
principles and realism, or deal with enemies without 
intelligence.  The battle of intelligence is going to 
be Hamas' most important battle." 
 
-- "Front" 
 
Daily columnist Nahed Hattar writes on the back-page 
of independent, mass-appeal Arabic daily Al-Arab Al- 
Yawm (01/29):  "From now on, we are going to have to 
be more careful when discussing the foundations of 
changing the current election law in our country.  In 
view of first, the organizational integration between 
Hamas, the majority leader in the Palestinian 
parliament, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, and 
second, the demographic political integration between 
the two banks, a rushed and pressured democratic shift 
in Jordan may lead to a disaster.  The disaster is not 
the possibility of establishing a Muslim Brotherhood 
government in Amman, which would normal and completely 
acceptable in the context of democracy.  The disaster 
lies in the merger of two Islamic majorities on both 
sides of the river, leading to a confederacy that is 
integrated popularly and politically, and thus leading 
to the disappearance of the Jordanian state.  Let us 
face the truth bravely:  Fatah and the Fatah regime 
that is based on the Palestinian entity and essence 
collapsed.  In return, Hamas's authority in the 
Palestinian territories is a strategic American option 
that weighs on Hamas' ability to control security and 
establish an efficient administration.  It is a wager 
launched by Bush Jr. last year when he realized his 
failure in Iraq and thought that binding Hamas with 
the golden chains of authority would make them more 
amenable to play the required role..  Hamas is also 
the choice of the strongest party in Israel, Sharon's 
party, which is leaning towards drawing the borders of 
the Palestinian entity unilaterally and without 
negotiations.  This plan which aims at alienating the 
Palestinians ends, logically, with a de facto 
confederation with a Brotherhood-ruled Jordan. 
Therefore, Amman may soon find itself facing American 
pressures to quickly shift towards 'democracy'.  The 
scene is very serious." 
 
-- "Jordanian Palestinian relations after Hamas' 
victory" 
 
Chief Editor Taher Udwan writes on the back-page of 
independent, mass-appeal Arabic daily Al-Arab Al-Yawm 
(01/29):  "The rupture of relations between Amman and 
Hamas occurred when the Movement was in the category 
of opposition and resistance and in the context of the 
international campaign against Islamic trends 
following the 9/11 attacks.  Will these relations 
continue as they or does the future hold some 
surprising changes for them, just as surprising as 
Hamas' win in the elections?  Nothing is constant in 
the world of politics.  Even revolutionaries and 
opposition make a 180 degree turn when they come to 
power and begin to deal with interests..  Despite the 
prevailing pessimism over the future of the peace 
process following Hamas's victory, I see its presence 
in authority as paving the way for a climate and 
opportunity for settlement and peace.  This is because 
first, the collapse of Fatah signals the first serious 
crack in the concept of Palestinian nationalism; 
second, Hamas's win could provide an opportunity for 
solutions along the lines of federation and 
confederation with Jordan; third, the current stage 
through which the Palestinian cause is going is one 
where all parties, including America and Israel, are 
leaning towards a solution, Israeli withdrawal and the 
establishment of a Palestinian state, and where 
negotiations will revolve around the form and content; 
fourth, the new version of 'Islam is the solution' has 
become 'democracy is the solution'." 
 
-- "'Islam is the solution' will be tested" 
 
Daily columnist Oraib Rantawi writes on the op-ed page 
of center-left, influential Arabic daily Al-Dustour 
(01/29):  "The shock of Hamas's landslide victory in 
the Palestinian legislative elections has tongue-tied 
some of the 'democrat-liberals' and pushed them to 
hallucinations, as if our democracy depends on the 
type of people brought forth by the ballot boxes..  I 
think the results of the Palestinian elections are 
going to give us the opportunity, for the first time 
in the modern history of the Arab region, to get to 
know firsthand what the slogan 'Islam is the solution' 
really means.  The Palestinian people are going to 
have the opportunity to test Hamas's slogans, 
programs, and ideologies, and it will be judged 
according to what it does on the ground not on the 
stances and slogans it launches.  How will Hamas deal 
with the occupation?  How will it deal with the 
international community?  How will it answer questions 
on finance, development, economy, salaries?  How will 
it handle unemployment and poverty?  How will it deal 
with other factions, specifically military ones?  How 
will it deal with the Arab countries?  Hamas was not 
required to answer any of these questions before..  It 
is no longer possible to settle for slogans and mottos 
of `continued resistance' through `complete 
liberation' all the way to `Islam is the solution.' 
What is required to translate these slogans into day- 
to-day plans, programs, and tactics..  It is very 
clear that Hamas wants to avoid this and put it off as 
long as possible . but it does not have that luxury. 
We have no idea how far Hamas is going to be 
successful in conciliating between contradictions that 
are already difficult to conciliate.  The Movement 
finds itself for the first time in its history 
standing between two options.  The first is to 
maintain its stances, programs, and old practices, and 
risk placing the Palestinian people in isolation, 
siege, and distress.  The second is to move to the 
Palestinian Authority and Fatah's program and gamble 
with its credibility and its popularity.  Hamas is 
striving to find a third option that combines the two. 
Will it succeed?" 
 
-- "Islamists in the ruling position, and why not?" 
 
Columnist Hussein Rawashdeh writes on the op-ed page 
of center-left, influential Arabic daily Al-Dustour 
(01/29):  "People want to try their luck with this 
recent choice.  After all, experiences with regimes 
over the decades led to miserable failure, and now it 
is people's right, after becoming desperate with 
reform and its figures, to try the credibility of 
those who stood by their slogans when they were 
outside the realm of authority and rule..  It was not 
a surprise for Hamas to win and attain authority.  In 
fact, if voters in any Islamic country were allowed to 
choose freely, Islamists would win majority seats in 
every election, and this has already started to happen 
in Egypt, and before it in Algeria and Turkey..  We 
are confident that political Islam is coming, and that 
people who have tried the various ruling methods, 
wagered on political personae, and tasted the 
bitterness of disappointment one time after another, 
want now to try and test the Islamists..  As much as 
we are happy with the result, we cannot hide our 
apprehensions about the failure of the experience or 
about attempts to make it fail.  The Islamists, in 
Hamas and others, face a difficult test.  They must 
pull through it successfully.  In addition, 
governments who continue to look at the Islamic 
political trend with caution must benefit from the 
experience and give people the freedom of choice. 
After all, trial has proven that elimination, 
oppression, and fear by which these governments have 
dealt with Islamists have only led to rallying 
people's support for this trend..  Let us try the 
Islamists, and why not?  They are citizens and 
politicians from amongst us..  We have tolerated 
decades of experienced and inexperienced rulers, why 
not give them the chance, then hold them accountable 
and judge them.  Why were we surprised that they won, 
especially when our experience with them in the 
opposition, resistance, and social work was not bad? 
We only have to try them in authority and politics, 
and whatever the outcome, we are not going to lose 
much more than we already have lost." 
 
-- "Jordan and the worst case scenario" 
 
Columnist and analyst Mohammad Abu Rumman writes on 
the op-ed page of independent Arabic daily Al-Ghad 
(01/29):  "Indeed, the success of the Palestinians in 
the test of democracy forces us to believe in the 
prevalence of logic and national interest among the 
various Palestinian factions, particularly Hamas and 
Fatah.  Having said that, we cannot rule out that 
developments would take a turn for the worst, and in 
turn affect the Palestinian internal affairs and the 
region at large.  In this context, the worst case 
scenario presupposes a hard-line stand adopted by both 
Hamas and Fatah in terms of Hamas's insistence on its 
current political rhetoric and Fatah's refusal to take 
part in government, along with dual authority between 
the presidency, the government apparatus, and the 
security apparatus controlled by Fatah on one hand, 
and the government controlled by Hamas on the other. 
According to this, one of the expected outcomes is the 
escalation of conflicts and armed confrontations 
between the two movements and the collapse of the 
security and political situation, leading to the 
acknowledgement that the Palestinian forces are 
incapable of managing the internal situation.  In this 
case, Israel would be the biggest beneficiary, 
striving to convey to the world that the Palestinians 
are not ready for the establishment of the state and 
for managing their affairs, and that Israel, in order 
to provide the minimum level of its security, would 
have to go ahead with its unilateral plan of 
separation and undertake preemptive strikes against 
Palestinian factions that could pose a threat to it. 
This situation would push the United States, Israel, 
and the European Union to urge the Arab countries to 
assume a security and political role in the 
Palestinian territories, and here talk would start 
about an Egyptian task in Gaza and a Jordanian task in 
the West Bank..  What concerns us here in Jordan is 
that this scenario takes us back to the fears of the 
alternate homeland, that is, resolving the Palestinian 
demographic problem at the expense of Jordan..  As far 
as Jordan is concerned, the official stand is very 
clear as Jordan rejects any security and political 
role for itself in the West Bank.  It is a stand that 
first and foremost stems from national interests. 
There is no regional interest for Jordan to get 
involved in Palestinian internal affairs.  Moreover, 
such a role would constitute a threat to the balance 
of Jordan's demography, which would raise tensions and 
troubles within Jordan..  Jordan's national interest 
calls for the government to quickly reopen channels of 
communications with Hamas Movement and to undertake a 
role of a mediator between Hamas and Fatah in order to 
prevent developments from taking a turn towards the 
worst case scenario." 
 
-- "Indications for those who read" 
 
Daily columnist Fahd Fanek writes on the back-page of 
semi-official, influential Arabic daily Al-Rai 
(01/29):  "The Palestinian elections were preceded by 
indications . which were easy to read after announcing 
the results.  For instance, America was fed up with 
Fatah-led Palestinian authority because of its 
weakness and because America wanted a strong authority 
that it could deal with.  Despite that, America 
declared its refusal to cooperate with any government 
in which Hamas was participating, knowing well that 
its declaration is going to serve Hamas in the 
elections, and volunteered the information that it is 
giving two million dollars to finance the election 
campaigns of Fatah candidates, presenting them as 
agents and eliminating what is left of their 
popularity.  Israel may have been the mastermind 
behind this scenario, as it repeatedly said that there 
is no Palestinian partner qualified for the peace 
process, meaning that maintaining the Fatah-led 
authority is not going to lead to negotiations and 
resolving the Palestinian issue and achieving a 
solution.  It also announced that it will not 
cooperate with Hamas if it wins in the elections, and 
now that Hamas won, Israel said that it will deal with 
it if it abandons violence and the motto of destroying 
Israel.  Hamas in turn read the new American pragmatic 
trends towards the rising Islamic movements..  Its 
leaders said that it is not a sin to negotiate with 
Israel.. What remains are indications on the ground: 
the financial and administrative corruption of some of 
the Palestinian Authority's figures, the security 
chaos, the threat of civil war, and the weakness of 
the Authority and its diminishing legitimacy.  These 
factors led to the rise of Hamas as a Palestinian 
partner capable and qualified to put a stop to the 
violence and achieve a compromise with Israel under 
American sponsorship and under the cover of mottos of 
principles.  The American President's praise for the 
freedom and integrity of the elections is but a 
preparation for accepting its results and dealing with 
them." 
HALE