This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 001576 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR BNEULING 
OES/IHA FOR DR. DANIEL SINGER, REBECCA DALEY 
INR/GI RAYMOND LESTER 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR C. COURVELLE, D. TEITELBAUM 
USDOC FOR ROBERT TELCHIN 
TREASURY FOR J. RALYEA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO SENV ECON EAGR EAID PREL ZI
SUBJECT: ZIMBABWE'S AVIAN FLU RESPONSE CAPABILITY 
 
REF: SECSTATE 206992 
 
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Summary/Introduction 
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¶1. (U) The GOZ has begun planning for a potential avian 
influenza outbreak, but lacks the scientific expertise or 
financial wherewithal to detect outbreaks and implement 
response measures effectively.  Burdened by a high HIV 
infection rate, growing incidence of tuberculosis, high 
emigration rates among health care professionals, and a lack 
of funds, Zimbabwe's once robust health care system is 
strained but still relatively capable compared with other 
developing African countries.  While our overarching 
bilateral relations are strained, the relationship between 
the GOZ and officials of the Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC) and USAID remains relatively constructive.  Keyed to 
the sequence of headings/questions in reftel, information 
below is based principally on the knowledge and experience of 
Mission personnel from CDC and USAID who work with the 
Ministry of Health (MOH).  End Summary/Introduction. 
 
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Preparedness/Communication 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) We understand from MOH sources that the GOZ does have 
a draft avian influenza preparedness plan.  The plan is 
reportedly based on WHO's Phase III Global Influenza 
Preparedness Plan.  It has not as yet been made public and is 
currently only available to individuals directly involved in 
the planning process. 
 
¶3. (U) Based on its public information campaigns associated 
with HIV/AIDS and a recent outbreak of dysentery, the GOZ 
would likely report on avian influenza outbreaks in animals 
and humans truthfully.  The GOZ would also likely emphasize 
education to promote outbreak-mitigating behavior.  Weekly 
independent newspapers and radio broadcasts from outside 
Zimbabwe (e.g., Voice of America) offer channels of 
communication outside immediate GOZ control for donors and 
NGOs. 
 
¶4. (U) Senior MOH officials chair planning meetings, with Dr. 
Midzi of the MOH Infectious Diseases Unit (tel: 
 263-4-729-032) as the key point of contact.  The GOZ 
generally does attach importance to public health concerns. 
However, it is increasingly absorbed with the country's 
economic meltdown, political crises, and chronic HIV/AIDS 
epidemic to the detriment of other issues. 
 
¶5. (U) As part of its planning exercise, the GOZ is reviewing 
its laws to ensure that they are consistent with 
international health regulations and do not pose barriers to 
avian influenza detection, reporting, containment, or 
response.  We are unaware of any existing regulations that 
would likely pose undue barriers.  There were no problems in 
implementing appropriate protection during the worldwide SARS 
epidemic. 
 
¶6. (U) The MOH is working with WHO, CDC, USAID, UNAIDS, and 
other international organizations in its avian influenza 
preparedness plan.  The GOZ is very sensitive about appearing 
to need international assistance but has generally been open 
to health-related assistance.  It would likely be interested 
in USG assistance to facilitate animal and human 
surveillance, early detection of avian influenza, laboratory 
expertise, and access to drugs.  The GOZ does not have a 
stockpile of vaccines and is not developing a vaccine for the 
H5N1 virus.  We are unaware of a liability shield for foreign 
makers/donors of vaccines.  The prospect for one's enactment 
may be clearer after the GOZ completes the review of its 
laws. 
 
¶7. (U) The GOZ is implementing a plan to educate key 
constituencies through existing professional associations and 
organizations.  The state media has reported on the issue 
generally but not as a specific threat to Zimbabwe. 
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Surveillance and Detection 
--------------------------- 
¶8. (U) There is no laboratory in Zimbabwe that is capable of 
detecting and isolating strains of influenza.  It is unknown 
how long it might take to diagnose given the lack of 
laboratory expertise and the fact that the closest laboratory 
with such expertise appears to be in Italy.  Zimbabwe cannot 
subtype influenza viruses and does not currently send samples 
out for verification. 
 
¶9. (U) The GOZ's inability to conduct adequate human and 
animal surveillance activities to detect signs of infection 
early is the most immediate critical gap in Zimbabwe's 
prospective avian influenza response.  The GOZ could most 
benefit from funding and technical assistance for such 
surveillance. 
 
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Response and Containment 
------------------------- 
 
¶10. (U) Zimbabwe does not have a stockpile of medications to 
handle an avian influenza outbreak. 
 
¶11. (U) Zimbabwe does not have a stockpile of pre-positioned 
personal protective gear in the event of an avian influenza 
outbreak. 
 
¶12.  (U) In the event of an avian influenza outbreak, the GOZ 
would use its already existing anthrax outbreak rapid 
response mechanism.  Given the current fuel crisis, such a 
response would likely be slow in remote rural areas. 
Capacity for animal control has been hampered by the decline 
of the agricultural sector and especially by the destruction 
of fencing.  Nonetheless, the GOZ is developing guidelines 
for the culling and vaccination of birds, disinfection of 
facilities, and limitations of animal movement. 
 
¶13. (U) In its draft planning document, the GOZ has 
reportedly identified quarantines, including closing schools 
and banning public gatherings, as possible measures for 
controlling the spread of avian influenza.  The GOZ has 
successfully shut down schools and banned public gatherings 
in other contexts.  The military could be involved in 
enforcing such quarantines. 
SCHULTZ