This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 009335 
 
SIPDIS 
 
RHONDA SHORE AND ED SALAZAR FOR NCTC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC EG
SUBJECT: EGYPT: 2005 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: STATE 193439 
 
Egypt 
 
¶1.  Egypt is an ally in the Global War on Terrorism.  The 
Egyptian and U.S. Governments maintained close cooperation on 
a broad range of counterterrorism and law enforcement issues 
in 2005 and exchanged information on a variety of terrorism, 
security, and law enforcement matters during the course of 
the year.  An interagency U.S. delegation met with the 
Egyptian Government's inter-ministerial counterterrorism 
committee in January. 
 
¶2.  In the past three years, Egypt has tightened its 
assets-freezing regime in keeping with relevant UN Security 
Council Resolutions.  Egypt passed strong anti-money 
laundering legislation in 2002 and established a financial 
intelligence unit in 2003.  Egypt maintained its strengthened 
airport security measures and security for the Suez Canal, 
and continued to institute more stringent port security 
measures. 
 
¶3.  Egypt was a victim of domestic terrorism in 2005.  In 
April, there were three unsophisticated attacks on crowded 
tourist destinations in Cairo.  On April 7, a lone suicide 
bomber killed three foreigners, including an American, at the 
Khan el-Khalili market. Several Americans were seriously 
injured in this incident.  Two related attacks at the end of 
the month targeting tourists near the Citadel and the 
Egyptian Museum were thwarted by Egyptian authorities.  The 
only deaths in these two attacks were the perpetrators 
themselves, whom the government described as the remainder of 
the small terrorist cell responsible for the April 7 bombing. 
 
¶4.  On July 23, 2005, three bombs exploded in Sharm El 
Sheikh, at the tip of the Sinai Peninsula, killing 67, 
including one American, and injuring hundreds of Egyptians 
and some foreign tourists.  One vehicle penetrated the 
driveway security of a hotel and detonated in the lobby area. 
Another car bomb exploded on a street in the old section of 
Sharm El Sheikh. The third bomb was in a bag that exploded in 
a pedestrian area frequented by tourists.  There is no 
indication that these attacks were directed at Americans, but 
they are widely regarded as targeting the Egyptian tourist 
industry. 
 
¶5.  On August 15, in the vicinity of the Rafah border 
crossing into the Gaza Strip, a small, improvised explosive 
device detonated near a Multinational Force and Observers 
vehicle, causing minor injuries to its occupants.  The day 
before, Egyptian authorities discovered a one-ton cache of 
explosives in El Arish, on the Mediterranean coast of the 
Sinai.  In addition, on August 13 an intercity bus was shot 
at along a road traversing the Sinai. 
 
¶6.  Between August and late November 2005, the Egyptian 
Government conducted an intensive security operation in Jebel 
Helal, a remote region in northeast Sinai, in pursuit of 
fugitives from a Salafist-Bedouin group suspected of links to 
the terrorist incidents cited in paragraphs four and five, 
and to other crimes.  During the course of the operation, 
several Egyptian security personnel, including two 
high-ranking police officers were killed in a late August 
ambush.  In subsequent skirmishes, in late September and 
again in late November, several of the fugitives were shot 
and killed, including Salim Khadr Al-Shanoub and Khalid 
Mua'id, whom the government identified as key planners of the 
July 2005 Sharm el-Sheikh attacks, as well as an incident in 
Taba the year before. 
 
¶7.  In the 2004 incident, a multi-storey tourist hotel in 
Taba and two rustic seaside camps near Nuweiba by the Israeli 
border were attacked by vehicular bombs.  Thirty-four people 
died, including one U.S. citizen.  The Egyptian Government 
maintained that all of the terrorist incidents which occurred 
in 2004-5 were conducted by small domestic groups. There is 
no information linking these incidents to al Qaida or other 
international terror networks. 
 
¶8.  The Egyptian judicial system does not allow plea 
bargaining, and terrorists have historically been prosecuted 
to the full extent of the law.  Terrorism defendants may be 
tried in military tribunals or emergency courts. 
 
¶9.  During his campaign for the September 7 Presidential 
elections, President Mubarak called for new anti-terrorism 
legislation to replace the decades-old Emergency Law, 
emphasizing that constitutional and legislative reforms would 
be needed to eliminate terrorism.   In explaining his 
proposal, Mubarak said "the time has come to create a 
decisive mechanism to fight terrorism."  While defending the 
use of the Emergency Law to respond to "the tragic 
circumstances" of the past, he said that the time had come to 
follow the example of other countries that had recently 
passed comprehensive laws to combat terrorism. 
 
¶10.  Embassy Point of Contact: Embassy Officers Ian McCary, 
mccaryij@state.gov, or Michael Roth at rothmr@state.gov. 
 
 
JONES