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Diana T Fritz  08/27/2006 04:57:35 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

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UNCLAS        ABU DHABI 05168

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    INFO:   P/M ECON RSO DCM AMB MEPI

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APPROVED: CDA:MQUINN
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RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNEXC/ECRBS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 ABU DHABI 005168 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/ECC -  B.PIKOULAS, J.COLLINS, K.CROUCH, P.VAN SON 
DOC FOR D. CREED 
US COAST GUARD FOR USCG ACTIVITIES/MIO EUROPE M. BEE 
US CUSTOMS FOR P. WARKER, W. LAWRENCE 
USDOE/NNSA FOR T. PERRY, W. KILMARTIN 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC MNUC PARM PREL KSTC KNNP JO
SUBJECT: EXBS ADVISOR VISIT TO UNITED ARAB EMIRATES OCTOBER 2005 
 
¶I. SUMMARY.  During the period October 9-23, 2005, EXBS Advisor 
met with Emirati officials, principal Embassy and Consulate staff 
and representatives of the Center for International Trade and 
Security, University of Georgia, to discuss the current state of 
Export Controls and Related Border Security in the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE).  Advisor met with senior representatives of the 
Ministry of Foreign affairs, Federal Customs Authority, Dubai 
Customs, Dubai Ports Authority, Ports Customs and Free Zone 
Corporation, Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority, Sharjah Airport 
International Free Zone, Federal Express International Inc., and 
Gulf Pharmaceutical Industries.  The Emirate of Dubai is a 
participant in the U.S. Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
Program.  The implementing Emirati agency for CSI is Dubai 
Customs.  Emirati officials are anxious to receive EXBS 
assistance in training.  There are close trading relations 
between the UAE and Iran and Iran is the UAE's largest re-export 
market.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
II. MEETINGS SUMMARIES. 
 
¶1.   Several times during the period October 9-23, EXBS Advisor 
met with principal US Embassy and Consulate staff to discuss the 
state of EXBS in UAE.  Salient points of subsequent conversation 
were as follows: 
 
¶A.   UAE has unique challenges with implementation of EXBS 
principles due to the structure of the federal government system, 
which preserves the independence of the Emirate-level governments 
in many issues, including customs. 
 
¶B.   Additional EXBS training events can be used by the Emirati 
officials as defacto 'proof' they are moving forward in 
implementation of EXBS, thus deflecting attention from the 
primary need to move forward in establishing an effective export 
control system based on new or revised law. 
 
¶C.   All sectors of the Emirati society, including police, armed 
forces, etc., reflect the general demographics of the UAE, i.e., 
third country nationals outnumber the Emirati people.  Many of 
these foreign workers and laborers are citizens of Pakistan and 
India and the number of Iranian nationals is estimated to be 
300,000.  Omani officials may not be concerned about stopping 
this illegal flow of immigrants since they are transiting Oman 
for UAE.  The population doubled in the last six years. 
Projections forecast the population will double again in the next 
five years. 
 
¶D.   UAE leadership in general is supportive of EXBS, especially 
programs such as the CSI and MEGAPORTS initiatives, which Emirati 
officials see as trade facilitators. 
 
¶E.   A telling comment made by several Emirati officials to 
principal members of U.S. staff was the oft-repeated question, 
"Do Hong Kong and Singapore have EXBS programs?"  In order to 
increase Emirati support to EXBS, we need to couch the concept of 
"facilitating secure trade" in terms of what officials are doing 
in Hong Kong and Singapore. 
 
¶F.   Diversion of strategic goods is fostered by the desire of 
individuals to do business.  Diversion does not appear to be 
sanctioned by any of the governments in UAE; however, they may 
enable diversion by absence of an export control system similar 
to those used by the U.S. and the EU or even Hong Kong and 
Singapore. 
 
ADVISOR NOTE:  Commercial ties with Iran are so pervasive and 
deep-rooted; it is the opinion of the Advisor this relationship 
will not change in the near future.  The best one can hope for is 
the establishment and effective administration of a viable export 
control system that prevents the illicit transfer of controlled 
dual-use items and related technology.  Deterrence will occur 
only following consistent and meaningful enforcement and 
implementation of appropriate monitoring and detection elements 
consistent with an effective EXBS system.  If such a system is to 
be effective, it must, as was noted by principal staff, be 
supported by all the Emirates after enactment by the federal 
government.  Advisor realizes this is no small task and may be 
the greatest individual challenge facing the UAE with respect to 
EXBS. 
 
¶2.   On October 11, EXBS Advisor accompanied Mary O'Brien, Export 
Control Officer, U.S. Embassy, Abu Dhabi while she conducted pre 
and post shipment licensing checks in Dubai, UAE.  This activity 
allowed the EXBS Advisor to gain a first-hand appreciation for 
the extensive commercial ties between the UAE and its gulf and 
regional neighbors, especially Iran, Pakistan and India.  Nearly 
all sectors of the Dubai and UAE economy are linked to these 
neighbor states.  Trade is extensive and uses both air and marine 
routes for movement of goods and persons.  Iranian companies 
located in Dubai are numerous and involved in shipping, export 
and import of diverse goods and commodities, and banking.  These 
commercial connections between UAE and Iran in particular have 
long historical roots and are not likely to change in the near 
future.  There are few export controls to regulate the movement 
of the majority of goods transiting the gulf between UAE and 
Iran. 
 
¶3.   During the period October 12-19, 2005, when EXBS Advisor met 
with Emirati and U.S. officials, analysts from the Center for 
International Trade and Security, University of Georgia (CITS) 
accompanied Advisor.  These CITS analysts visited UAE to conduct 
an official in-country review of the UAE export controls system. 
CITS will provide this report to State Department under separate 
cover before spring 2006. 
 
¶4.   On October 15, EXBS Advisor met with Yacub Yoysif Alhosani, 
Director of Organizations and International Conferences 
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, United Arab Emirates. 
Salient points of subsequent conversation were as follows: 
 
¶A.   In general, the historical focus of UAE customs 
organizations has been one of revenue collection rather than 
export or import controls. 
 
¶B.   General awareness among customs inspectors concerning dual- 
use and related technology is lacking. 
 
¶C.   (Companies dealing in dual-use items have files on their 
transactions maintained by relevant UAE or Emirate government 
Ministries, Agencies or Departments.  These files identify the 
`End-User.'  Federal Customs, as appropriate, shares 
investigative and/or historical information with appropriate 
security and law enforcement elements. 
 
¶D.   No specific export control law exists at present.  Criminal 
law addresses "dangerous items."  The 2004 Anti-Terrorism law has 
a section that deals with the transfer of WMD and Components for 
use by terrorist organizations. 
 
¶E.   An inter-ministerial committee (including representatives 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, 
Customs, Police and others) has completed an initial review of 
the concept of export controls.  This committee meets 
irregularly, but has drafted an export control law.  This draft 
law is currently under review by senior decision makers before 
being forwarded to the cabinet.  (Note:  during the week prior to 
Advisor's visit, Ministry of Interior asked cabinet to make 
passage of this law a priority.) 
 
¶F.   UAE anticipates use of established control regimes lists to 
identify controlled items and technology. 
 
¶G.   The CWC acceptance law is in legislative committee.  UAE 
anticipates implementing the regime list and says that it plans 
to adhere to MTRC, Wassenaar and NPT. 
 
¶H.   UAE says it supports the Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI) in concept but has yet to declare publicly or privately its 
agreement to the principles of PSI.  The UAE is open to the idea 
of participating in a regional conference on PSI and 
Nonproliferation, so long as sufficient lead-time exists before 
such an event to ensure attendance of the right individuals. 
 
¶5.   On October 16, EXBS Advisor toured the ports of Jebel Ali 
and Rashid located in Dubai, UAE and met with the following 
officials of Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority (JAFZA) Dubai Ports 
Authority (DPA) and Ports, Customs & Free Zone Corporation 
(PCFC): Ibrahim M. Al Janahi, Vice President-Commercial Sales, 
JAFZA; Abdalla Al Banna, Senior Manager-Marketing, JAFZA and 
Shehab Al-Rahma, Commercial-Sales, DPA and Feras Dahlan, Business 
Relations Officer, Public Relations, Promotions & Exhibitions 
Department, PCFZC.  The Ports, Customs and Free Zone Corporation 
is the parent organization of the Dubai Port Authority and the 
Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority, as well as Dubai Customs.  Salient 
points of subsequent conversation and observations were as 
follows: 
 
¶A.   CSI is at the port of Jebel Ali and MEGAPORTS is in the 
process of implementation.  Officials support both these 
initiatives because the officials view them as trade facilitating 
programs. 
 
¶B.   The port of Jebel Ali is self-funding, has 65 operative 
berths and nearly 15km of frontage.  At present, 125 major 
shipping lines call at Jebel Ali. By 2007, Jebel Ali port will 
have a "paperless clearance system" including Customs clearance, 
payment of fees and freight forwarding documentation.  By 2020, 
the port expects to have expanded to over 120 gantry container 
cranes and well over an hundred berths and additional deep-water 
anchorage. 
 
¶C.   JAFZA, located adjacent to the port of Jebel Ali, hosts over 
5,000 companies including many global conglomerates such as Sony, 
which has located its second largest distribution hub after Japan 
in JAFZA. 
 
¶D.   JAFZA serves the greater GCC, Iran, the Indian subcontinent 
and east Africa.  Recently, over 600 companies opened in JAFZA 
focused on providing goods and services to Iraq.  (NOTE:  JAFZA 
does not allow movement of scrap metal from Iraq into its port 
facilities.)  JAFZA has access to two billion customers and 
potential consumers mostly in the aforementioned states and 
regions.  In regards to shipments through JAFZA, 60+% are 
transshipments, 20+% are imports and the remainders are exports. 
 
¶E.   The Dubai Port Authority is an investor or manager of 18 
other major ports including ports in Djibouti, Morocco and 
Malaysia.  DPA also manages numerous free zones in India, 
Australia and South America.  DPA also manages two terminals in 
Hong Kong. 
 
¶F.   Dubai Police is the primary law enforcement organization 
serving JAFZA.  It has a local station at the free zone and 
handles smuggling cases.  Dubai Customs handles customs-related 
issues.  Federal Customs does not have a presence in the zone. 
 
¶G.   JAFZA issues three types of business licenses:  Trading, 
Manufacturing and Service. 
 
¶6.   On October 16, EXBS Advisor met with the following officials 
of the Federal Customs Authority (FCA), UAE: Mohamed K. Al 
Mehairi, Director General and Ahmed Mohamed Al Bakr, Director of 
Legal Affairs Department.  Salient points of subsequent 
conversation were as follows: 
 
¶A.   FCA has no existing rules or standards for risk management, 
but has the ability to review shipments and tasks the various 
Customs authorities to conduct searches of specific 
shipments/cargo when and if needed. 
 
¶B.   FCA would like to establish an academy or regional center 
for customs training.  This training would establish common 
standards and procedures for the UAE and the region. 
 
¶C.   A draft for a comprehensive export control law exists and is 
under review by senior decision makers. 
 
¶D.   In 1971, when the UAE was formed, the Emirati constitution 
allowed the emirates to retain their own customs authorities. 
The constitution, however, includes a reference to move to 
"Customs unity" at a future date, thus providing a constitutional 
basis for the establishment of the Federal Customs Authority in 
¶2003.  FCA would like to accelerate this process of customs 
unity, but there is resistance at the Emirate level.  Since 1981, 
the UAE has had a Customs Council composed of the Head of Customs 
of each of the seven Emirates.  The Committee has elected one 
among the seven to serve as the head of federal customs. 
 
¶E.   FCA views its current and future role as one of supervising 
emirate-level customs authorities, setting rules and regulating 
customs procedures throughout the UAE. 
 
¶F.   While admitting their view is probably not shared by the 
free zone authorities throughout the UAE, FCA is of the opinion 
that the only legal exemption inside the free zones is that which 
protects foreign ownership from taxation; all other UAE laws 
regarding labor, customs, etc., apply to both companies and 
individuals.  (Note: the UAE Federal Customs Authority imposed a 
tax on scrap metal dealers in Jebel Ali Free Zone.   According to 
press reports, the initial response from JAFZA was to direct the 
dealers to the FCA.  After several days, the Federal Customs 
Authority withdrew its demand for the free zone companies to pay 
an export tax.  End Note) 
 
¶G.   FCA is working on a national control list and would like to 
see a common GCC control list. 
 
¶7.   On October 17, EXBS Advisor met with Rashid Sultan Hamad Al 
Roum, Director of Customs and Border Protection Service (CBPS), 
Dubai Customs, UAE.  Salient points of subsequent conversation 
were as follows: 
 
¶A.   CBPS estimates 90-95% of all goods entering the ports of 
Jebel Ali and Rashid originate outside the UAE.  Of these goods, 
80-85% transit UAE via land routes or maritime transshipments. 
In 2004, Dubai handled/shipped 6.2 million containers. 
 
¶B.   CBPS customs processing system is completely automated. 
 
¶C.   In 2004, CBPS established Risk management practices, 
including automated review protocols.  Inspectors have received 
training in interview and non-verbal assessment skills. 
Inspectors still screen closely historical areas and actors of 
interest.  CBPS maintains its own version of a `watch list' and 
routinely coordinates with Interpol and WCO on matters of mutual 
interest. 
 
¶D.   Consistent with regional practices, CBPS gives special 
attention to shipments involving weapons, explosives, hazardous 
materials and other items identified on special control lists 
developed by governmental entities such as the Ministries of 
Agriculture and Interior. 
¶E.   In accordance with its specific laws and regulations, CBPS 
has the authority to open "civil" customs cases, levy fines, 
seize property and make arrests.  When a customs case crosses 
over into criminal jurisdiction, CBPS coordinates with Dubai 
Police to determine which organization will take the 
investigative lead. 
 
¶F.   CBPS prevents potential corruption by providing an excellent 
salary and benefit package to employees, many of which are third 
country nationals who would risk jail and deportation if 
convicted of wrongdoing.  Customs employees attend an academy 
course lasting six months, three of which are at the Dubai Police 
Academy.  This basic training is followed by site and location 
specific training, interview and screening skills, and use of 
field tools and equipment, e.g., hand-held chemical and 
radiological sensors and various optical inspection scopes. 
 
¶G.   Illegal immigration via maritime routes is the jurisdiction 
of the Coast Guard. 
 
¶H.   CBPS has expertise and experience dealing with medical, 
dental and oil industry radiological sources. 
 
¶I.   In addition to uniform customs officers, CBPS has a K-9 unit 
and individuals embedded in select organizations and areas of 
port and JAFZA operations. 
 
¶J.   CBPS reports trends and operational statistics to the 
Federal Customs Authority. 
 
¶8.   On October 17, EXBS Advisor met with members of the 
Container Security Initiative (CSI) team located in Dubai, UAE. 
CSI enjoys an excellent working relationship with Dubai Customs. 
Dubai uses a NUCTEC X-Ray scanning system produced by China. 
Members of the CSI team claimed this system was better than other 
models they have used.  One major feature enhancement was 
software that allows the operator to shift and alter the color 
spectrums with greater variety than other versions of similar 
equipment and this made it easier for the operator to conduct 
better and quicker analysis of cargo.  The Chinese trained the X- 
Ray equipment operators and CSI team members evaluated this 
training as excellent.  CSI maintains local trend analysis and 
profiling data. 
 
¶9.   On October 17, EXBS Advisor visited the Dubai Creek Dhow 
Harbor located in Dubai, UAE.  Salient points and observations of 
this visit were as follows: 
 
¶A.   Dhow traffic is pervasive, involves a great variety of 
consumer goods and does not appear to be regulated or controlled 
by any governmental agency.  Access to the wharf is completely 
open. 
 
¶B.   Controls on persons and cargo appear non-existent. 
 
¶10.  On October 18, EXBS Advisor toured the Dubai Hub, Federal 
Express International Inc. (FEDEX), Dubai, UAE and met with the 
following officials of FEDEX: Tayssir Hassan Awada, Managing 
Director-Operations & Customer Service, Middle East, Indian 
Subcontinent, Africa, Central Asia & Turkey; Vivek Ashoka, 
Manager-Hub & Ramp Operations, Dubai Hub; Ahmed M. Abu Hamraa, 
Airport Coordinator & Government Liaison Representative Hub & 
Ramp Operations, Dubai Hub; Peter DeBenedictis, Manager, Dubai 
Operations and Ray Cole, Manager-International Security, Europe, 
Middle East & Africa.  Salient points of subsequent conversation 
and observations were as follows: 
 
¶A.   Dubai Customs has authority on all goods entering Dubai. 
Dubai Police have authority over all goods transiting the hub. 
Dubai Police scan goods to identify flight safety hazards. 
During these scans, police do not have in their possession 
customs paperwork on parcels and packages and therefore cannot 
screen packages to determine if stated content matches actual 
content image.  Police are not trained to recognize `dual-use' 
items and would not likely discern a problem of this nature so 
long as the parcel contents did not overtly appear to be a threat 
to the safety of FEDEX aircraft. 
 
¶B.   FEDEX does not "service, support or facilitate" trade with 
Iran or any parties or entities identified as having connections 
to Iran. 
 
¶11.  On October 18, EXBS Advisor visited Port Khalid, the Sharjah 
Airport International Free Zone (SAIF-Zone) located in Sharjah, 
UAE and met with Saqer R.H. Al Qassemi, Deputy Director General, 
SAIF-Zone.  Salient points of subsequent conversation and 
observations were as follows: 
 
¶A.   Customs has jurisdiction over movements of goods in and out 
of SAIF-Zone.  All goods entering the zone are logged with 
Customs.  If they are transferred to another company in the zone, 
the transaction is recorded and maintained by SAIF-ZONE and 
Customs.  All goods moving in and out of the zone are checked 
against this general transaction ledger. 
 
¶B.   Some ministerial oversight of select business activities and 
products does occur within the zone, i.e., Ministry of Health 
regulates some pharmaceuticals. 
 
¶C.   SAIF-Zone's port is the largest bulk cargo hub in the region 
and the airport is the largest for movement of air cargo.  Status 
of the airport is due in large measure to the fact Lufthansa's 
largest cargo hub outside of Frankfurt is located in Sharjah. 
 
¶D.   SAIF-Zone grants a trade license to all "investors" resident 
in the zone and monitors compliance with SAIF-Zone regulations 
and laws of Sharjah and the UAE.  Any infraction of the laws is 
referred to Sharjah Police and or the Ministry of Interior.  In 
the last five years, two or three companies have closed due to 
criminal activity or infraction. 
 
¶E.   Main sectors in the zone are bulk textiles for end-use 
consumers and aviation supply and maintenance. 
 
¶F.   SAIF-Zone issues three types of business licenses: 
Industrial, Trading and Service.  The Sharjah government has 
asked SAIF-Zone to suspend licenses when conditions warranted 
such action.  SAIF-Zone has also suspended licenses unilaterally 
when investors failed to pay fees or to abide by regulations by- 
laws of the zone. 
 
¶G.   SAIF-Zone has 2,000 companies and annual growth of 30-35%. 
India has more companies in the zone than any other country. 
 
¶H.   In contrast to laborers employed outside of free zones, 
laborers in the SAIF-Zone are sponsored by the zone, not the 
company for which they work.  Ministry of Interior runs a 
"security check" on each potential employee before hire. 
 
¶I.   Saudi Arabia is the largest regional trade partner for 
Sharjah. 
 
¶12.  On October 19, EXBS Advisor visited the plant facilities of 
Gulf Pharmaceutical Industries (GPI) located in Ras Al Khaimah, 
UAE and met with Said Ibrahim, PhD, Manufacturing Director, GPI 
and Syed Imtiaz Haider, PhD, Quality Affairs Director, GPI. 
Salient points of subsequent conversation were as follows: 
 
¶A.   GPI has four plants in UAE and one in Germany.  In December 
2004, USFDA certified GPI manufacturing processes.  GPI ships 95% 
of its product outside the UAE, most of which goes to GCC 
neighbors and North Africa.  Plant employees are from 18 
different countries.  The majority of these employees are 
citizens of Pakistan, India or Syria. 
 
¶B.   When GPI ships product, it obtains four documents fro the 
Chamber of Commerce of Ras Al Khaimah: Certificate of Analysis, 
Certificate of Origin, Airway bill and Invoice.  Typical routing 
and means of product shipment include marine or land conveyance 
to Jordan, by air to GCC neighbors and marine conveyance to 
Yemen. 
 
¶C.   Psychotropic drugs require additional controls and UAE 
clearance when shipped.  The Ministry of Health audits these 
transactions monthly. 
 
¶D.   GPI does import some chemical precursors for their 
manufacturing.  These chemicals originate from Europe.  The 
Ministry of Interior audits these transactions and visits the 
plant monthly.  Ministry representative provide updates to 
controlled items lists. 
 
¶E.   The Ministry of Health certifies plant operations by 
conducting unannounced site inspections.  GPI complies with `best 
practices' and pharmaceutical standards established by the 
European pharmaceutical industry.  GPI also complies with World 
Health Organizations communiqus. 
 
¶F.    GPI is associated with The International Center for Genetic 
Engineering & Biotechnology located in Trieste, Italy.  This 
relationship began in the context of GPI's production of 
synthetic hormones to stimulate formulation of human red blood 
cells.  GPI imported equipment for this production line from 
Amersham Phamicia (General Electric HealthCare) located in 
Austria and Taylor Warton located in the United States.  (NOTE: 
GPI claimed older equipment such as dryers, etc., were stored on 
the premises and accounted for in annual audits or sold to 
government-approved end users.  Some specialized equipment such 
as incubators was subject to non-movement and no re-sale 
agreements.) 
 
¶13.  During the period October 20-23, EXBS Advisor waited for 
authorization from UAE officials to visit land border crossings 
between the UAE and Saudi Arabia.  UAE officials did not grant 
permission for this visit despite repeated requests from the U.S. 
Embassy. 
 
¶14.  On October 22, EXBS Advisor in company with a Senior U.S. 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement Representative toured the Dubai 
Creek-Dhow Harbor located in Dubai, UAE.  Salient points of 
subsequent conversation and observations were as follows: 
 
¶A.   Dhow traffic is supposed to stop at the entrance to the 
   creek harbor to declare and clear goods with customs.  This does 
   not appear to occur.  Even if Dhows did stop to declare goods, 
   the design of the vessel does not allow inspection of cargo at 
   point of entry.  No customs officials appeared engaged on the 
   wharf in verifying cargo against manifests. 
 
¶B.   The variety of cargo and product containers, i.e., boxes, 
   crates, 50-gallon drums, plastic bottles and barrels, etc. 
   provide many different ways to smuggle dual-use items in or out 
   of the port.  Post notes however that in the last three years no 
   known diversion of US origin goods (of which there have been 
   many) has occurred via dhow, due in no small part to the lack of 
   export controls and the excellent transportation available to a 
   variety of countries of concern. 
 
¶C.   Dhow traffic routinely shuttles between Dubai and Iran as 
   well as other ports in India and through the greater Gulf region. 
 
ADVISOR NOTE:  Diversion of WMD components and production 
capabilities via Dubai has occurred with some frequency. 
Authorities have focused greater attention on the ports of Jebel 
Ali and Rashid and the international airport; however, little 
attention appears to have been given to the Dhow harbor and its 
connections to Iran.  The Dhow harbor will be extremely 
attractive as an operational venue for individuals trained in 
classic incursion, infiltration or diversion operations, 
particularly if an export control system were established in the 
UAE to scrutinize cargo traveling on more traditional modes of 
transportation.  The setting and environment facilitates passage 
of materiel and illegals both ways. 
 
 
III. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING UAE. 
 
For additional information concerning UAE and the current state 
of its export controls and related border security system, see 
ABU DHABI 3346. 
 
 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXBS VISIT 2006. 
 
Following meetings, tours and extensive discussions with Emirati 
and U.S officials, Advisor recommends the following actions 
during Advisor's first visit to UAE in 2006: 
 
¶1.   Visit and observe land border crossings between UAE and 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
¶2.   Visit bunkering port facility of Fujairah. 
 
¶3.   Meet representatives of the Coast Guards of Abu Dhabi, 
Dubai, Sharjah and Fujairah. 
 
¶4.   Visit `traditional' smuggling ports along the UAE coast. 
 
¶5.   Visit the ports and northern coast of the Musandam 
Peninsula.  (NOTE:  Advisor can do this during either the visit 
to Oman or UAE.) 
 
¶V. Any questions or comments can be directed to Joseph C. Irvine, 
EXBS Advisor to Jordan & the Middle East, Telephone:(962 6) 590- 
6550/6558, Fax: (962 6) 592-7653, Email: IrvineJC@state.gov.