This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 LAGOS 001943 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDA FAS WASHDC FOR CMP/DL&P DIVISION 
FAA/AREA DIRECTOR/RANDY HAGER 
ITP/THOMAS POMEROY 
ICD/DRD 
USDA/APHIS 
 
FROM OFFICE OF AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS, LAGOS 
 
TOFAS 015 
 
E.O. 12958, N/A 
TAGS: EAGR PGOV NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA TO ESTABLISH NATIONAL CONTINGENCY 
PLAN FOR HPAI PANDEMIC 
 
REF: STATE 00206588, STATE 00216147, SECSTATE 
001770774, ABUJA 00002234 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE PROTECT 
ACCORDINGLY. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: National technical committee of 
experts on the prevention and control of Highly 
Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) concluded 
deliberations in Abuja December 12-14, 2005 and 
proposed contingency plans for a pandemic in 
Nigeria. Federal Ministries of Agriculture and 
Health technical committees proposed national 
contingency plans for both human and animal 
health. Both technical committees (one from 
Health, the other from Agriculture) will seek 
substantial financial support from international 
donors to implement these plans. National 
contingency plans will be presented to the 
National Inter-ministerial Committee on Avian 
Influenza chaired by the Minister of Health, 
before going to the  president for approval and 
GON budgetary support. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) National technical committee of experts 
on the prevention and control of Highly Pathogenic 
Avian Influenza (HPAI) concluded deliberations in 
Abuja December 12-14, 2005 and proposed 
contingency plans for Influenza Pandemic in 
Nigeria. Federal Ministries of Agriculture and 
Health technical committees proposed national 
contingency plans for both human and animal 
health. Both contingency plans will be presented 
to the National Inter-ministerial Committee on 
Avian Influenza chaired by the Minister of Health, 
before going the Federal Executive Council and the 
president for final approval. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Ministry of Agriculture's strategy 
for the prevention and control of HPAI is based on 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) format 
for preparing National Emergency Preparedness and 
Contingency plans for Trans-boundary Animal 
Diseases (TADs) and the Australian Veterinary 
Plan. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The committee noted the threat to human 
health would persist as long as the problem 
persists in poultry flocks. Therefore, the primary 
focus of attention in the prevention and control 
of HPAI in the country should be from the animal 
health perspective. The committee recommended that 
prevention and control measures should focus on 
clinically affected poultry with full safe 
disposal of carcasses, adequate disinfection and 
decontamination and appropriate surveillance to 
determine the origin and extent of the disease. 
The plan also calls for full compensation to 
affected poultry farmers. (Comment: The provision 
of full compensation appears relatively 
enlightened until one realizes that several 
powerful Nigerians are involved in poultry farming 
and would stand to benefit by this provision. End 
comment). 
 
 
 
¶5. (SBU) The report details resources that would 
be required to contain and eradicate the virus. 
The Ministry of Agriculture's contingency plan 
calls for the immediate allocation of 555.5 
million Naira (approximately 4 million dollars) by 
the Federal Government and $400,000 from 
international donors in order to implement its 
plan.  The Ministry of Health will require the 
government to spend 109.2 million Naira (slightly 
over $800,000) in addition to $1.1 million it 
hopes to collect from international donors. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The committee acknowledged Nigeria's 
deteriorating animal health delivery services due 
to lack of adequate resources. In order to 
strengthen the national surveillance network, the 
committee recommended establishing a diagnostic 
laboratory network involving NVRI and designated 
laboratories in the veterinary teaching hospitals 
in Zairia, Ibadan, Nsuka, Maiduguri and Sokoto as 
well as the OIE/FAO/WHO regional and world 
reference laboratories for HPAI. Comment: 
currently, the National Veterinary Research 
Institute (NVRI) in Jos is the only laboratory in 
the country capable of animal disease diagnostics. 
End Comment.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) The committee further identified 
smuggling or importation of infected poultry and 
poultry products and migratory birds as the 
possible sources of the introduction of the 
disease into the country.  Following are specific 
recommendations by the committee that will be 
presented to the Executive Council (Presidency) 
for approval and financial backing. 
 
¶8. (SBU) --Ban the importation of poultry and 
poultry products from countries where the disease 
is know to exist.  At present, there is a complete 
import ban on live birds, poultry products 
including fertile eggs. 
 
¶9. (SBU) --Immediate rehabilitation and 
revitalization of existing veterinary quarantine 
infrastructure, control posts and enhanced 
manpower capabilities. 
 
¶10. (SBU) --Training of veterinarians, auxiliaries 
and other categories of poultry operators on HPAI 
prevention and control strategies, including all 
aspects of biosecurity. 
 
¶11. (SBU) --Ensure effective animal surveillance 
involving high-risk areas such as poultry markets, 
wetlands and migratory bird routes. 
 
¶12. (SBU) --GON planning for Avian Influenza is 
welcome news and a commendable development. 
Apparently, the GON planning, right now, is more 
weighted towards the agricultural side of the 
equilibrium and secondarily toward human health 
implications. This is perhaps a prudent strategy 
as long as the assumption holds that Avian 
Influenza is still limited to animal-to-animal 
transmission. However, if the disease mutates to 
human-to-human form, Nigeria's planning might not 
be optimal. The GON will have to play catch-up 
with very little time to spare. Compounding this 
problem is that, on the human health side, the GON 
appears to be relying more on the international 
community for funding than its own coffers. 
Browne