This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 007729 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT (SHORE, SALAZAR) AND NCTC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: 2005 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: STATE 193439 
 
GENERAL ASSESSMENT 
------------------ 
 
¶1.  (U)  In 2005, Thailand continued to support domestic and 
international counterterrorism efforts.  Thailand is a major 
beneficiary of US anti-terrorism assistance, with numerous 
Thai police and security officials participating in 
US-sponsored training courses. 
 
¶2.  (U)  There were no acts of international terrorism in 
Thailand in 2005.  Thailand's biggest domestic security 
challenge is the ongoing insurgency in the far southern part 
of the country.  This region, bordering Malaysia, has 
experienced episodic separatist related violence for decades. 
 Since January 2004, however, there has been a dramatic 
increase in the level of violence which has continued 
throughout 2005.  Press reports indicate that over 1,000 
persons have been killed either by militants or by security 
forces during this two-year period.  Suspected separatist 
militants have attacked symbols of Thai and Buddhist 
authority, Buddhist civilians, and Muslims suspected of 
collaborating with the Government.  There continue to be near 
daily incidents of violence. 
 
¶3.  (U)  There are no indications that transnational 
terrorist groups are directly involved in the violence and 
there is no current evidence of direct operational links 
between southern Thai separatist groups and regional terror 
networks.  Overall, the RTG maintains that the situation 
remains a domestic issue.  However, elements of the Royal 
Thai Government (RTG) have expressed public concern that 
militants involved in the violence may have received funding 
and training from outside Thailand.  Additionally, relations 
between Thailand and Malaysia have been strained as the 
violence continues in Thai territory near their common 
border.  The ongoing unrest has drawn increasing 
international attention as well as the concern of 
international Islamic organizations.  In March 2005, in 
response to the violence, the Indonesian-based Nahdlatul 
Ulama Islamic organization sent a delegation to Thailand, and 
in June 2005 the Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIC) 
sent a fact-finding delegation to study the underlying causes 
of the violence. 
 
¶4.  (U)  Thailand's law enforcement and judicial system has 
struggled at times to combat the southern insurgency.  Police 
forensics and ballistics work has often failed to produce 
evidence that leads to arrests following insurgent attacks 
and RTG prosecutors have struggled to develop cases that can 
stand up in court, leading to low public confidence in the 
authorities.  In June 2005 four southern Thai Muslims, 
accused of having links with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), were 
acquitted by a Bangkok court because of a lack of evidence. 
In February 2004, the RTG created the National Coordinating 
Center for Combating Terrorism and Transnational Crime 
(NCC-CTTC) in order to improve CT coordination between 
intelligence, police, and the military. 
 
SANCTUARY ASSESSMENT 
-------------------- 
 
¶5.  (U)  During 2005 there was no direct evidence that 
Thailand served as a sanctuary/safe haven for terrorists or 
terrorist organizations.  Thai security forces cooperate with 
the US and other countries to deny safe haven for terrorists 
within their territory.  In the past, Thailand has served as 
a transit point for regional terrorists, as evidenced by the 
2003 capture of Nurjaman Riduan bin Isomuddin (a.k.a. 
Hambali) in Thailand.  However, there is no current evidence 
to indicate a continued presence of transnational terrorists 
in Thailand. 
 
¶6.  (U)  Thai officials have expressed concern that 
transnational terror groups could establish links with 
southern Thailand-based separatist groups.  However, there is 
no current evidence that the groups have established links or 
that Thai separatist are seeking direct assistance from 
international terror groups.  The US and Thailand are 
cooperating to improve border security.  As part of the USG's 
Terrorism Interdiction Program, we are providing Thailand 
with a customized border control computer network system 
known as PISCES (Personal Identification Secure Comparison 
and Evaluation System).  The program became operational at 
Thailand's three main international airports (Bangkok, Chiang 
Mai and Phuket) in September 2005.  Installation at fifty-six 
additional border posts and crossing points is expected by 
the end of 2006. 
 
INFORMATION ON TERRORIST GROUPS 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (U)  There is no current direct evidence that regional or 
transnational terror groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) or 
Al-Qaida are operating in Thailand.  There remain in Thailand 
several Thai JI associates who have provided financial and 
logistics support to JI fugitive leaders and operatives. 
Since Hambali's capture in 2003, there has been no indication 
that these Thai nationals have any form of contact with JI. 
Thailand does not have any indigenous terrorist groups. 
However, there are several domestic militant separatist 
groups that have been implicated in the ongoing unrest in the 
far southern Muslim majority provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, 
and Pattani as well as several districts of Songkhla 
province.  These organizations include the Pattani United 
Liberation Organization (PULO), Barasi Revolusi Nasional 
(BRN) and Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Movement (GMIP). 
 
¶8.  (U)  These separatist groups may share a basic ideology 
and general rejection of Western influence held by 
international Islamic terrorists, but by all indications they 
remained focused primarily on seeking autonomy or 
independence for the far southern provinces.  During 2005, 
separatist militants conducted attacks that included 
coordinated bombing attacks using IEDs (usually triggered 
with a cell phone), shootings, and beheadings.  There is no 
evidence that foreign governments provide financial, 
military, or diplomatic support for Thai separatist groups 
and no indication these groups would attempt an act of 
international terrorism. 
 
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT COOPERATION 
------------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (U)  The Thai government works closely with the US and 
other international partners on counterterrorism.  The US and 
Thai militaries conduct a large number of joint exercises and 
training programs that support CT objectives.  The US and 
Thailand are working on a joint effort to create a National 
Training Facility (NTF) that will provide field training for 
Thai military and police units involved in counter terror 
operations.  We will also seek to increase our cooperation on 
Maritime Security and port security issues both in the Gulf 
of Thailand and the Andaman Sea.  The State Department, under 
the Diplomatic Security Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) 
Program, continues to provide a robust training program for 
Thai CT and police units.  Bangkok's International Law 
Enforcement Academy (ILEA) is a center for law enforcement 
skills training that is also useful to CT efforts.  Under the 
auspices of the Container Security Initiative (CSI), we 
continue to work closely with the Thais on a range of port 
security programs.  Thailand also works with international 
partners to eliminate financial support networks for 
terrorists. 
 
¶10.  (U)  The RTG has been an active participant in 
international CT efforts, however, there are areas of 
concern.  Thailand is currently party to only five of the 13 
UN conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.  The Thai 
government has given oral commitments to acceding to the 
remaining eight UN conventions and protocols.  Thailand has 
not endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a 
key objective given Thailand's regional leadership role and 
strategic location.  Thailand also remains an international 
center for document fraud.  The RTG has engaged with the G-8 
Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG) on increasing penalties 
for document fraud, but proposed legislation has yet to be 
passed. 
 
¶11.  (U)  Embassy point of contact is Colin Crosby, political 
officer.  EMAIL: CrosbyC@state.sgov.gov (classified) 
CrosbyCT2@state.gov (unclass). 
BOYCE