This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

310757Z Jan 06

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000212 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: NI
SUBJECT: A VISIT TO NIGERIA'S EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 
 
REF:  ABUJA 2387 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary. Embassy Abuja economic officer and 
military air attach visited the headquarters of Nigeria's 
National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA).  This visit 
occurred following the October and December 2005 crashes of 
large passenger aircraft near Lagos and in Port Harcourt. 
NEMA currently cannot operate its sole helicopter at night. 
The agency is moving toward joint operations with the 
Nigerian Police.  NEMA's national storage facility contains 
flour, rice, sheet metal, and blankets and tents, but in an 
emergency, these supplies would not be sufficient for even 1 
percent of the population of Abuja, let alone the 
surrounding region.  End summary. 
 
 
¶2. (U) Embassy Abuja economic officer and military air 
attach visited the headquarters of Nigeria's National 
Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) in Abuja on December 22, 
¶2005.  They met with NEMA Director General Salisu Shuaib 
"S.S." Makarfi; Air Force Group Captain N.S. Kanwai, NEMA 
director of search and rescue operations; and Kenneth Nsor, 
special assistant to Makarfi. 
 
NEMA is learning from its mistakes 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) NEMA's mission is to carry out the timely and 
effective management of emergencies and disasters in 
Nigeria.  This includes collecting information about and 
disseminating information concerning ethnic and religious 
clashes occurring within Nigeria.  The embassy officers' 
visit to NEMA occurred in the wake of the October and 
December 2005 crashes of aircraft, near Lagos and in Port 
Harcourt, respectively, of Nigeria's Bellview and Sosoliso 
Airlines.  Each crash killed more than 100 persons, and 
Government of Nigeria (GON) control especially at the 
Bellview crash site was severely deficient.  NEMA Director 
General Makarfi was defensive about the public and media 
criticism that NEMA received during the immediate aftermath 
of the Bellview crash.  He said the first responder in such 
an event should be the local community, not the GON or NEMA. 
Makarfi also asserted that the flow of information initially 
should be at and between local entities and the lower levels 
of government, not at the federal level. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Search and Rescue Director Kanwai said the GON and 
NEMA both demonstrated "considerable improvement" in their 
response to the Sosoliso Airlines crash at Port Harcourt. 
He acknowledged that intra-government communications during 
the Bellview crash were "very deficient" and suggested 
Nigerian agencies should be able to use the Internet to 
communicate during emergency situations.  (Comment:  GON 
offices endure a lack of stable electric power, and they 
suffer even more severe shortages of computer and Internet 
terminals.  While the GON's actions at and control of the 
Sosoliso crash site were better than at the Bellview site, 
the GON's performance at Port Harcourt was not exemplary. 
The GON also benefited from the Sosoliso crash's having 
occurred at the edge of Port Harcourt International Airport, 
rather than out of the city in heavy brush.  End comment.) 
 
¶5. (U) The air attach observed that NEMA did not "attend 
to" the media at the Bellview crash, which resulted in a 
slew of inaccurate news stories.  Kanwai said NEMA learned 
from this and that at Port Harcourt, the agency opened a 
press unit, restricted media access to the crash site, and 
escorted the media - rather than allowing members of the 
media to roam freely and broadcast gruesome scenes, as 
occurred near Lagos.  Kanwai also noted that, unlike the 
Bellview accident, where the crash site remained unsecured, 
Port Harcourt police maintained a 24-hour vigil until the 
Sosoliso aircraft's "black box" was located, then handed it 
over to the appropriate authorities. 
 
No night operations; cooperation with the police 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶6. (U)  Kanwai said NEMA has one Mi-17 helicopter and hopes 
to obtain four more in 2006.  This Mi-17 is housed and 
maintained in Kaduna, several hours north of Abuja.  This 
helicopter is flown and manned by the Nigerian Air Force for 
use in search and rescue and disaster management.  After the 
air attach noted that NEMA's helicopter currently operates 
only during daylight hours, and that a 15-hour response time 
is not acceptable, she urged that these Air Force pilots 
pursue night-flying qualifications.  Kanwai acknowledged the 
need for NEMA to gain a nighttime capability for its 
helicopter, which is equipped for night flying. 
 
¶7. (U) Makarfi noted that NEMA is "moving toward" 24-hour 
joint operations with the Nigerian Police.  Zanna said 
senior police officials are committed to cooperation in 
disaster management, as is the national police inspector 
general (commander).  Zanna said that while commitment by 
the police exists, they need training in and funding for 
logistics (primarily vehicles), protective clothing, and 
especially for improved, integrated communications.  Zanna 
said there is a need for joint training with the Nigerian 
Police because the police are the first responders, and 
because of the need to protect an accident scene or crime 
scene. 
 
¶8. (U) Zanna observed that in Nigeria, deploying the Army 
legally is highly complicated and cannot be carried out 
quickly.  Kanwai agreed and asserted that in terms of 
disaster management, there are too many layers of approval 
required to make a military deployment within Nigeria 
practical.  He said this makes NEMA's cooperation with the 
Nigerian Police that much more necessary.  The air attach 
explained that because of U.S. Government (USG) human-rights 
concerns over possible American military training of 
Nigerians, it is easier for the USG to give disaster- 
management equipment to NEMA than to the Nigerian military. 
 
UK disaster-management training at Jaji 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) Zanna discussed the UK-funded training, now in the 
fourth of five years, under way at Nigeria's Command and 
Staff College in Jaji.  This training seeks to build up 
Nigeria's capacity in emergency and disaster management, for 
mid-level to senior-level planners working for national- 
level entities.  The program is now starting to enroll state- 
level officials as well.  Zanna described this training as 
too general in nature, rather than being specific to Nigeria 
and its six geopolitical zones.  He said the course is 
really for Nigerian managers, who will then tailor what they 
have learned for those officials serving below them, but 
that the current training is not for "hands-on" employees. 
Kanwai added the course's curriculum must be translated into 
Nigeria's three predominant local languages, to make it more 
applicable and relevant. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Zanna said that despite fears the training may 
cease in 2007 because of a lack of funding, the United 
Kingdom likely will extend funding for this training, in 
part so officials of other West African states may enroll in 
the course.  (Comment:  The first year of this training 
accomplished little.  This was largely because Nigerian 
officials originally exhibited considerable suspicion over 
the United Kingdom's motives in offering this training. 
Nigerian course participants now value the training highly, 
and the UK trainers are complimentary about their NEMA 
student's enthusiasm and professionalism.  End comment.) 
 
NEMA's Mission-Control Center 
----------------------------- 
 
¶11. (U) NEMA's facilities include the agency's Mission- 
Control Center, which was completed in 2003.  Its main 
feature is Nigeria's COSPAS-SARSAT (Space System for the 
Search of Vessels in Distress/Search and Rescue Satellite- 
Aided Tracking) system, built by Techno-Sciences, Inc., of 
Lanham, Maryland.  This system, which uses satellites in low- 
earth and geostationary orbits, aids maritime and aviation 
safety in and off the coast of Nigeria.  It is designed to 
detect and locate mariners, aviators, and land-based users 
in distress. 
 
Disaster-relief stockpiles are lacking 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) NEMA has outside its Abuja headquarters its 
national storage facility, which is composed of three small, 
non-refrigerated warehouses, which altogether were half 
empty.  These warehouses contained flour, rice, sheet metal 
for roofing, and blankets and tents, and had a large supply 
of timber outside.  (Comment:  These supplies could not 
provide for even 1 percent of the population of Abuja, let 
alone the surrounding region.  Should an emergency in or 
near Abuja affect more than several thousand persons, 
Nigeria will need international assistance to contend with 
the disaster.  End comment.)  NEMA's equipment stored 
outside its warehouses included two towed generators with 
erectable lights, one towed water purifier, and three mobile 
medical clinics.  All of this equipment was stored uncovered 
in the open, and one mobile medical clinic that the economic 
officer and air attach toured was ruinously hot inside. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13. (U) Nigeria currently has six zonal offices for disaster 
management:  northwest zonal office, Kaduna; northeast zonal 
office, Maiduguri; central zonal office, Jos; southwest 
zonal office, Lagos; southeast zonal office, Enugu; and the 
south-south zonal office, Port Harcourt.  The country 
eventually will have 36 disaster units, organized on a 
geographical basis and corresponding to Nigeria's 36 states. 
 
¶14. (U) The NEMA officials gave the economic officer and air 
attach copies of the most recent version (2001) of 
Nigeria's "National Disaster Response Plan" (NDRP).  NEMA, 
which prepared the plan, notes in it that prior to the 
agency's establishment in 1999, Nigeria's "response 
e 
personnel were as hapless as the victims."  NEMA also writes 
in its NRDP that large portions of the manual were adopted 
from U.S. disaster-management publications.  While portions 
of the NRDP appear well thought out, it also includes a list 
of government hospitals across Nigeria "to which disaster 
casualties may be taken in the first instance" - but 
includes telephone numbers for almost none of these 
hospitals. 
 
¶15. (SBU) In her discussions with NEMA officials, the 
embassy's air attach explained that to achieve consistent 
improvement in NEMA employees' crisis-management skills, the 
same cadre of personnel must receive recurring training for 
six to eight years.  Such sustained effort, however, will be 
a challenge to the NEMA and other Nigerian agencies with a 
role in disaster management, because of GON agencies' 
generally deficient professionalism, infrastructure, and 
funding.  NEMA also is at the mercy of bureaucratic 
deficiencies within the GON and especially within Nigeria's 
severely flawed air transportation sector. 
 
CAMPBELL