This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 009923 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS USAID FOR GLOBAL HEALTH/K HILL, D CARROLL 
USDA FOR APHIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO KHIV AMED EAGR ECON PGOV PREL JO
SUBJECT: Amman Avian Flu Contingencies 
 
Ref: State 219189 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary: Embassy Amman has implemented broad-based 
contingency planning for avian influenza that covers 
protection of USG personnel, continuity of operations, and 
our responsibility to American citizens in Jordan. 
Tripwires are in final clearance and will be posted on 
TRIPS.  End summary. 
 
Avian Flu Task Force Readies Amman Tripwires 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) In October, post created an Avian Influenza Task 
Force that serves as an interagency planning forum and 
information clearinghouse for the official Embassy community 
and for the larger American citizen community. 
 
¶3.  (U) The AI Task Force has developed Jordan-specific 
tripwires through extensive discussion in-house and with 
relevant Jordanian organizations.  Post will publish the 
tripwires on the classified Tripwire Reporting and 
Integrated Planning System (TRIPS) per reftel instructions. 
 
Overview of Jordan's Medical Response Capabilities 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Jordan has small numbers of well-trained 
individuals in animal and human health surveillance systems, 
but lacks capacity at the lower levels.  The same is true 
for its laboratories: Jordan has a small number of well- 
equipped, well-staffed labs but not many of them, and they 
cannot handle the highest level of analysis.  Jordan's labs 
are unable to perform the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) 
tests that are essential to mounting an effective, rapid 
response to an influenza outbreak. The PCR test would have 
to be done elsewhere, adding days to a response time. 
Jordan has among the most effective, well-trained and well- 
equipped health systems in the region, but it lacks the 
"bench" of numerous, qualified personnel and effective 
systems that integrate at all levels.  Post's view is that 
Jordan would be able to respond well to a small-scale 
emergency by throwing its top assets at the problem, but 
that these people and resources would quickly be overwhelmed 
by a larger crisis. 
 
Responses to Individual Items in Reftel 
--------------------------------------- 
 
Mission Briefings: 
¶5.  (U) (Reftel item 8(A)): Ambassador has led two Town Hall 
meetings on avian influenza, one for American staff and one 
for FSN staff, and a meeting of wardens where avian 
influenza was discussed.  Hard copy information sheets in 
both Arabic and English on avian influenza were distributed 
at those meetings, and Embassy Amman has extensive avian 
influenza information available on its intranet and public 
websites. Mission also briefed the Overseas Security 
Advisory Council. 
 
Medical Human Resources: 
¶6.  (U) (Reftel (8(B)): Post has a Regional Medical Office 
(RMO) staffed by one Foreign Service physician,  a Regional 
Psychiatrist, three locally hired nurses and one support 
staff.  RMO is responsible for Israel, Cyprus, Syria, 
Lebanon and Jordan. Peace Corps/Jordan has a full time RN as 
their medical officer. Post has several additional American 
and FSN staff with medical skills.  There is no 
institutional mechanism for identifying these additional 
individuals; post's awareness of these skills is through 
informal means.  Post has a group of bio-chem "first 
responders" already trained, equipped with personal 
protective equipment, and in place.  RMO is developing plans 
for providing basic training to non-medical personnel to 
care for influenza patients. 
 
Drugs and Medical Equipment: 
¶7.  (SBU) (Reftel (8(C)): Post has one hundred courses of 
Tamiflu at the chancery and a large supply of Cipro.  The 
Peace Corps has ten courses of Tamiflu.  The health unit has 
full protective gear (gowns, masks, goggles, gloves) for 
thirty persons, and roughly four hundred N-95 masks.  Staff 
at the Defense Attache Office and Military Assistance 
Program office have M-40 chem-bio masks.  RSO's "first 
responder" group has a dozen sets of chem-bio protective 
gear. 
 
Security for Drugs: 
¶8.  (SBU) (Reftel (8(D)): Post's supplies of Tamiflu are 
maintained in a secure location. 
 
Stockpiling: 
¶9.  (U) (Reftel (8(E)): Embassy staff have been urged to 
stockpile food, water and medical supplies at their 
residences.  The length of time that post could shelter in 
place, drawing upon these supplies, would depend on the 
number of staff and family members at post.  Post has 
emergency stockpiles of gasoline, water, meals ready to eat 
(MREs) and diesel fuel in place and is augmenting that 
supply.  The current supply of MREs is expired; new ones are 
on order and are expected at post within a month.  In a 
crisis, post would be able to draw on goods in the on-site 
commissary.  This would significantly augment post's current 
stockpile of emergency food and water.  Peace Corps has 
their own Emergency Action Plan that includes specific 
gathering points that have been prestocked with food and 
water. 
 
Continuity of Operations: 
¶10.  (U) (Reftel (8(F)): Post has up-to-date plans in place 
for operations from an alternate Embassy site.  Emergency 
stores at that site are in the process of being replenished. 
Consular Section is completing a transition of its American 
citizen registration system from an in-house system to an 
internet-based system.  Consular staff have successfully 
tested their ability to access these names and email 
addresses, and as of February 2006 will have those names 
available in a manner that permits the warden system to be 
run from any of several possible locations. 
 
Essential Staff: 
¶11.  (U) (Reftel (8(G)): Post has just updated its drawdown 
lists for emergency and minimal staffing situations. 
 
At-Risk Staff: 
¶12.  (U) (Reftel (8(H)): Regional Medical Office maintains a 
list of American staff who are at risk because of underlying 
medical conditions. 
 
Pre-Planned Departure Packets: 
¶13.  (U) (Reftel (8(I)):  Administrative packets to 
facilitate authorized/ordered departure have been prepared 
by the Human Resources Office and are ready for immediate 
use. 
 
Border Closure: 
¶14.  (SBU) (Reftel (8(J)): Post has multiple options under 
various border/airport closure scenarios, including overland 
departure to Israel or Egypt, and by boat from Aqaba. 
Overland departure from Jordan might not be realistic or 
desirable if a pandemic was affecting neighboring 
countries.  Embassy staff would likely be better off in 
Jordan, with its small population and good medical 
infrastructure. 
 
Amcit Town Halls: 
¶15.  (U) (Reftel (8(K)):  Post feels that physical town hall 
meetings for interested Amcits would not be feasible, given 
the nearly ten thousand American citizens resident in 
Jordan.  Post's plan to maximize outreach on a fair basis is 
to promote information sharing through warden messages, 
additional warden meetings and post's public internet page. 
Other tools such as a "web chat" are being evaluated. 
 
Engagement with Host Country: 
¶16.  (U) (Reftel (8(L)): Several sections at post, including 
AID, RMO, Econ, RSO, Military Assistance Program and 
Environmental Hub, routinely discuss avian flu issues with 
their GOJ counterparts, other contacts in Jordan, and 
regional contacts. 
 
HALE