This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MANILA 005950 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR S/CT, EAP, AND EAP/MTS 
S/CT FOR RHONDA SHORE AND ED SALAZAR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV ASEC MOPS RP
SUBJECT: PHILIPPINES:  2005 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 
 
¶1.  (U) Post's 2005 narrative update of the Philippine 
portion of the 2004 Patterns of Global Terrorism report is 
provided below. The information is keyed to specific reftel 
requests. 
 
¶2.  (U) Summary.  The Philippines, one of the earliest 
supporters in the global coalition against terrorism, 
continues to cooperate with the United States on bilateral 
and multilateral counterterrorism efforts.  In 2005, the 
Philippines was repeatedly the victim of terrorist assaults, 
but had a number of significant arrests and convictions of 
terrorists; several important terrorist figures were also 
killed in fighting with the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP).  The Philippines also made some progress in tracking, 
blocking, and seizing terrorist assets.  Nevertheless, major 
evidentiary and procedural obstacles in the Philippines 
continue to hinder the building of effective terrorism cases, 
and a large and growing case backlog and the absence of 
continuous, contiguous trials for terrorism cases are major 
impediments to the Philippines' prosecution of suspected 
terrorists.  A counterterrorism bill moved forward in the 
House of Representatives in December, but the bill remains 
stalled in the Senate.  End Summary. 
 
------------------ 
GENERAL ASSESSMENT 
------------------ 
 
¶3.  (U) The Philippines was one of the earliest supporters in 
the global coalition against terrorism, and the United States 
continues to cooperate closely with the Philippines on 
bilateral and multilateral counterterrorism efforts.  The 
Philippines unanimously won election as chairman of the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation's (APEC) Counterterrorism Task 
Force in November 2004, and continued to hold this post 
throughout 2005. 
 
¶4.  (U) The Philippines faces threats from internal terrorism 
on several fronts.  The United States has listed three groups 
operating in the Philippines as Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations: the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Communist 
Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA), and 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).  The United States has also listed two 
indigenous groups on its Terrorist Exclusion List:  the Alex 
Boncayo Brigade (ABB) and the Pentagon Gang (both of which 
are now virtually extinct). 
 
¶5.  (U) In 2005, the Philippines was repeatedly the victim of 
terrorist atacks.  In February, it suffered the worst 
terrorist attack of the year when three bombs went off almost 
simultaneously in three different cities -- Manila, Davao, 
and General Santos City -- killing 8 people and injuring 153. 
 In August, a bomb exploded aboard the Dona Rosa passenger 
ferry in Basilan, injuring 30 people (four of whom 
subsequently died of their injuries). 
 
¶6.  (U) Philippine authorities had a number of successes 
against terrorists in 2005.  The GRP's most recent successes 
were the arrest in October of several members of the 
ASG-affiliated Rajah Sulaiman Movement (RSM), including RSM 
leader Ahmad Santos, and the arrest in December of RSM's 
alleged second-in-command and operations chief, Pio de Vera. 
The Anti-Terrorism Task Force (ATTF) arrested, captured, or 
killed 83 suspected terrorists in 2005.  ATTF also 
coordinated operations that led, in March, to the seizure of 
600 kilograms of ammonium nitrate and other bomb-making 
materials being stored in an apartment in Quezon City, Metro 
Manila. 
 
¶7.  (U) 2005 also saw several significant convictions of 
terrorists in Philippine courts.  In June, a Philippine court 
convicted seven members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 
responsible for the Dos Palmas kidnapping, the Lamitan siege, 
the Golden Harvest massacre, and the Balobo massacre, which 
all took place in 2001.  In October, a court convicted RSM 
operative Angelo Trinidad, JI operative Rohmat (a.k.a Zaki), 
and and ASG operative Gamal Baharan for their roles in the 
February 14 bombings in the Philippines. 
 
¶8.  (U) Several key ASG figures were also killed during armed 
encounters with the AFP.   Wedjimeh Sayad and Ahmad Sabudin, 
operatives serving under ASG sub-leader Jundam Jamalul, were 
killed in an encounter in Sulu on September 5.  Jainal Usman, 
a senior ASG lieutenant, who was behind the abduction of six 
Malaysian resort workers in 2003, was killed in fighting in 
Tawi-Tawi on November 17 along with two subordinates, Faizal 
Mohammad and Pula Ali. 
 
¶9.  (U) The Philippines has made some progress in tracking, 
blocking, and seizing terrorist assets.  The main body tasked 
with investigating terrorist finance cases -- the Anti-Money 
Laundering Council (AMLC) -- completed the first phase of its 
information technology upgrades in 2004.  From January to 
October 2005, AMLC received 1760 Suspicious Transaction 
Reports involving 8144 suspicious transactions, and had 
received Covered Transaction Reports involving 44 million 
covered transactions.  As a result of the significant 
improvements in the GRP's anti-money laundering authorities 
and efforts, and AMLC's accomplishments and efforts in 
addressing remaining vulnerabilities, the OECD's Financial 
Action Task Force removed the Philippines from the 
Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories list in February 
¶2005.  Subsequently, AMLC was accepted as a member of the 
Egmont Group, a prominent body of financial intelligence 
units that foster international cooperation. 
 
¶10.   (U) U.S. and Philippine authorities worked closely 
during 2005 on rewards programs targeting terrorist groups. 
Using its Rewards Program, the U.S. Department of Defense 
made a major payment of $50,000 in November to a Filipino 
informant for his role in the capture of Rohmat, a.k.a. Zaki, 
a JI operative linked to the February 14 bombings.  Other 
payments were made to informants whose information led to the 
capture of ASG operatives Rasman Mohammad ($2500, July 2005); 
Asbar Ismael ($5000, September 2005); Yadzi Manatad ($5000, 
September 2005); and Gumbahali Jumdail ($15,000, September 
2005; payment made to the family of the deceased informant). 
The U.S. Department of Defense also made two in-kind payouts 
under the rewards program in July, valued at $1000 and $2500, 
respectively.  The U.S. Department of State did not make any 
payouts in the Philippines in 2005 through its Rewards for 
Justice program; a payout to the informant who led to the 
capture of Toting Craft Hanno, an ASG terrorist under U.S. 
indictment for his role in the Burnham kidnappings was 
approved in November 2005.  A reward payment will most likely 
be made in January 2006. 
 
¶11.  (U) The GRP continues to imprison Juanito Itaas, 
convicted by Philippine courts in connection with the 1989 
murder of Embassy Manila Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group 
Deputy Commander Colonel James "Nick" Rowe.  Donato 
Continente, also convicted as an accessory to the murder, was 
released in June 2005, after serving his full term.  Both 
Itaas and Continente were associated with the CPP/NPA at the 
time of the murder. 
 
¶12.  (U) Major evidentiary and procedural obstacles in the 
Philippines continue to hinder the building of effective 
terrorism cases, such as the absence of a law defining and 
codifying terrorist acts, and restrictions on gathering of 
evidence.  Generic problems in the law enforcement and 
criminal justice systems also hamper bringing terrorists to 
justice in the Philippines.  These problems include: rampant 
corruption, low morale, inadequate salaries, recruitment and 
retention difficulties, lack of information technology 
upgrades, and lack of cooperation between police and 
prosecutors. 
 
¶13.  (U) A large and growing case backlog and the absence of 
continuous, contiguous trials for terrorism cases are the 
major impediments in the Philippines' prosecution of 
suspected terrorists. 
 
¶14.  (U) In 2005, after four successive years of trying, the 
Philippines came closer to enacting new antiterrorism 
legislation.  A counterterrorism bill passed its second 
reading in the House of Representatives in December.  The 
House bill is expected to receive its third and final reading 
early in 2006.  The bill remains stalled in the Senate, which 
is seeking assurances that the provisions of the legislation 
would not allow the government to use it against political 
opponents, as well as terrorists. 
 
¶15.  (U) The Philippines did not extradite or request the 
extradition of terrorists for prosecution during 2005. 
 
¶16.  (U) The Philippines has issued arrest warrants for all 
Filipino nationals sought by the U.S. for terrorism charges. 
(Typically, the number of charges entered against each 
suspect by Philippine authorities far exceeds the number of 
U.S. indictments per individual.)  The U.S. and the GRP 
signed a bilateral Extradition Treaty in 1996.  The treaty 
gives precedence to the GRP for the prosecution, conviction, 
and imprisonment of Filipino criminals apprehended in the 
Philippines. 
 
¶17.  (U) The GRP does not supply any support for terrorists 
either within or without its borders. 
 
¶18.  (U) The Philippines has ratified all 12 international 
conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.  In 2005, 
the GRP supported the USG in UNGA and UNSC matters related to 
terrorism. 
 
--------------------------------- 
SANCTUARY (SAFE HAVEN) ASSESSMENT 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶19.  (U) The GRP is aware that some JI members have obtained 
safe haven in Mindanao in areas under the control of elements 
of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and is actively 
engaged in efforts to stop this activity. The GRP is 
addressing the JI presence through military operations and 
through ongoing peace talks with the MILF.  Two specific 
mechanisms have been established to further GRP-MILF 
cooperation.  The Coordinating Committee for the Cessation of 
Hostilities (CCCH) allows GRP and MILF representatives to 
broker cease-fire violations.  The Ad Hoc Joint Action Group 
provides a framework for GRP and MILF representatives to 
cooperate against terrorists and criminals present in MILF 
areas, and has begun operating with some success over the 
last year. 
 
¶20.  (U) Philippine military and law enforcement at the 
regional and provincial level work closely with U.S. Embassy 
counterparts and visiting military personnel to ensure 
anti-terrorism force protection to more than 25 annual 
USG-GRP bilateral military events conducted throughout the 
Philippines.  In 2005, U.S. and Philippine military and law 
enforcement officials cooperated against JI and ASG targets, 
with U.S. officials actively assisting in investigating and 
pre-empting several terrorist attacks.  Members of Joint 
Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) in the 
southern Philippines are involved in civil-military 
operations and operations/intelligence fusion in order to 
help the AFP develop a sustained counterterrorism capability. 
 The Embassy's law enforcement team maintains regular and 
intimate contact with police and security counterparts. 
Mission has experienced good levels of cooperation from 
Philippine law enforcement in the areas of access to 
terrorist detainees and witnesses for FBI interviews, and 
access to criminal, immigration, financial, and biographic 
records via the mechanisms established in the 
U.S.-Philippines Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty.  DS is in 
the process of establishing an in-country Anti-Terrorism 
Assistance program that will seek to improve the capability 
of GRP agencies to respond to terrorist threats. 
 
¶21.  (U) U.S. and Philippine authorities worked closely 
during 2005 to continue rewards programs targeting terrorist 
groups.  Using its Rewards Program, the U.S. Department of 
Defense made a number of payments ranging from $2,500 to 
$50,000 to informants who played critical roles in the 
capture of JI and ASG terrorists. 
 
¶22.  (U) Under USAID's multi-year "LEAP" program, which ended 
in 2005, 28,000 Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 
combatants were successfully integrated into the economic 
mainstream.  USAID stands ready to provide immediate 
assistance to MILF combatants and their communities if an 
anticipated peace deal is reached in 2006. 
 
¶23.  (U) In June and July, an INL-led assessment team (a Post 
initiative) identified critical problems in Philippine law 
enforcement and proposed potential solutions.  Many of these 
proposals, if funded, will directly improve anti-terrorism 
efforts.  One such initiative, which Post hopes to achieve in 
2006, aims at improving cooperation between police and 
prosecutors in building legal cases, including those against 
terrorists. 
 
¶24.  (U) Neither the proliferation nor the trafficking of 
weapons of mass destruction play a role in terrorism in the 
Philippines, though the National Intelligence Coordinating 
Agency (NICA) remains concerned about possible future 
developments. 
 
---------------- 
TERRORIST GROUPS 
---------------- 
 
¶25.  (U) Foreign governments do not provide financial 
support, military or paramilitary training, weapons, 
diplomatic recognition, or sanctuary from prosecution to 
terrorist groups operating in the Philippines. 
 
¶26.  (U) The major -- and worrying -- trend in the 
Philippines has been the growing cooperation among the 
county's Islamist terrorist organizations: the JI, ASG, and 
RSM.  The near simultaneous "Valentine's Day" bombings in 
Manila, Davao, and General Santos involved operatives from 
all three entities.  These bombings also utilized more 
technically sophisticated explosive devices, another cause 
for concern.  The RSM, composed of Christian converts to 
Islam, has the ability to "blend in" and move freely about 
Luzon and other areas of the Philippines, increasing the 
likelihood of more Islamist terror in areas outside Mindanao. 
 
 
------------------------------ 
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT COOPERATION 
------------------------------ 
 
¶27.  (U) The Philippines was one of the earliest supporters 
in the global coalition against terrorism, and the United 
States continues to cooperate with the Philippines on 
bilateral and multilateral counterterrorism efforts. 
Philippine authorities arrested a number of terrorists in 
2005 (para 6).  2005 also saw several significant convictions 
of terrorists in Philippine courts (para 7). 
 
¶28.  (U) The Philippines has issued arrest warrants for all 
Filipino nationals sought by the U.S. for terrorism charges. 
(Typically, the number of charges entered against each 
suspect by Philippine authorities far exceeds the number of 
U.S. indictments per individual.)  In 2005, the GRP supported 
the United States in UNGA and UNSC matters related to 
terrorism. 
 
¶29.  (U)  Philippine-Australian cooperation on 
counterterrorism issues is growing.  The Australia-funded 
Bomb Data Center for the Philippine National Police provides 
a new and important resource for investigating terrorist 
attacks, and Australia is working with the Department of 
National Defense to establish a "coast watch" system to 
monitor better the Philippines' porous frontiers in Mindanao. 
 The GRP also cooperated on regional counterterrorism efforts 
through its membership in APEC and in the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  The Philippines unanimously 
won election as chairman of APEC's Counterterrorism Task 
Force in November 2004, and continued to hold this post 
throughout 2005.  At the Fifth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 
Transnational Crime in November 2005, ASEAN nations, 
including the Philippines, called for the establishment of an 
ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism. 
 
¶30.  (U) Border management in the Philippines is struggling 
under the pressures of poor physical and information 
technology infrastructure and insufficient capital and human 
resources.  Increased traffic and antiquated facilities 
overburden air and seaports.  Understaffed customs and 
immigration offices, manned by under-trained and underpaid 
officials are extremely vulnerable to corruption.  The USG 
has made some headway in assisting the Philippines in its 
improvement of its border management systems. 
 
¶31.  (U) Despite plans dating back to 2001, the Philippine 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) has yet to introduce a 
digitized, machine-readable passport.  However, the 
Philippine government has completed a process of review and 
claims that it will roll out a machine-readable passport in 
¶2006.  While the Philippines has cooperated with USG requests 
for prosecutions for persons who have tampered or altered 
travel documents, the prosecutions carry low-level penalties 
for criminals who commit this type of fraud.  In addition, 
there is a reluctance to investigate or charge vendors or 
users of false documents when the Philippine government was 
not the issuing authority.  Under current Philippine law, the 
suspect must present the fraudulent document as genuine 
before a Philippine Government authority in order for a crime 
to have been committed. 
 
¶32.  (U) Embassy Manila's POC for the 2005 Terrorism Report 
is Political Officer John Groch (grochjr@state.gov). 
 
Jones