This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 QUITO 002866 
 
SIPDIS 
 
S/CT - RHONDA SHORE, S/CT - ED SALAZAR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PGOV KJUS MARR CASC ASEC EC
SUBJECT: ECUADOR: 2005 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: SECSTATE 193439 
 
¶1.  Embassy Quito's contribution to the 2005 Country Report 
on Terrorism report follows, keyed to questions in Reftel 
(paras 7-10).  Embassy POC is PolOff Jarahn Hillsman, 
593-2-256-2890 ext 4471, unclass email Hillsmanjd@state.gov, 
classified email Hillsmanjd@state.sgov.gov, fax 
593-2-254-0712. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) General Assessment: 
 
Overview:  The GOE does not provide financial support, 
training, or sanctuary to international terrorist groups. 
Ecuador's primary contribution to the Global War on Terrorism 
continues to be its campaign to prevent the spread of 
narcoterrorism in Ecuador.  The GOE,s historical neglect of 
the 400-mile northern border with Colombia, the lack of licit 
employment opportunities in the border area, and its 
proximity to rebel-held Colombian territory had made this 
zone ripe for narcoterrorist influence and recruitment. 
However, high-level GOE support for greater engagement in the 
north is evident in the GOE,s recent troop shifts to the 
border region, its sustained effort to combat FARC presence 
in Ecuador, military-to-military cooperation between Ecuador 
and Colombia, and its willingness to work with USAID and 
other donors to create licit economic opportunities along the 
northern border.  Even more aggressive engagement will be 
needed to counter the narcoterrorist threat as Colombian 
government forces succeed in their efforts against the FARC 
and illegal armed groups. 
 
Military CT Efforts:  Since the irregular change in 
government in April 2005, the GOE has increased its security 
posture along the northern border.  The Ecuadorian military 
claims to have increased troop deployment from 8,000 (in 
2004) to between 9,000 and 10,000.  The Ministry of Defense 
has also increased patrolling and operations units along the 
border, and plans to mobilize new units in Imbabura province. 
 Beginning January 2006, the MOD will initiate the Petroleum 
Infrastructure Security Force to protect oil refineries, 
pipelines, and white gas centers from terrorist attack, 
allowing northern border units to better focus their efforts 
in the region.  An increase in the purchasing of U.S. 
military equipment for use along the northern border, and the 
Ecuadorian Army,s Special Operations Group,s increased 
counterterrorist activities have also been evident.  There 
are positive indications that military-to-military 
communication between Ecuador and Colombia is improving at 
all levels. 
 
The GOE,s stepped-up patrol efforts along the northern 
border bore fruit in September when the Ecuadorian military 
discovered and destroyed a suspected FARC refuge camp in the 
province of Sucumbios.  A drug processing plant was also 
discovered and destroyed by patrol units.  Nevertheless, the 
Ecuadorian military remains resource-challenged.  USG 
assistance and effort continues to be vital to buttressing 
GOE forces and spurring them to conduct more frequent and 
wide-ranging patrols.  However, Article 98 sanctions continue 
to restrict GOE access to a full range of USG funding 
resources. 
 
Law Enforcement CT Efforts:  The GOE arrested and rendered to 
Colombia Senior FARC leaders in 2005.  In September, for 
example, Marcial Compana, a key FARC financial facilitator, 
was captured by Ecuadorian authorities and promptly 
surrendered to Colombia.  The GOE also cracked down on 
clandestine FARC combat injury clinics operating in Ecuador. 
In February, Ecuadorian police forces raided a clinic in 
Quito, capturing 16 individuals of Ecuadorian and Colombian 
nationality.  A key FARC commander and four sympathizers were 
captured in July at a different clinic in Quito.  In each 
instance, the GOE swiftly delivered the Colombians to the GOC. 
 
The GOE also advanced on the counter-narcotics front, seizing 
34 metric tons of cocaine (a ten-fold increase over 2004), 
270 kilograms of heroin, and 174 kilograms of cannabis 
(January-October 2005).  Security forces located and 
destroyed over 36,000 cultivated coca plants in 2005, 
significantly more than found in 2004.  GOE units also 
secured major white gas trafficking lines out of the 
Sucumbios Province, seizing over 116,000 liters during 2005. 
 
The staffing of the Counternarcotics Directorate (DNA) of the 
National Police was increased from 1305 to 1385 officers in 
¶2005.  The DNA, with USG financial assistance, also opened 
new bases and stations in the Esmeraldas and Imbabura 
provinces.  USG-supported DNA infrastructure projects are in 
construction or design phases in the northern border 
provinces of Esmeraldas, Carchi and Sucumbios. 
 
U.S. Coast Guard officials conducted courtesy inspections of 
Ecuador's four international ports in February 2005 to 
determine if they met International Ship and Port Facility 
Security Code (ISPS) requirements.  The USCG found the GOE 
facilities to be on schedule for meeting international 
standards. 
 
Alien smuggling continues to be a serious problem in Ecuador, 
with Special Interest Aliens (SIAs) among the cargo.  In 
response, the GOE operates a dedicated anti-smuggling police 
unit, COAC, funded in part by the USG.  Cooperation is 
excellent, with COAC working with DHS officials to identify, 
investigate, and remove SIAs.  The GOE has expressed 
high-level interest in expanding COAC,s reach, proposing to 
open special units in Guayaquil and Cuenca.  The GOE is 
seeking national funds to support this effort, while also 
requesting USG support. 
 
Legislative CT Efforts:  Congress passed a landmark 
anti-money laundering law in October, a major step against 
money laundering and terrorism financing.  The new law 
criminalizes the laundering of illicit funds from any source 
and penalizes the undeclared entry of more than $10,000 in 
cash.  The law calls for the creation of a financial 
intelligence unit (FIU) under the Superintendency of Banks. 
Implementing regulations are currently being developed by the 
GOE.  The Embassy is working with the Organization of 
American States Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission 
(CICAD) and the GOE to support the creation of the FIU. 
Ratification of the Inter-American Convention Against 
Terrorism remains pending before the Ecuadorian Congress. 
 
In August 2005, following the sinking of an overloaded 
migrant ship near the Galapagos and the subsequent drowning 
of an estimated 104 intending immigrants, the Ecuadorian 
Congress began debating whether to increase sentences for 
alien smugglers convicted of causing the death of migrants. 
A proposal that would increase penalties against smugglers 
and broaden the net to allow for the arrest of more 
accomplices, is currently stalled, pending redrafting. 
 
Judicial CT Efforts:  There were no noteworthy 
counterterrorism actions by Ecuador's judicial system in 
¶2005.  Judicial institutions remain weak and corrupt.  While 
military and police have made numerous arrests, prosecutions 
in general are impeded by the dysfunctional judicial system, 
which until recently lacked a functioning Supreme Court.  The 
Constitutional Court has been vacant since November 2004. 
 
Financial CT Efforts:  The GOE Superintendency of Banks has 
cooperated with the USG by instructing financial institutions 
to report transactions involving known terrorists, as 
designated by the United States or by the UN 1267 Sanctions 
Committee.  However, no terrorist financial assets have been 
identified to date in Ecuador. 
 
Embassy Security:  Between November 2004 and November 2005, 
over 30 anti-American demonstrations occurred in Quito, many 
near the Embassy compound.  The Ecuadorian National Police 
(ENP) have cooperated fully in defending the mission, never 
hesitating to deploy additional units in response to 
perceived or real threats.  Two pamphlet bombs were detonated 
in close proximity to the compound on November 16-)the 
Popular Combatants Group (GCP) is believed to be behind both 
incidents.  During the same period, protesters spray painted 
anti-American propaganda on the outer wall of the 
Ambassador's residence. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Sanctuary (Safe Haven) Assessment: 
 
The GOE does not provide sanctuary for any known terrorist 
group.  That said, Ecuador's far north -- the provinces of 
Esmeraldas, Carchi, and Sucumbios ) abuts Colombian 
departments Narino and Putumayo, narcoterrorist strongholds. 
While Ecuador's military has increased troop deployments to 
the frontier in recent years, the police presence, although 
increasing, remains scant, and municipal and provincial 
governments offer few services.  Ecuadorian military leaders 
in border units believe the FARC and ELN hold sway in up to 
three-quarters of Ecuador's border hamlets, their 
narcodollars buying townspeople's silence or compliance.  GOE 
police and military claim the FARC and possibly the ELN have 
significant numbers of Ecuadorians in their employ.  These 
narcoterrorist organizations regularly use Ecuadorian 
territory for rest, recuperation, and re-supply. 
 
The GOE closely tracks suspicious Middle Easterners and 
regularly shares information on SIAs with the USG.  We have 
as yet seen no evidence that suggests Al-Qaida or other 
Islamic terrorist groups are currently operating or present 
in Ecuador.  Owing to lax border controls, it is conceivable 
that Al-Qaida and others could target Ecuador for 
recruitment, fundraising, or even establishment of training 
facilities.  The Islamic community in Ecuador numbers 
3,500--three mosques exist nationwide. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Information on Terrorist Groups: 
 
GOE Police suspect several Ecuadorian groups of domestic 
subversion and probable involvement in terrorism.  Prime 
among the groups they follow is the "Popular Combatants 
Group," known by its Spanish acronym "GCP."  The GCP is 
reportedly an armed faction of the Marxist-Leninist Communist 
Party of Ecuador.  Its members, mainly students, are trained 
in the use of firearms and the production and activation of 
low-yield pamphlet bombs.  The GCP has taken responsibility 
for exploding these devices, as well as calling in false bomb 
threats, nationwide.  Police claim its membership totals 
approximately 200.  The GCP claimed responsibility for a 
small bomb that was detonated outside a Citibank branch 
office in Guayaquil in June.   The GCP is believed to have 
detonated the two pamphlet bombs close to the Embassy and 
another at a Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant in Guayaquil 
in November. 
 
The Revolutionary Militias of The People (MRP) is another 
armed faction of the Ecuadorian Communist Party.  In 2002 and 
2003, the MRP claimed responsibility for exploding bombs at 
U.S.-associated businesses, such as a McDonalds restaurant in 
Guayaquil and an American Airlines office in Quito.  Police 
estimate its strength at approximately 75 individuals, mainly 
university students.  There is no recent activity to report. 
 
The Communist Party itself is a concern to police due to its 
ability to organize and promote unrest nationwide.  It is 
said to have connections with Colombian narcoterrorist groups. 
 
The Alfarista Liberation Army (ELA) serves as an umbrella 
group for a number of small, violent leftist organizations 
which operate in Ecuador.  It was created in 2001, and is a 
combination of former Carajo Group Free Montoneros Party 
("Montoneros Patria Libre"), and Red Sun ("Sol Rojo") 
members.  Over the last twenty years, ELA membership has 
grown to over 200 members, mostly comprised of young rural 
revolutionaries and clerics from Pichincha, Imbabura, and 
Esmeraldas.  The group is reported to have connections to the 
FARC and ELN in Colombia, and with armed groups in Venezuela, 
from whom they receive training in arms, revolutionary 
intelligence and counterintelligence, urban warfare, 
explosives, and tactical practices. 
 
The ELA espouses an anti-United States message, directing 
particular criticism at the U.S. Cooperative Security 
Location (CSL) in Manta.  The ELA has claimed responsibility 
for a variety of pamphlet bombings, such as the 2003 attack 
on the British Consulate in Guayaquil and 2003 bombings at 
Quito's Hilton Hotel and a McDonalds, both near the Embassy. 
 More recently, the ELA is believed to be targeting key 
Ecuadorian figures for kidnapping, as they lack sufficient 
arms to hit harder targets.  The GOE is closely monitoring 
the activities of the ELA, but does not consider the group a 
major threat to its security. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Information on Foreign Government Cooperation: 
 
Despite an irregular change of government in April 2005, GOE 
CT policy has not changed significantly in 2005.  The GOE 
remains cooperative, but limited resources available to 
Ecuadorian law enforcement and military forces hamper CT 
performance.  U.S.-supported units perform well, however.  At 
the political level, isolationist sentiments remain strong, 
sometimes hindering the GOE from taking a proactive 
counter-terrorist stance.  Ecuadorian leaders take a 
political risk by favoring increased security cooperation 
with Colombia, and the GOE has publicly refused to accept any 
GOE involvement in Colombia's internal conflict or classify 
the FARC as a terrorist organization.  However, the Palacio 
government has taken decisive action against FARC interests 
in Ecuador and communication and bilateral relations between 
the GOE and GOC are currently on the upswing.  The GOE has 
not criticized U.S. policy in Iraq, but unpopularity of the 
U.S. campaign in Iraq here may limit the GOE's willingness to 
publicly support democratic progress there. 
JEWELL