This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SANTO DOMINGO 005004 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR WHA, WHA/CAR, WHA/EPSC, INR/IAA; USSOUTHCOM ALSO 
FOR POLAD; TREASURY FOR OASIA-MAUREEN WAFER; DEPT PASS USDA 
FOR FAS; USDOC FOR 4322/ITA/MAC/WH/CARIBBEAN BASIN 
DIVISION; USDOC FOR 3134/ITA/USFCS/RD/WH; DHS FOR 
CIS-CARLOS ITURREGUI 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: DR ECON ETRD TBIO
SUBJECT: DOMINICAN INDUSTRIAL DISASTER WAITING TO HAPPEN 
 
REF: 05 SANTO DOMINGO 4805 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  The intentional gas release by the 
National Refinery (REFIDOMSA) on October 24 revealed how 
poorly the Dominican petrochemical industry regulates itself. 
 It also revealed how ill prepared the city of Santo Domingo 
and the Dominican government are in preparing for or 
responding to industrial accidents, natural disasters or 
terrorism.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) On the afternoon of Sunday, October 24, the Refineria 
Dominicana de Petroleo station number 5 began to release 
mercaptan gas from a storage tank over the Caribbean Sea. The 
intent was to empty the storage tank for cleaning.  After a 
large amount of gas had been released into the atmosphere, 
the wind changed direction and the gas drifted back over the 
city of Haina (west of Santo Domingo) and the southern 
districts of Santo Domingo, causing widespread illness and 
emergency room visits. 
 
¶3. (U) LP Gas in its natural state is odorless and colorless. 
Mercaptan is the chemical component added to the LP Gas to 
produce the characteristic smell. Mercaptan is considered an 
environmental irritant and is hazardous only in large 
quantities, causing asphyxiation by displacing oxygen. In 
lesser quantities it causes respiratory irritation. 
 
¶4. (U) Unofficial reports from local medical contacts 
estimate the number of victims seeking urgent medical care to 
have been approximately 7,000. Five families from the 
official American community visited local emergency rooms 
with multiple family members complaining of nausea, vomiting, 
and numbness in their arms and legs. Several American 
children from the Embassy community became ill after being 
dropped off at Carol Morgan School. Carol Morgan and several 
other schools in the area later closed after the noxious 
fumes related to the gas release had sickened many children. 
Three local fatalities are being blamed on the gas release. 
Physicians said the gas had exacerbated previously existing 
medical conditions. As a result of the gas release, the 
"Gringo" neighborhood in Haina was in a state of chaos. The 
medical center closest to the refinery did not have 
electricity to treat patients and several medical staff 
became ill from fumes rising from patients, clothing. Clinic 
director Catalina Bido stayed on duty although she was 
nauseous and vomited twice and was suffering from fatigue and 
headaches, symptoms consistent with gas intoxication. 
 
¶5. (SBU) An inspector within REFIDOMSA station number 5, who 
asked not to be named, commented that these events were far 
from unexpected. The inspector says that the plant is rife 
with safety violations. Toxic gases are routinely emitted 
into the atmosphere or drained into the sea. Safety equipment 
is routinely not used and inspection violations or complaints 
are quickly swept under the rug. 
 
¶6. (U) The local fire department headquarters related in an 
internal memo that the mercaptan gas was released so that the 
plant could clean their storage facility but that an 
unexpected wind change toward the city caused temporary 
contamination of the city. 
 
¶7. (U) Immediately after the incident, Refidomsa President 
Aristides Fernandez Zucco and Industry and Commerce Minister 
Francisco Javier Castillo offered contradictory versions of 
the origins of the leak.  Fernandez Zucco changed his story 
the next day and President Fernandez dismissed him that 
evening (reftel).  A committee from the National Emergency 
Commission is investigating whether there was malpractice or 
a lack of compliance with procedures for the management of 
cases like this. 
 
¶8.  (U) A greater question remains. Why was there such a poor 
local and federal response to the disaster? 
 
¶9. (SBU) While the Dominican Republic has a "911" system, 
citizens place very low confidence in the authorities' 
ability to respond. When disasters occur, citizens express 
their distress over the local radio waves and in the printed 
press. One caller related, "I didn't know whether I should 
open my doors and windows or close them. Was my neighborhood 
in danger? Should I flee? No information from anyone!" 
 
¶10. (SBU) Citizens' skepticism concerning the emergency 
medical system may be valid. After the October 24 gas release 
city and national officials offered no comment for a full 24 
hours, and then they spoke to emphasize that their agencies 
were not at fault. At no point did anyone provide the medical 
community or local citizens with information on the gas 
release or what they could do to keep themselves or their 
community safe. Had the gas been a more toxic substance, 
thousands would have been killed. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Disaster preparedness reform is needed in the 
Dominican Republic. Currently the city and federal emergency 
response organization do not work well together. Each 
organization zealously guards its own territory. 
 
¶12. (U) Law 147 of 2002, created a national system for 
prevention, mitigation and response to deal with natural and 
man-made disasters. This law designated 22 government 
institutions to form part of the National Emergency 
Commission (CNE). Several non-governmental organizations also 
belong, including telecoms and electricity distribution 
companies and the Red Cross. A tripartite council including 
the head of Civil Defense, a representative of the Army and 
Santo Domingo Fire Chief heads the commission.  The Head of 
the Civil Defense is the Executive Director of CNE. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Institutional issues hindered response to the 
mercaptan gas release, although many consider the industrial 
establishments in Haina to be the equivalent of a ticking 
time bomb.  Recent changes in city districting have left 
Haina outside the jurisdiction of the Santo Domingo Fire 
Department.  And the Fernandez administration has shifted the 
policy, planning and preventive aspects of the Disaster Law 
back to the Technical Secretariat of the Presidency. This 
leaves CNE and COE outside of the planning loop, providing 
immediate emergency response only. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Traditionally, local police and fire departments 
are the frontline guardians of public health and safety. 
These institutions suffer from poor coordination, lack of 
funding for training, and the lack of authority to inspect, 
enforce, or investigate issues of public safety.  On the day 
of the gas release, the office of military intelligence sent 
investigators to REFIDOMSA to bring the refinery technical 
manager back to military offices for questioning.  The police 
and fire are not fully integrated in the greater 
command-and-control system, and their expertise goes largely 
ignored. 
 
¶15. (SBU) The government needs to re-assess their ability to 
prepare and respond to disasters.  The national 911 system 
needs to be effectively managed so as to gain the confidence 
of the public.  While radio and TV reporters reported what 
they could learn during the event to report what they knew, 
the government had no plan to integrate the press into their 
disaster response system. 
¶16. (U) The U.S. Office of Overseas Preparedness (OFDA) has 
provided significant training  to Dominican authorities 
through USAID for disaster preparedness in the past. 
Unfortunately, when the admininistration changed in August 
2004, the trained technicians were replaced with political 
appointees with little knowledge of the work. 
 
¶17. (U) Finally, the GODR needs to re-examine their disaster 
plan, practice it, and correct problems before worse 
disasters occur. 
 
¶18. (U) Drafted by Medical Officer Ty Flewelling. 
HERTELL