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Viewing cable 05NDJAMENA1852, CHAD: SLM REPORTS CHAD REBELS REGROUPING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
05NDJAMENA1852 2005-12-27 17:16 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ndjamena
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

271716Z Dec 05


ACTION AF-00    

INFO  LOG-00   ACQ-00   CIAE-00  DODE-00  EUR-00   UTED-00  VCI-00   
      TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    L-00     VCIE-00  NSAE-00  ISN-00   
      NSCE-00  OIC-00   OIG-00   OMB-00   PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   
      P-00     ISNE-00  SP-00    SS-00    TRSE-00  T-00     IIP-00   
      PMB-00   DRL-00   G-00     SAS-00     /000W
                  ------------------758AC2  271748Z /03    
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2822
INFO AMEMBASSY ABUJA 
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
USMISSION GENEVA
UNCLAS NDJAMENA 001852 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD: SLM REPORTS CHAD REBELS REGROUPING 
 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary:  SLM General Coordinator Adam Shogar 
warned Charge that the Sudanese government was arming and 
supporting Chadian rebels in the Darfur region and that 
movement of new vehicles and arms indicated that the rebels 
were gearing up for a new attack.  Shogar stated that SLM was 
trying to respect the cease-fire agreement, but that the 
fighting between the Government of Chad (GOC) and Chadian 
rebels was going to affect SLM bases along the border. 
Shogar warned that the SLM would "not wait to be attacked." 
End Summary. 
 
2.  (SBU) Charge met with N'djamena-based Sudanese Liberation 
Movement (SLM) General Coordinator Adam Shogar and SLM 
Vice-Chairman Khamis Abdulla December 24 at their request. 
Shogar informed Charge that the SLM intended to have a 
conference once the peace talks concluded in Abuja.  He noted 
that to date there has not been a comprehensive conference. 
In this context, he alluded to the problems that SLM 
breakaway leader Mini Minawi had caused by holding his own 
conference.  Shogar reported that Mini was losing his 
supporters in the field who were defecting from Mini's camp 
to other groups. Shogar asked Charge to convey the message 
that the SLM was hard pressed by the international community 
to cooperate with the peace talks without being given an 
opportunity for the SLM to organize themselves. 
 
3.  (SBU) Shogar turned next to the situation on the 
Sudan/Chad border. He noted that there was fighting in the 
border between the GOC troops and Chadian rebels.  Shogar 
stated that the Chadian rebels were "fully supported by 
Government of Sudan (GOS)" and claimed that SLM knew where 
the rebel camps were and what the GOS was supplying in terms 
of weapons and vehicles.  By way of example, he stated that 
on or about December 9, Chadian rebels joined the GOS in 
fighting in western Darfur (Masteri, some 45 kilometers from 
Al-Geneina.)  Shogar reported that SLM had seen the Chadian 
rebels moving from their camps with 17 vehicles, and meeting 
up with GOS forces, including 3 helicopter gunships and 2 
antonovs.  Shogar stated that janjaweed fighters had joined 
the GOS and Chadian rebels.  In an aside, Shogar stated that 
it was difficult to distinguish between janjaweed fighters 
and Chadian rebels because, in his words: "most of them are 
Chadian arabs." Shogar also noted that some three days before 
the Adre attack, the Chadian rebels had also been involved in 
the attack on Jabal Um. Shogar said that Chadian rebels 
numbered more than 10,000, but less than 20,000.  He 
explained that he reached this number by adding in "all the 
janjaweed." 
 
4. (SBU)  Shogar explained that the SLM was trying to respect 
the cease-fire agreement, but that the GOS was still looting, 
abducting and attacking.  The current conflict between GOC 
and Chadian rebels across the border would "add fuel to the 
fire" of an already highly volatile situation.  In the 
meantime, Shogar said that they had learned that the GOS had 
brought 300 toyota vehicles to Al-Geneina on December 23 for 
use by Chadian rebels.  Chadian rebels, according to Shogar, 
were being armed and provided new vehicles and were preparing 
for a new attack.  Shogar explained that the SLM's 
preoccupation was that the fighting would affect the SLM as 
they have bases along the border. Furthermore, he stated, 
that if the situation continued, the SLM would not wait to be 
attacked. He recognized that such acts jeopardized the 
cease-fire agreement, but stated that they had no alternative 
but to fight. 
TAMLYN 
 
 
NNNN