This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

221530Z Dec 05

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 OTTAWA 003732 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
FOR WHA/CAN, EB/TRA, AND L/WHA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAIR ECIN ASEC CA
SUBJECT: PRECLEARANCE CONSULTATIVE GROUP REVIEWS POLICIES 
AND PROCEDURES 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED--PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  The inaugural meeting of the Preclearance 
Consultative Group (PCG) took place in Ottawa on December 13. 
 The U.S. side was represented by the State Department, 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the Transportation 
Security Administration.  Canadian officials were from 
Foreign Affairs Canada, Transport Canada, and the Canada 
Border Services Agency (CBSA).  Terry Breese, Director of the 
Office of Canadian Affairs, Department of State, led the U.S. 
delegation.  Tobias Nussbaum, Director, U.S. Relations 
Division, Foreign Affairs Canada, led the Canadian 
delegation.  This was the first formal review since 
conclusion of the Aviation Preclearance Agreement in 2001 of 
policies and procedures at the seven air preclearance 
facilities in Canada (the eighth will be in Halifax).  Issues 
raised included congestion at preclearance areas, especially 
during peak hours; intransit and progressive preclearance; 
and U.S. input ("consultation") to the process of granting 
security clearances for Canadian employees having access to 
the preclearance areas.  Government of Canada (GOC) officials 
agreed that a mechanism can probably be developed whereby the 
U.S. can check Canadians working in the preclearance areas 
against U.S. data bases, though the extent of such 
information sharing was not resolved at this meeting. 
Several members of the group will meet again soon to address 
the immediate concerns of the Halifax International Airport 
Authority (HIAA) regarding the installation of radiation 
detection equipment at the new preclearance facility there. 
Other follow up items will be handled through correspondence 
between PCG member agencies.  End summary. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
A Brief History of Preclearance in Canada 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) Following a pre-meeting in Washington in October, 
2005, and numerous e-mail and telephone exchanges, the 
members of the PCG finally sat down in Ottawa on December 13 
to work on a mutually-agreed agenda.  The U.S. has provided 
preclearance customs and immigration services for passengers 
departing Canada for the United States from some Canadian 
airports since the 1950's.  Being precleared in Canada allows 
passengers the flexibility to land in U.S. destination cities 
which are not serviced by U.S. inspection agencies.  A formal 
preclearance agreement was signed by Canada and the U.S. in 
1974; that was subsequently updated by an agreement signed in 
January 2001 and brought into force in May 2003. 
Preclearance is presently offered at seven airports: 
Calgary, Edmonton, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Vancouver, and 
Winnipeg.  Halifax is scheduled to begin preclearance on 
October 1, 2006.  Although the 2001 agreement authorizes 
Canada to offer preclearance at 13 U.S. airports, no 
facilities have been opened in the U.S.  The 2001 agreement 
also stipulated that a Preclearance Consultative Group would 
meet on a regular basis to address issues which could not be 
resolved at the local (individual airport) level, and that 
the PCG should conduct a joint review of the preclearance 
program.  The December 13 meeting was the first PCG review. 
 
------------------------------ 
Major U.S. Issues/Agenda Items 
------------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Perhaps the foremost concern of U.S. preclearance 
personnel is ensuring physical security in the preclearance 
area itself.  U.S. officers working preclearance are not 
armed.  They must rely on armed Canadian police officers to 
respond if a passenger threatens or assaults them, or must be 
forcibly detained, removed, or arrested.  Our officers are 
also vulnerable to any weapon, explosive, or biological agent 
that a would-be terrorist or hijacker might be trying to 
smuggle aboard a flight to the U.S.  The U.S. position is 
that for any new preclearance facilities, or extensive 
remodeling of existing facilities, we want baggage and 
passenger security screening to be done by Canadian Air 
Transport Security Authority (CATSA) personnel in front of, 
not after, the preclearance area (see para. 5 also).  Second, 
many Canadian airport, airline, contractor, and vendor 
employees have access to the preclearance area.  The U.S. is 
concerned that Transport Canada, which grants security 
clearances that allow the airport authorities to issue 
identification badges, does not have access to all 
potentially detrimental information concerning an applicant 
for employment.  The U.S. wants to ensure that a Canadian 
with a record in the United States does not slip through the 
Transport Canada background investigation.  In addition to 
normal criminal checks, which can be conducted by Transport 
Canada and CBSA now, the U.S. also wishes to check Canadians 
who may work in preclearance areas against CBP and 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement records. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) In response to U.S. arguments, GOC officials noted 
that the GOC has concluded that sharing of an applicant's 
name with CBP may not run counter to the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (equivalent to the U.S. Bill of Rights). 
However, the GOC believes that supplying extensive biographic 
data raises Charter concerns but left date and place of birth 
for further consideration.  The U.S. side pointed out that 
the more data supplied, the less of a problem we will have 
with false matches.  The GOC offered to work up a model of 
exactly how information sharing between Transport Canada and 
CBP might work.  An issue for Canada is that the GOC might be 
put in the position of justifying and explaining why a 
Canadian citizen was denied the right to work on Canadian 
soil; i.e., the preclearance area.  The U.S. noted that there 
might be occasions when we would not be able to share with 
the GOC the reason why we request a hold on a particular 
applicant. 
 
¶5.  (U) On the location of CATSA screening, Canadian 
officials agreed that security screening will be placed in 
front of preclearance facilities at all new or extensively 
remodeled airports, a commitment we have been seeking for 
some time.  Regarding security in general at preclearance 
areas, the U.S. noted that access to the area is a problem. 
Sometimes non-passengers get all the way back to the 
preclearance area without having been asked by airport 
personnel for a ticket or boarding pass.  It was noted that 
at Vancouver airport, the "panic button" in the preclearance 
area is not connected to any warning alarm.  In addition, the 
armed guard stationed at preclearance in Vancouver is in the 
secondary area and is unable to view (or react to) what is 
happening in primary inspection.  The U.S. agreed to document 
these and other such incidents in writing and submit them to 
the GOC for action. 
 
------------------- 
The Case of Halifax 
------------------- 
 
¶6.  (U) CBP reported that the process for starting Halifax 
preclearance in October 2006 is moving forward.  CBP approved 
the overall building construction plan and has started 
procurement of equipment.  Recruitment of staff has begun. 
There will be 14 to 19 inspectors in addition to the port 
director.  CBP anticipates that 270,000 passengers per year 
will be precleared when the facility opens. 
 
¶7.  (U) The status of Halifax preclearance and the opening of 
the facility on October 1 raises two issues:  radiation 
detection equipment for checked baggage, and the provision of 
information on checked baggage to CBP inspectors.  The U.S. 
requirement that all airports use such equipment to inspect 
passengers and baggage was issued after construction of the 
airport preclearance facility was already approved and 
underway.  The U.S. requirement for information on checked 
baggage has not been accommodated in the Halifax preclearance 
facility design blueprints.  Finally, the GOC reported that 
HIAA is under the impression that CBP will pay for the 
radiation detection equipment, but CBP allowed as how it has 
not come to a final decision regarding payment for the 
equipment.  The GOC asked for, and the U.S. side agreed to, 
"technical written explanations" regarding both the radiation 
detection equipment and checked baggage requirements.  U.S. 
officials offered to meet soon with HIAA to go over these 
requirements.  The GOC suggested that the U.S. encourage HIAA 
to invite Transport Canada to those meetings as well. 
Regarding the opening date of October 1 and radiation 
detection equipment, it was pointed out that handheld 
scanners could be used until such time as permanent equipment 
was installed.  The U.S. will take into consideration a later 
start-up date (post-October 1) for the permanent radiation 
equipment.  CBP will provide contact information to HIAA 
regarding a company in Texas that manufactures the equipment 
preferred by CBP. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Major Canadian Issues/Agenda Items 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (U) The GOC raised the issue of congestion at Toronto and 
Montreal, particularly during peak periods such as 
pre-holiday travel.  Canada also raised the question of CBP's 
commitment in terms of personnel, equipment, and other 
resources to adequately manage renewed growth in passenger 
and baggage traffic between Canada and the U.S. now that the 
aviation sector is bouncing back from the declines caused by 
9/11.  Canada pointed out that the successful negotiation of 
an Open Skies agreement will further stimulate air traffic 
between our two countries.  The GOC reported that in a recent 
four-hour meeting with Canadian carriers, two hours were 
devoted to discussion of the congestion problem.  The GOC 
said that Canadian carriers had even offered to pay an 
additional dollar to CBP from the Air Travelers Security 
Charge at preclearance airports for passenger processing. 
 
¶9.  (U) Continuing on congestion, Canada pointed out that at 
the Toronto preclearance area the morning rush hour lineup, 
when flights are most dense, can be 90 minutes long.  Pre- 
and post-holiday air travelers are also subjected to long 
waits.  The U.S. replied that there must be a coordinated 
effort by members of the airport council (e.g., airport 
administration, CBP, CATSA, and the carriers) to reduce 
congestion.  Scheduling most flights of the day during a 
two-hour morning period, the time considered most popular 
with travelers, will of course lead to crowding at that 
preferred flight time and should be addressed by the airport 
council.  CBP pointed out that sometimes it isn't responsible 
for the congestion.  At Vancouver airport, for example, CBP 
periodically stops processing because CATSA cannot handle the 
passenger flow. 
 
¶10.  (U) Regarding future growth and the commitment of 
resources, the GOC offered to share with the U.S. studies it 
has undertaken on airport growth rates.  For its part, CBP 
explained that it has developed models for the staffing of 
preclearance facilities.  CBP's models incorporate best 
practices and also examine the most efficient use of 
resources at preclearance facilities.  CBP's staffing models 
are not generally releasable, but CBP will share them with 
the GOC.  The U.S. will feed GOC data on projected growth 
into CBP staffing models.  The two sides expressed confidence 
that application of the studies and staffing models will 
enable the two governments to direct the other players 
involved in airport councils to create conditions to both 
avoid congestion and meet the demands of anticipated growth. 
The GOC will encourage Canadian airport authorities and 
carriers to form councils to work with CBP and CATSA. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The GOC raised the issue of complaints about the 
preclearance process/procedures.  Canadian travelers complain 
about being "detained" in secondary inspection, and the lack 
of adequate advance information regarding their right to 
withdraw their application to enter the United States once 
the preclearance process has started.  Foreign Affairs 
receives about four complaint letters per month.  CBP replied 
that there is a customer satisfaction form available on which 
travelers can register their comments about preclearance, 
including complaints.  A passenger can also ask at any time 
in the preclearance process to speak with a supervisor, and 
that request will be honored.  It was suggested that more 
signage could be displayed concerning a Canadian's right of 
withdrawal.  (Note:  There are signs in the primary 
inspection area, but not in the secondary area.  End note.) 
CBP offered to send directives to the preclearance ports 
informing officers of their rights and obligations concerning 
withdrawal.  CBSA also undertook to restart training for CBP 
officers on how Canadian law applies to the right of 
withdrawal.  Finally, the U.S. agreed to take action on 
complaint letters received by the GOC, and to provide a 
written response when appropriate. 
 
¶12.  (U) Canada asked that CBP officers be better informed 
about the process whereby they must register with Foreign 
Affairs Canada on arrival in country, and apply for an 
identification card that is issued by the Protocol Office of 
Foreign Affairs.  The officers should also be sure to apply 
for renewals of passports and work permits prior to their 
expiration, and to return their identification cards at the 
end of their assignments in Canada.  The U.S. side said that 
this issue is being addressed.  Port directors and Embassy 
Ottawa are making sure that officers are aware of these 
requirements. 
 
---------------------- 
Intransit Preclearance 
---------------------- 
 
¶13.  (U) Canada and the U.S. agreed to a joint review of 
intransit preclearance, whereby passengers from domestic 
Canadian flights, as well as foreign passengers from 
international flights, arrive at a preclearance airport and 
are processed for U.S.-bound flights.  Intransit is 
operational in Vancouver and works well.  Domestic and 
international passengers on their way to the U.S. share the 
same secure transit facility.  The GOC limits the number of 
carriers (to four) whose passengers can apply for intransit 
preclearance when they arrive in Vancouver.  If CBP finds an 
international intransit passenger inadmissible to the U.S., 
that passenger is turned over to CBSA, not returned to the 
carrier for repatriation.  To allow CBP to inspect 
international intransit passengers with adequate time, the 
carriers fax the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) 
data to CBP well before the arrival of the plane in 
Vancouver.  Toronto and Montreal want to begin intransit 
preclearance, in 2007 and 2008, respectively. 
 
-------------------------- 
"Progressive Preclearance" 
-------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (U) Canada and the U.S. had finalized pre-9/11 an MOU 
for a pilot project for progressive preclearance under which 
passengers could be cleared by CBP in Ottawa who were 
transiting Toronto or Montreal for U.S.-bound flights.  Under 
that plan, an aircraft would carry only cleared passengers on 
the domestic leg who were U.S.-bound.  At the December 13 PCG 
meeting, the U.S. agreed to review the pilot and reply.  A 
major challenge in Toronto and Montreal will be sterile areas 
with adequate security--and size--to hold transit passengers. 
 
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa 
 
WILKINS