This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 003285 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2015 
TAGS: PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: BOLIVIA ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS 
 
REF: LA PAZ 3687 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Dennis Hearne. Reasons:1.4(B)(D). 
 
¶1. (SBU) PolCouns spoke with senior Brazilian Government 
(GOB) contacts in the foreign ministry (MRE) and Presidency 
on 15 December to check on the GOB's preparations for the 18 
December election in Bolivia.  They noted the following: 
 
¶2. (SBU) Marcel Biato, deputy foreign affairs advisor to 
President Lula da Silva, told PolCouns that Marco Aurelio 
Garcia, Lula's senior international advisor and designated 
Bolivia envoy, will travel on Saturday to Bolivia and link up 
with Carlos "Chaco" Alvarez, a former vice president of 
Argentina and Mercosul's senior political representative. 
Biato said Garcia and Alvarez, along with their advisors, 
will not act as observers per se, but rather will be in 
Bolivia as a "high-level presence" to show regional support 
for the democratic process.  They plan to meet with the three 
presidential candidates and other key leaders, Biato said. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The MRE's Acting Andean division chief, Lauro 
Beltrao, told PolCouns that Mercosul has also organized a 
regular election observer mission of working level personnel, 
including Brazilian officials, who should begin arriving in 
Bolivia on 16 December.  He added the Mercosul mission was in 
part a response to the November "open letter" from the 
Bolivian Government seeking observers, and the details of the 
Mercosul mission had been finalized by FM Amorim in 
conversations with Bolivia's foreign minister. 
 
¶4. (C) Comment. Biato and Beltrao both affirmed the GOB's 
paramount concern that the election process needs to be seen 
among Bolivians as transparent and legitimate.  They said the 
GOB, like other observers, anticipates a best-case scenario 
in which there is a "gentleman's agreement" wherein the 
second-place candidate will defer to the front-runner if the 
margin of victory is clear.  A more troubling scenario, in 
the GOB's view, would be a murky electoral result that leads 
to the president-elect being designated by the legislature, 
exacerbating the polarization among the populace.  In an 
earlier meeting on 8 December during the Brasilia visit of 
WHA Special Advisor for Counter Terrorism and Border Security 
McCarthy, PolCouns ask Antonio Macedo Soares, a senior 
analyst in the Presidency's Institutional Security Cabinet 
(GSI), whether the GSI is planning for possible second-order 
effects if the Bolivia political situation deteriorates into 
instability or radicalization that threatens Brazilian 
interests, especially Petrobras and energy resources from 
Bolivia that are critical to industry in southern Brazil. 
(Note: The GSI is a combination crisis management and 
national security and intelligence coordination entity within 
the Brazilian presidency. End note.)  Macedo Soares 
acknowledged that the GSI has been assessing likely impacts 
from energy shortfalls, but would not be drawn into a 
detailed discussion.  Rather, he admitted candidly that the 
GOB is essentially banking on "a strategy of hope," i.e., 
that despite fiery nationalist rhetoric during the elections, 
sensible leaders in Bolivia will not allow radical new 
government policies or general instability to damage 
Brazilian energy industries which contribute so massively to 
Bolivia's economy.  Per remarks of Brazil's Ambassador in La 
Paz noted in reftel, Macedo Soares also expressed deep 
concern within Brazil's police and intelligence communities 
about the potential for increased cocaine flows into Brazil 
from Bolivia in the event of a Morales victory. 
 
CHICOLA